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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1. Statement of purpose.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate
Heisenberg* s principle of uncertainty to see if implications
for philosophy, and more particularly for the philosophy of
religion, may be derived from it. To make the search still
more definite and to limit the field of endeavor, three prob-
lems in the field of philosophy of religion are chosen as fol-
lows: The problem of human freedom of choice, the problem of
chance, and the problem of G-od as finite or as infinite. The
attempt will be to show whether the principle first given form
by Werner Heisenberg twenty years ago has any bearing on these
problems, and if so, what bearing. This principle has become
known sometimes as the "principle of uncertainty," and some-
times as the "principle of indeterminacy . " In this disserta-
tion these two terms will be used interchangeably.
Dr. Heisenberg is, of course, a physicist. As we
shall see, there are those who question whether a physicist
can say anything of importance to philosophers of religion.
What conceivable bearing can our knowledge of the activities
of the electron have on our faith in God? A swift glance at
history can answer that question.
Prior to 1492 it was utterly impossible for most men
to think of the world as anything other than flat. It takes
very little imagination on our part to comprehend how great

their difficulty in trying to conceive of the world as
round. A mother in our day feels the difficulty when she
tries to explain to a child how it is that people on the
other side of the world do not "drop off." Yet, difficult
as the viewpoint was, it is now universally accepted. But
it could not be said to have been accepted until the impli-
cations were clear and acceptable, not only in astronomy and
physics, but in metaphysics also. It was this point that
Giordano Bruno made clear to the generations after him if
not to his own. For Bruno saw clearly that a universe of
solar systems did have implications for the doctrine of God
and for metaphysics generally which were not unacceptable.
It was a good while after Copernicus that philosophy generally
felt the force of his discoveries, but philosophy cannot re-
sist indefinitely the influence of new truth.
Something very similar happened in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Sir Isaac Newton discovered that physical laws, former-
ly thought to apply to this planet only, might be interpreted
to apply to the entire universe and when so applied explained
many things formerly mysterious. It did not immediately ap-
pear that metaphysics and philosophy were in for any revision
on this account, but the keen eye of Immanuel Kant saw that
David Hume, philosopher, and Isaac Newton, physicist, had
irreconcilable ideas of the universe. Thus it came about
that Kant began a task of constructing a philosophy for the
eighteenth century with which the physics of Newton might
be reconciled.

It is important to note that both of the scientific
activities mentioned above were instrumental in introducing
new periods of philosophic thought. That of Copernicus and
Galileo brought on the period of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz, often referred to as the Natural Science period
of the Renaissance. The activity of Newton, on the other
hand, brought on the period of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, known
as the Idealistic period.
In our generation the most creative and original
thought to come from the field of natural science- -at least
from the field of physics— springs from the field of quantum
mechanics. Perhaps the most colorful figure in that whole
field is Dr. .verner Heisenberg, the winner of the Nobel
prize in 1932, for his work in theoretical physics. It was
he, as has been said, who formulated the principle of uncer-
tainty. A. close study of his life and work should reveal
whether modern quantum mechanics in general, or more partic-
ularly, whether the principle of uncertainty, is bringing
or will bring about any changes in contemporary philosophy
comparable to the revolutionary transformations brought about
by Copernicus in his day and by Newton in his. For this pur-
pose the three problems in philosophy were selected. It Just
happens that all three are problems in philosophy of religion.
The reason for their selection is, however, simply that these
three—namely, human freedom, chance, and God—bid fair to
be most affected by the philosophical adoption of Heisenberg's
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principle of uncertainty. Most time and space will be al-
loted to the first of these problems—human freedom—as the
most crucial problem affected by the Heisenberg principle.
2. Previous work done in this field.
Work in this field naturally falls into three classes:
books, periodical articles, and dissertations. It is very
difficult indeed to decide which to include in such a survey
as this and which to exclude. Certainly there is an abun-
dance of material to select from. But much of it deals so
predominantly with physics rather than with philosophy as
to be of small value to this study. Conversely much of it
also deals so predominantly with philosophy and has so lit-
tle to say about physics as to be of little value to us for
the opposite reason. Out of many books, five are here se-
lected for special mention:
F. A. Lindemann, The Physical Significance of the Quantum
Theory .
Carl Wallace Miller, A Scientist* s Approach to Religion .
F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles .
Hans Reichenbach, Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Me -
chanics
.
Max Planck, The Philosophy of Physics .
All of these books deal with the problems found in the hy-
phenated field of physics-philosophy. All of them have sec-
tions or chapters dealing with the problems raised in this
study. Their points of view will be introduced as we deal
with the questions as they arise.
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Because the subject is a recent one in human history,
periodical articles are especially important. After study-
ing more than fifty articles, the author lists herewith nine
for special mention:
P. W. Bridgman, "The New Vision of Science."
R. B. Lindsay, "Some Aspects of Recent Atomic Theory."
H. T. Flint, "The Uncertainty Principle in Modern Physics."
E. Schrodinger, "Indeterminism and Free ./ill."
Ladenburg and Wigner, "The Progress of Science."
William Seifriz, "Creative Imagination and Indeterminism."
Erwin Biser, "Discrete Real Space."
R. F. Alfred Hoernle, "Review of Three Interpretations of the
Universe
.
and Sod and Creation , by John Elof Boodin.
"
Blanchard W. Means, "Freedom, Indeterminacy, and Value."
As in the case of the boohs, so in the case of the period-
ical articles, no attempt should be made to review them at
this point in the discussion. Rather, the solid arguments
advanced will be introduced as the discussion continues.
Turning to the doctor* s dissertations published in
the United States, we find that since 1927, when Heisen-
berg* s principle of indeterminacy appeared in print, only
nine dissertations have been written bearing on freedom of
choice, and all but one of these discussed the question
with little or no reference to Heisenberg's principle or
to quantum mechanics. There are two doctor's dissertations,
however, worthy of mention for our present purposes:
Robert Edward Whallon, Metaphysical Theories of the Freedom
of the Will
. (Harvard University . )

6C. Hillis Kaiser, Physical Causality in the Light of Recent
Developments in Physical Theory
.
(Harvard University.)
In the first of these, Mr. Whallon gives a careful
account of the history of the struggle of indetermini sts
versus determini sts and his material will he referred to
here and there. But he makes no mention of Heisenberg and
finds no relation between his problem and recent developments
in physics. This seems a little strange as his dissertation
was written in 1945. The second one of Mr. Kaiser wrestles
with the precise problem which is the theme of this disserta-
tion. The "recent developments in physical theory" he refers
to include the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg. Mr. Kaiser
deals at great length with the Heisenberg principle and its im-
plications for philosophy. Here are a few of the conclusions
that he reaches: "The uncertainty relations are obviously
merely an expression of our ignorance of how to correlate
’particles’ and their attendant waves. "-
It is obvious that Heisenberg is ant to overlook
the fact that, although the form /italics his/ of
the uncertainty relations is the same in both in-
stances, the uncertainty expressed in the general
equation. . .is an "intrinsic" uncertainty of the
position and momentum of the particle within the
wave packet, while the uncertainty deduced from
the act of measurement is an uncertainty imposed
on /Italics his again/ the particle by the action
of the measuring apparatus.
2
The experimental uncertainty relation is a conven-
ient expression for the disturbing effects of the
light used in measurements, but this "uncertainty"
1. Kaiser, FORD, 149.
2. Kaiser, PCRD, 151-52.
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must be considered as operative only at the time
of measurement .1
All of these conclusions are different from the con-
clusions that have been reached in this dissertation. In
the first quotation above Mr. Kaiser implies the expecta-
tion that in time we shall know how to correlate particles
and their attendant waves and that when that time comes, our
uncertainty will be changed to certainty. In the second and
third quotations, Mr. Kaiser adheres to the view that there
is reason to suppose that unobserved particles behave with
perfect certainty and that it is only observed ones that act
with uncertainty. He suspects, therefore, that the uncertain-
ty which Mr. Heisenberg thinks is intrinsic is actually im-
posed by the measuring apparatus. But Mr. Heisenberg himself
discusses all these questions, as do many other people, and
the validity of these conclusions of Mr. Kaiser will be exam-
ined.
There remains to be listed the work of Dr. Werner
Heisenberg himself, which is to be our primary source ma-
terial:
"Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentbeoretischen
Kinematik und Mechanik."
Zeltschrift fur Phvsik
. 1927.
Die ohvsikalischen Frinzinien der Quantentv eorie . 1930.
Wandlungen in den Irundla.^en der Katurwi ssenscbaft . 1935.
“Frinzipielle Fragen der modernen Physik."
Neuere Fortschritte in den exakten Wissensch after. . 1936.
1. Kaiser, PCRD, 168

Die Einheit des naturwissenschaftlichen Weltblldes
.
1942.
Kosmische Strahlung; Vortraae 3-ehalten im Max Planck
Institut
.
194-3^
3. Definition of terms.
Lest there he ambiguity, the terms to be used most
frequently in this writing must now be defined.
1. Determinism. Determinism here refers to any doc-
trine whatever which makes the events of successive moments
definable, and hence predictable, exclusively and without
exception as "results" of the events of preceding moments.
To state it otherwise, it means that all events are absolutely
dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. This point
of view is usually distinguished by the implicit assumption
that complete prediction of all future events is contingent
only upon complete knowledge of the present and the past.
2. Indeterminism, indeterminacy, or uncertainty.
These three terms, used interchangeably, do not refer to the
exact opposite of determinism, as might be supposed. For
they do not render prediction entirely impossible. Rather
they refer to a technical doctrine of Werner Heisenberg,
which will be defined at length in Chapter Three. The words,
indeterminism, indeterminacy, and uncertainty, are all ap-
propriate because determinism must be denied if Dr. Heisen-
berg' s doctrine is to be accepted.
3. Freedom, or free will. The term, freedom, like
the words, free will, always refers to human freedom of choice
in the present writing. This in turn implies moral responsi-

bility for that choice. This freedom is to be thought of as
genuine and not illusory, and the alternatives rejected in
the free choice must be real possibilities, only one of which
becomes by virtue of that free human choice an actuality,
while one or more other possibilities remain unrealized.
This free will may or may not be thought of as related in
a uniform way to the agent* s character, except that if it
is, the character must not be viewed as fixed and unchange-
able, or even as entirely predictable. Thus, in any case,
new unforeseen elements may emerge in human choices. Free-
dom, then, is characterized by self-determination, indepen-
dent of external constraint and antecedent conditions in
the strict sense of the word, condition.
4. Cause, causation, and causality. When any of
these terms are used without qualifying adjectives they will
mean a supposed relationship between two or more events in
which the event or events preceding are thought to predeter-
mine the event or events succeeding. A determini st defini-
tion of causation is here chosen in preference to a non-
determini st definition because by this means the necessity
of facing the problem of causation in dealing with the prob-
lem of freedom is thereby acknowledged • Furthermore, this is
the definition of causation with which both Hume and Kant
wre stled.
5. Chance. Chance means the absence of necessary
connection between preceding events and succeeding events

so that succeeding events are not entirely predictable.
Even after events have occurred they may not be explained
entirely on the basis of their relationship to events occur-
ring before them. Prediction of events under a doctrine of
chance is possible only in accordance with laws of probabil-
ity, which in turn reveal mathematically measurable percen-
tages of error or utter unpredictability.
6. God, infinite and finite. By God we mean a per-
sonal consciousness operating within the universe and in some
sense controlling it and perhaps working out his purpose in
it. The term, infinite God, means a belief that finds God
to be devoid of essential limitation on his powers. The be-
liever who accepts the idea of an infinite God assures him-
self that anything at all that God really wants to do, he
can do. The attempt here is to rule out extreme notions of
an infinite God in which, for example, it is sometimes thought
that since God cannot make the illogical logical, he is there-
fore finite. The true believer in a finite God, on the other
hand, is one who accepts the position that there are some
genuine limitations on the power of God, and that further-
more these limitations are not self-imposed but rather are
to him inescapable. Not only so, but one other item must
be added: They are limitations from which he would escape
if he could, provided that by avoiding them he would not be
incurring still greater difficulties on some other score.
A doctrine of the finite God, therefore, views God as facing

11
a dilemma. This is the essential nature of the view.
It is to be noted, however, that God may be infinite
at many points and in many capacities, but if he is finite
in any one, then he is finite. He must be infinite at all
points to be infinite at all.

CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN FREEDOM
A review of the history of the problem of human free-
dom is necessary in order to determine the ground on which
the view has rested all down through history and even more
important, to determine the grounds for any doubts men have
entertained as to the reality of free choice. For it cannot
be asserted that Heisenberg* s principle of uncertainty has
any bearing on the problem of freedom until we can be certain
of the issues involved in that problem.
1. Selections from the history of the doctrine of freedom
of choice.
i . Early G-reek thought
.
Human freedom was the subject of much discussion in
ancient thought. In fact, it is probably true that philos-
ophy was bom in the attempt to understand how freedom could
be and what importance it hs.d. The antagonist of freedom in
primitive minds was not determinism, as we understand it to-
day, but fate. Fate conceived of events as largely, although
not entirely, controlled by laws that were utterly impersonal
and indifferent to human welfare. The essence of the Greek
tragic drama was the thesis that no amount of virtue or wisdom
could save a good man from the operation of fate, usually
misfortune. Since the gods themselves were often victims,
fate is seen to be thought of as some impersonal force out
beyond the gods and more powerful than they.
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Among pre-Socratic poets, one of the most important
was Homer, who lived about the tenth century, B.C. He was
not a philosopher, and his world view is not stated. But
he reveals the background of Greek thought. For Homer, cer-
tain winged creatures, called "Keres, " brought disease and
old age and death. These same winged creatures were later
referred to as the fates. At times Homer seems to think of
good and evil as the result of conflicting wills of polythe-
istic gods and he seems to imply that some human freedom re-
sults from this conflict. But on the other hand Homer seems
not to be able to get away from a system of ethics, or some
principles of right, or perhaps something in nature, a
"moira, behind the gods to which the gods themselves must
conform. Thus Zeus is powerless to avert the death of his
own son, Sarpedon. In Homer is to be found also the idea of
the Jealousy of the gods. No man dare boast, lest the gods
be Jealous and destroy him. Thus Menelaus will not allow
his palace to be compared to that of Zeus in the Odyssey.
Much of man f s grief is accounted for in this way in early
Greek thought.
Theognis, in the late sixth century, B.C., rises to
protest the injustice of evil men prospering and good men
suffering. Especially is he keen to point out the injustice
of the suffering of innocent children of evil men. This
gives him much in common with Job and Ezekiel. Unlike the
1. Greene, MOI.

Old Testament writers, however, Theognis blames man' s sor-
row on ambition and over-eagerness that encounters the jeal-
ousy of the gods. This makes him utterly pessimistic and
he exclaims, "Better never to have been bom'.
In Findar (c.522 - c.443 B.C.) fatalism shows its
first refinement. According to W. C. Greene, Pindar got
"well along the road to henothei sm,
"
2 the worship of Tyche.
Henotheism means the worship of one god although many are
recognized. While even for Pindar unhappiness in man is to
be explained as the conflict between what we want, or free-
dom, and what the gods require, or fate, yet these need not
necessarily be in conflict. Oftentimes the demands of fate
were helps to the realization of true happiness. "Fortune
(Tyche) is for Pindar not the fickle goddess of later times
who takes delight in the rolling of the wheel, but the kindly
power who may crown the efforts of man. "3 Happiness, then,
for Pindar, is not a matter of luck or blind fate, but the
adjusting of one's will to the will of the gods, being care-
ful not to incite their envy. He does not hesitate to say
that a part of man' s misery is his own fault and hence
avoidable
.
Bacchylides (c.470 B.C.) fails to rise above Pindar.
If anything he is a little more fatalistic. Bacchylides
often speaks of evils in human life as sent by the gods or
TT Greene, MOI
,
42. 3. Greene, MOI, 72.
2. Greene, MOI, 70.

fate. "Neither prosperity, nor stubborn war, nor all-destroy
ing strife, cometh to us of our choice," yet "God prospereth
him that doeth a thing well." 1 Eacchylides represents the
solidest kind of ethical orthodoxy of ancient Greece, for he
firmly believed that the only sure road to happiness was sub-
jective, "the power to keep a heart ungrieving to life's end.
There are several places, and this is one, where one can per-
ceive the faint odor of oriental incense burning on the theo-
logical altars of ancient Greece.
With Herodotus (c.484 - c.425 B.C.) the doctrine of
jealous gods came to its clearest and most unattractive form.
"Retribution from God overtook Croesus, because he regarded
himself as the happiest of men, "3 and for no other reason.
It is easy to see why Socrates decided that the old paganism
was morally bankrupt. "Never have I heard.," says Herodotus,
"of any man who prospered in all things who did not come at
last to an utterly evil end."^ "Seeest thou how God with his
lightning smites always the larger animals, and will not suf-
fer them to wax insolent, while the smaller ones do not chafe
him? "5 "God suffers no one to have high thoughts but him-
self. In Herodotus there is a real concern to warn the
young against frivolous arrogance in the presence of deity,
but God is thus so completely dispossessed of all his moral
1
. Greene, MOI, 8l. 4. Greene, MOI
,
85
2. Greene
,
MOI
,
83. 5. Greene, MOI, 86
3. Greene
,
MOI 85. 6. Greene, KOI 87

grandeur, that there is little ground for any respect for
him.
Several of the ancients make reference to a man named
Diodorus (4th century, E.G.). This is not the better known
Diodorus Siculus, who lived in the first century, B.C., but
Diodorus Cronos, known as the " K
i
£ 6 co is00
t
u 0r the mas-
tered one. Cicero says of him, "Diodorus asserts that noth-
ing is possible, except what either is true or is going to be
true." 1 This is apparently an original and radical statement
of determinism. It may be paraphrased as, "Only the actual
is possible," as Windelband puts it.
2
It is supposed that
Aristotle* s reference is to Diodorus when he later says,
But there are some who say—for instance of the
Megaric School—that where there is energy,
there is potentiality, or capacity, but where
there is no energy, there is no potentiality .5
Here in the thinking of Diodorus is a philosophical formula-
tion of fate that makes it unqualified, complete, and ruth-
less.
In Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle there is less of
poetry, myth, and tradition and more creative thought and
real grappling with vexacious problems. This is especially
evident in the field of moral philosophy. Socrates (469 -
399 E.C.) rejected vigorously any crude notions of causation
and asserted freedom in a fairly modern form. Socrates says:
1. Cicero, De ?ato . IX.
2. Windelband, HOP, 89.
3. Aristotle, Met
. .
VIII, III, 1046b, 29.

IT.
It may be said, indeed, that without bones and
muscles and other parts of the body I cannot exe-
cute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do
because of them, and this is the way in which
mind acts, and not from the choice of the best,
is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.
1
It may be observed at once that Tocrates will have no deal-
ings with mechanism in his system of ethics. It is clear
that the reason for this is that he will allow nothin • to
interfere with moral responsibility for individual acts com-
mitted. His ethics demands this. All the demands of God,
for Socrates, are ethical demands* "I shall obey God rather
than you," 2 he cries defiantly at the Athenians. Most impor-
tant of all is Socrates’ redefinition of evil. Evil had al-
ways meant pain, sorrow, disappointment, etc. But not for
Socrates. For him there was a moral evil in so-called evil
or it was not real evil at all. "No evil can happen to a
good man, in life or after death. "5 This was truly revolu-
tionary. It is easy to see that at this early stage of hu-
man thought, at least, insistence on human freedom was the
true beginning of moral philosophy and of a real comprehen-
sion of moral principles.
Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) eagerly elaborated his master's
principles. "Pleasure is not the first of possessions,” he
A
says. The difference between a good man and a bad one was
not in their fates, but in themselves. "An evil soul must
1. Plato, Phaedo, 99b.
2. Plato, Apology
. 29c
3. Plato, Apology . 4lc
.
4. Plato, Phil . . 66a.
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necessarily be an evil ruler, and a good soul a good ruler.
Plato is not asserting here what we today would know as free-
dom, but rather a form of inner determinism. Eut at least he
is clearly repudiating the doctrine that the conduct of a
man is controlled by fates external to the nature of the in-
dividual person. For Plato freedom, as he understands it,
is the basis not only of ethics but of art as well.
I am sure...that he who does not know how the
beautiful and the just are likewise good will
not be worth much as a guardian of them; and I
suspect that no one will have a true knowledge
of them without this knowledge.
2
It was Aristotle (384 - 322 E.C.), however, who devel-
oped most clearly a modern doctrine of freedom. Here are some
of his statements: "Appetite is in every form of it relative
to an end. "5 "That which moves therefore is a single facul-
ty and the faculty of appetite . "The Good of Man comes to
be 'a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,' or, if
Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most
perfect Excellence . "5
Wow since the End is the object of Wish, and the
means to the End of Deliberation and Moral Choice,
the actions regarding these matters must be in
the way of Moral Choice, i. e. voluntary; but the
acts of working out the virtues are such actions,
and therefore Virtue is in our power. And so too
is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to
do, it is also in our power to forbear doing, and
vice versa
. . . .Then the being good or vicious char-
acters is in our power. As for the well-known
saying, "No man voluntarily is wicked or involun-
tarily happy," it is partly true, partly false;
1. Plato, Hep., 353d.
2. Plato, Hep., 506b.
3. Aristotle, De Anima
.
Ill, 10, 433a, 16.
4. Aristotle, De Anima . Ill
10, 433a, 22.
5. Aristotle, Sth . . I, VII,
1098a.
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for no man is happy against his will, of course,
but wickedness is voluntary.-1-
But perhaps a man is of such a character that he
cannot attend to such things; still men are them-
selves the causes of having become such charac-
ters. by living carelessly, and also of being un-
just or destitute of self-control, the former by
doing evil actions, the latter by spending their
time in drinking and such-like. 2
Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that
the man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does not
wi sh to attain the habits of these vices: for if
a man wittingly does those things whereby he must
become unjust he is to all intents and purposes
unjust voluntarily; but he cannot with a wish
cease to be unjust and become Just. For, to take
the analogous case, the sick man cannot with a
wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he
is voluntarily ill because he has produced his
sickness by living intemperately and by disregard-
ing his physicians. There was a time then when
he might have helped being ill, but now that he
has let himself go, he cannot any longer; Just
as he who has let a stone go out of his hand can-
not recall it, and yet it rested with him to aim
and throw it, because the origination was in his
power. Just so the unjust man, and he who has
lost all self-control, might originally have
helped being what they are, and so they are vol-
untarily what they are; but now that they are be-
come so they no longer have the power of being
otherwise .3
But there are some who say—for instance of the
Megaric School—that where there is energy, there
only is potentiality, or capacity, but where there
is no energy, there is no potentiality; for exam-
ple, that the person who does not actually build
has not the capacity of building, but that he has
the capacity of building when he actually builds,
and that it is in like manner, also, with other
things. Now, the absurdities which ensue with
^these speculators it is not difficult to discover.
1. Aristotle, Eth., Ill,
V, 1113b.
2. Aristotle, Eth., Ill,
V, 1114a.
3. Aristotle, Eth., Ill,
V, 1114a.
4. Aristotle, Met., VIII,
III, 1046b, 29.

.Aristotle goes on to show that the logical result of such
reasoning is impossible. "These assentations overturn both
the existence of motion and of generation. n ^
It is clear that Aristotle not only repudiates the
fatalism of the early G-reeks, but that he advances to the
point where he repudiates any notion of inner determinism as
well, and asserts that any supposed determination of conduct
by character is itself the result of previous free choice.
This doctrine is indeed a doctrine of true freedom.
Epicurus (341 - 270 B.C.) further developed the philos-
ophy of free-will and attacked with vigor all previous thinkers
whom he regarded as fatalistic. He said:
It were better to follow the myths about the gods
than to become a slave to the destiny of the nat-
ural philosophers; for the former suggests a hope
of placating the gods by worship, whereas the lat-
ter involves a necessity that knows no placation.^
Epicurus was twenty-one years old when Aristotle died and his
words were directed not at Aristotle, nor at Plato, nor at
Socrates, for they were not natural philosophers. But prob-
ably they were directed at the Ionian Physicists—Thales,
Anaximander, and Anaximenes --who lived some three hundred
years before him and sought in the realm of material things
the answers to all questions. It would come as a surprise
to Epicurus to know that in our day he is thought of as one
of the founders of mechanism, since he was so critical of
the fatalists of that day. Yet Epicurus did believe in
IT Aristotle. Yet.. VIII, III, 1046b, 29.
2. Bailey, Epicurus
.
Epicurus to Menoeceus, 134, 1-4.

.atoms and in a rain of atoms that descended upon the earth.
He attempted to preserve freedom by the doctrine that atoms
"swerved" here and there as they came down, freely and in
uncaused action. Here is a fascinating foretaste of Heisen-
berg. But the loyalty of Epicurus to human freedom is clear:
"That which is in our control is subject to no master." 1
"The prudent man laughs at (destiny), whom some have intro-
duced as the mistress of all things." 2 It must be noted
that Epicurus was pro- scientific and anti-religious and that
he repudiated teleology and determinism with equal vigor. He
embraced chance as the only escape from iron-clad causation.
Windelband has this to say of Epicurus:
Epicurus. . .found the Stoic determinism so irre-
concilable with the wise man' s self-determination
which formed the essential feature of his ethical
ideal, that he would rather still assume the il-
lusory ideas of religion than believe in such a
slavery of the soul. Therefore he, too, denied
the universal validity of the causal law and sub-
sumed freedom together with chance under the con-
ception of uncaused occurrence . . . .The freedom of
indeterminism means, accordingly, a choice be-
tween different possibilities that is determined
by no causes, and Epicurus thought thereby to
rescue moral responsibility .5
Zeno (336 - 264 B.C.) was the founder of the Stoics
and a contemporary and rival of Epicurus. In this matter,
as in many others, they did not agree. Epicurus, as has just
been noted, cast away both teleology and determinism and em-
braced both freedom and chance. Zeno made an opposite choice.
1. Bailey, Epi curus
.
2.
Epicurus to ilenoeceus, 133,
9-10. Cf., Greene, MOI
,
336.
3 .
Bailey, Epicurus
.
Epicurus to Kenoeceus,
133, 5-6.
Windelband, HOF, 194.
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He embraced both teleology and determinism and cast away both
freedom and chance. Zeno taught that nothing happened without
a cause. More consistent than others he went so far as to
teach that knowing the future does no good because you cannot
even be on your guard unless it is foreordained that you shall
be on your guard, and in that case you would be anyhow, even
without knowing the future. But the world was not an evil
place. Rather purpose was everywhere in operation in a world
serving the welfare of man; thus the world was a sort of "adap-
tation for man."-1- Carneades, another Stoic, sought to modify
this determinism somewhat; but Chrysippus, still another
Stoic, compared man's fate to a dog tied to a moving wagon,
wherein the dog may choose to run along with the wagon or not,
but if he does not run, he will be dragged. 2
Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.), Virgil (70 - 19 B.C.), and
Plutarch (46 - 120 A.D.) all struggled with the problems and
supported Zeno against Epicurus or vice versa . But no pro-
gress was made until the appearance of Christian thought and
it is a question whether the coming of Christian thought was
the occasion of real progress in the philosophy of freedom
for many centuries.
ii. Early Christian and medieval thought.
Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.200 A.D.) argued that true
fate exists only in nature, and does not apply to mind, and
1. Windelband, HOP, 182. 2. von Arnim, S7T . 975.
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furthermore that even in nature fate does not control by ne-
cessity. Rather fate amounts to little mere than natural
tendencies, as we would say, and that these are subject to
the control of human will. There is no certain evidence of
any connection between Alexander of Aphrodisias and Christian
thought. Yet his viewpoint suggests the possibility of Chris-
tian influence. 1
Plotinus (c.205 - 270) shows the effect of Plato. He
recognized cause and effect in nature, but held to freedom in
human personality as well as in God and creation. He said
the universe was too orderly to be accounted for by "swerves"
in the rain of atoms. He believed in a good providence--
otbers were strangely reluctant to say this—and he accepted
a disciplinary explanation of evil. "Of course, such util-
ities are not the cause of the existence of evils; we only
mean that, since evils exist, the divinity made use of them
to accomplish His own purposes." 2 With all this fine insight
it still seems doubtful if Plotinus had any direct contact
with Christian thought.
The earliest writers in this field, known to be Chris-
tian, seemed to have struggled against notions of fate. For
example, Diodorus, Bishop of Tarsus (n.d.), was the author
of a work, entitled, Against Fate , and Saint John Chrysostom
(34-5 - 4-07) wrote something that he called On Fate and Provi -
dence . Not until we come to Saint Augustine, however, are
TT Greene, MOI
,
374-. 2. Plotinus, Enneads . Ill, 2,5.
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the lines of influence very clearly traceable once more.
Saint Augustine (354 - 430) wrote after the fall of
Rome. He taught that fit rewards and punishments can be ex-
pected only in the next world. He asserts freedom and re-
jects fate, chance, and even God' s foreknowledge. All sin
is, of course, accounted for by the fact of freedom. Yet in
spite of this, Augustine developed an opposite line of thought
which may be called the doctrine of election and predestina-
tion. This is the doctrine which John Calvin later carried
to such lengths. But Augustine developed this point of view,
not because he felt called upon to recognize the cause-and-
effect relationship in nature, but rather for quite a differ-
ent reason: He could not see how man could act righteously
except by a special act of grace on G-od* s part. The idea
that man, apart from G-od, could be good in his own power was
abhorrent to Augustine. Man could be evil apart from God,
but not good. If Augustine' s predestination can be called
determinism, then it rests on quite a different basis from
any that preceded him or any determinism that is current in
modern times. Determinism of a scientific sort disappeared
about this time and did not reappear until the time of Spin-
oza in the seventeenth century. What determinism there was,
was a theological variety and not of a scientific sort,
throughout the middle ages. It was freedom that survived.
For it was freedom that had destroyed ancient paganism. It
was freedom that Socrates had been required to establish in
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order to make moral life and progress possible. And it was
freedom emerging from G-reek thought that established a point
of agreement with Christian thought and was largely respon-
sible for the union of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian
theology, especially in Augustine. For in Augustine, "Aris-
totle won a great battle."^ The battle that Aristotle won
was a battle for a visible embodiment of invisible ideas-
-
in this case the church—but the fact still remains that in
Augustine the New Testament and the philosophy of Aristotle
took their nuptial vows for many, many centuries of married
bliss, and that union would not have been possible without
the emphasis on moral responsibility in the first and the
emphasis on freedom in the second.
Eoethius (c.480 - 524) was as staunch a believer in
free will as Augustine, but he also accepted the foreknowledge
of God. He could see no solution of the problem of good and
evil in this world and like Augustine looked to the next world
as the place where retribution and rewards would even things
up. His chief sorrow was that there is evil at all, and since
there is that it pass unpunished. 2 He maintained that the
more man is concerned with contemplation of God, the more free
he is, and the more concerned man is with his body, the less
free he is. This is, of course, a distinctly Christian--or
at least religious
—
point of view.
1. Windelband, HOP, 269. 2. Greene, KOI, 391.
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There is no reasonable being... who has not free-
dom of will.... With regard to man, his immaterial
spirit is also free; but it is most at liberty,
when employed in the contemplation of the divine
mind; it becomes less so, when it enters into
a body.^-
Beginning with John Scotus Erigena (c.850) the con-
troversy over realism versus nominalism developed. Erigena
pointed out the implications of Platonic universals for Chris-
tian theology and taught that all things are as real as they
are universal and no more. G-od is the great universal and
he is most real. 2 Following this same line of thought An-
selm (1033 - 1109) argued that given particulars there must
be a universal, or in other words given imperfection and in-
completeness there must be perfection and completeness or God.
But in opposition to this Koscellinus (c. 1050 - c. 1122) con-
tended on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy that universals
cannot be substances but are names only. 3 This controversy,
so prominent in the middle ages, has bearing on the problem
of human freedom in a strange manner. It comes in connection
with the solution of the problem which Abelard (1079 - 1142)
and William of Champeaux (c. 1070 - 1121) proposed and which
Thomas Aquinas (1227 - 1274) accepted. They suggested that
universals be considered neither substances on the one hand
nor mere names on the other, but rather as concepts in the
mind, concepts in the mind of God prior to their appearance
1. Boethius, Cons
. . V, 2,5-6. 3. Windelband, HOF, 296.
2. Cf. Windelband, HOP, 289-291.
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in the external world, or ante rem . and concepts in the mind
of man following their entrance into the experience of man,
or post rem . 1 This happy solution and middle-of-the-road
doctrine did two things for the doctrine of freedom. First,
it called to the forefront of attention once more the mind,
both the mind of God and the mind of man, as essentially
real and ultimate. Second, it resulted in an "indifferentist
"
theory of the nature of universals. 2 The viewpoint now was
that it is equally erroneous to ignore universal characteris-
tics of things and particular characteristics of things.
Every apple, every dog, every stone, has some characteristics
in common with all others of its kind, and yet it has also
some characteristics peculiar to itself—and even if it did
not, the universal characteristics of this particular object
would still be its own. Thus it was contended that the mind
of God is "indifferent" as between universals and particulars
for he honors them both. This strange doctrine of "indiffer-
ence" Descartes later used as the basis of his doctrine of
freedom.
Thomas Aquinas (1227 - 1274) and Duns Scotus (c.1265 -
1308) became involved in an argument as to whether the mind
and nature of God were primary and accounted for the will of
God, as Aquinas contended, or whether the will of God was
primary and explained the mind and the nature of God, as
1. Windelband, HOP, 299. 2. Fuller, HOF, (A) 378.
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Scotus contended. The emphasis on will in Scotus tended to
favor the doctrine of freedom more than the emphasis on rea-
son in Aquinas. However, both men believed in freedom, al-
though it may perhaps be said that Scotus believed in it a
little more emphatically than Aquinas.
Indeterminism, as Scotus and as Occam /d.c. 13497
teach it, sees therefore in the will the funda-
mental power of the soul, and maintains converse-
ly, that as a matter of fact, the will on its
side determines the development of the intellec-
tual activities.
Jacob Arminius (1560 - 1609) was a Dutch Protestant
theologian who took sharp issue with the Calvinist doctrine
of predestination. Arminius maintained that man is morally
responsible only for that which he has freely chosen. To
deny freedom to him is equivalent to denying any real mean-
ing to heaven or hell, to sin or virtue. John Wesley (1703-
1791) adopted the theology of Arminius and was the first
prominent Protestant reformer to do so. So did Hugo G-rotius
(1583 - 1645), the Dutch law giver who was imprisoned in
1619 for his agreement with Arminius and his denial of pre-
destination. When he was released he wrote a book in which
he showed that a whole host of writers, ancient Greek, Jew-
ish, and Christian, have favored freedom. 2
John Milton (1608 - 1674) throughout his entire poem,
Paradise Lost , struggles with the problem of freedom. He
asserts the freedom of God, and believes also in a limited
lT Winds lband, HOP, 330-331. 2. Grotius, PSDF
.
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freedom of man; but he feels that God' s grace must be added
to man' s feeble will before that will can secure an effec-
tive freedom. 1
iii. Descartes.
Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650) used as his starting
point a principle he got from Augustine, the certainty of
the self. Augustine had said, ’’Even if I doubt, I am. 1 ’ 2
Descartes’ famous Cogito. ergo sum , in a parallel line of
thought, exalts at the outset consciousness to a point of
great importance. As we would expect, he struggles to
maintain human freedom. He does so, as indicated above, by
reference to the doctrine of “indifferentism. ” Following
the Scot i st he says that the will is indifferent. He means
by this that the will of God is indifferent in the sense
that whatever God wills thereby becomes right and desirable.
So his will is free for this reason. In the case of man,
his will may or may not be indifferent. When he sees the
good clearly his will is not indifferent, but it is still
free because the good Is exactly what he wants when he rec-
ognizes it as good. This is the highest kind of freedom.
But when man* s ideas of good and evil are confused and un-
clear, as they usually are, then his will becomes indifferent
and he has a freedom of another and lower sort. The most
difficult problem of freedom in the Cartesian system is that
lT Milton. F.L.
.
eso. VIII, 403-32.
2. Augustine, De Beata Vita. . 7; Solil . . 1; De Ver. Rel ..
72. Cf. Windelband, HOP, 277.
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of interaction. How can mind have any effect on body and
physical nature at all? This problem remains unsolved in
Descartes although he attempts to meet it with his idea of
the function of the pineal gland,
iv. Leibniz.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716) was in many
respects a modern thinker. He struggled valiantly with the
problem of freedom. He felt keenly all the previous forces
demanding freedom on the one hand and determinism on the
other. Actually there seemed to be four such demands. Two
of these forces called for human freedom. First, the appar-
ent experience of freedom in which a man is conscious of
genuine choice, and second, the impossibility of moral stan-
dards, the mockery of sin and virtue, and the absurdity of
heaven and hell hereafter, unless man is morally responsible
for his acts. But there were also two forces making demands
on the other side. First, the conviction that God, the author
of right, or at least responsive to it, would naturally cre-
ate men who would be bound to do the right if they knew it.
This would constitute inner determinism. Second, the observ-
able law of cause and effect in nature could quite likely
apply in man, and in the mind of man, as well as anywhere
else. This situation constituted the dilemma of the free-
dom-determinism struggle. More than any previous thinker
Leibniz wished to do full justice to both the natural sciences
and the moral requirements of religion. He began by rejecting
*
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the so-called "freedom of indifference" as being only a
freedom that springs from ignorance. 1 True freedom he iden-
tified with the inner determinism mentioned above, in which
a man feels bound to do something simply because it is right.
G-od or the perfect sage would always choose the
best that is known, and if one thing was no bet-
ter than another, they would choose neither. In
other intelligent subjects, passions often take
the place of reason; and it can always be said
in regard to the will in general that the choice
follows the greatest inclination , under which I
understand passions as well as reasons, true or
apparent
.
2
Leibniz had the law of cause and effect in nature to
face, and he saw no way around it. Rather it seemed more con
sistent to him to argue that even as there is a law of physi-
cal cause and effect in physical nature, 30 there is a corres
ponding non-physical law of cause and effect in the non-physi
cal world. These two worlds interact not through the pineal
gland, as Descartes thought, but through a harmony of action
pre-established by G-od. In both worlds the events are per-
fectly predictable to a mind knowing all preceding events,
so Leibniz ends up with a deterministic system. This is the
more regrettable since Leibniz was a pan-psychist and pan-
psychism scarcely fits well into a deterministic framework.
Our reasonings are founded on two great principles .
that of contradiction . . . .and that of sufficient
reason , in virtue of which we hold that no fact
can be real or existent, no statement true, unless
there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not
otherwise, although most often these reasons can-
not be known to us. 5
Fuller, HOP, (B)118. 3. Leibniz, The Monadology . 31-32
2. Leibniz, Letter to K. Coste . 260-261.
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v . Kant
.
In between Leibniz and Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804)
there are two other very important men that help us to under-
stand Kant. They are John Locke (1632 - 1704) and David
Hume (1711 - 1776). John Locke faced the same problems that
Leibniz did but came out with a belief in freedom. He says:
That which immediately determines the will, from
time to time, to every voluntary action, is the
uneasiness of desire, fixed on absent good: either
negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive,
as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasi-
ness that determines the will to the successive
voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of
our lives is made up, and by which we are conduct-
ed to different courses to different ends, I shall
endeavor to show, both from experience and the rea-
son of the thing. 1
David Hume stressed the fact that we can know only what we ex-
perience and pointed out that we never actually experience
causation, and hence that determinism rests on no positive
foundation at all. But he also pointed out that we never ex-
perience a self either, so the freedom of the self rests on a
foundation just as vague and uncertain as determinism. Into
this uncertain situation Immanuel Kant enters with the high
purpose of bringing order and comprehension. Kant' s first
and perhaps his greatest book, Kritik der reinen Vernunft .
wrestles with this problem. He makes a technical distinc-
tion between forms of intuition and categories of understand-
ing, which, for our present purposes, we may ignore. He
asserts that causation is not different from number or from
1. Locke, Essay
.
II, 21, 33.
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reality or unreality or from existence or non-existence or
from any other category of the understanding. Nor in this
respect is it different from time and space. For we can
never say with strict truthfulness that we experience any
of these. They do not come from experience at all. They
come from "der reinen Vernunft." They are a uriori . But
on the other hand, if we assume that all these a priori
elements are ultimate truth, then we are in trouble again.
For the "antinomies of reason" will torment us. For example,
his third antinomy reads as follows:
Thesis: Causality according to the laws of na-
ture is not the only causality -operating to origi-
nate phenomena of the world. A causality of free-
dom is also necessary to account fully for those
phenomena
.
1
Antithesis: There is no such thing as freedom,
but everything in the world happens solely accord-
ing to the laws of nature. 2
Of these antinomies, Kant, says, "The proofs of the fourfold
antinomy are not mere sophistries—are not fallacious, but
grounded on the nature of reason, and valid—under the sup-
position that phenomena are things in themselves . "3 This
is another way of saying that phenomena are not things in
themselves, and the world, as it truly is, is not the world
of phenomena as we see it through our forms of time and
space and through our categories. By one stroke, then, Kant
attempts to establish causality and all other categories and
a priori forms as valid for thought and observation but as
T~. Kant, KrV. B472. (Tr. Keiklejohn) 3. Kant, KrV, E535.
2. Kant, KrV, B473. (Tr. Meiklejohn) (Tr. Meiklejohn)
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invalid as far as giving us a true picture of ultimate real-
ity is concerned. In other words causality is necessary if
man is to think at all, for thought presupposes the opera-
tion of this category, hut profound reflection should make
man aware that causality is not a characteristic of man'
s
external world, but a characteristic of his own mental frame-
work with which he looks at the world. Kant' s purpose in
writing this book he makes clear in his foreword:
Durch diese kann nun allein dem Materialismus
,
Fatalismus, Atheismus, dem freigeisterischen Un-
glauben, der Sqhwarmerei und Aberglauben, die
allegemein schadlich werden konnen, zuletzt auch
dem Idealisnius und Skeptizismus
.
die mehr den
Schuleii gefahrlich sind und scbwerlich ins Pub-
likum ubergehen konnen, selbst die Wurzel abge-
schnitten werden. 1
Toward the close of this book, Kant explains that he has not
attempted to prove freedom of the will., but only that he has
made it clear that "freedom of the will, the hope of future
life, and the existence of God" can never be disproved. 2 In
his Kritik der nraktischen Vernunft Kant sets about to estab-
lish his belief in freedom, God, and immortality, not with
apodictic certainty, to be sure, but with moral principles.
Further, he undertakes to show that just such moral princi-
ples are primary for practical, or moral, reason, rather than
so-called proof. When he gets through it is very clear that
Kant believes in freedom however his followers may insist that
1. Kant, KrV, Vorrede, Bxxxiv.
2. Kant, KrV, B781. (Tr. Meiklejohn)
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causality is a necessary framework for observation of the
world. In general it may be said that God, freedom, and
immortality were all better respected after Kant in philos-
ophy generally than they were before . Here are some words
from Kegel (1770 - 1831)
,
for example, on the point:
Der moralische Standpunkt ist der Standpunkt des
Wallens, insofern er nicht blosz an slch . sondern
fur sich unendlich ist. Diese Reflexion des Wil-
lens in sich und seine fur sich seiende I dent itat
gegen das Ansichsein und die Unmittelbarkeit und
die darin sich entwickelnden Bestimmtheiten bes-
timmt die Person zum Subjekte.l
All of the post-Kantian idealists believed in freedom of the
will.
vi. Eergson.
Henri Eergson (1859 - 194-1) was as vigorously opposed
to mechanism as any previous philosopher. The essential
thesis of the Bergsonian system is that time is real and
that conversely all true reality is time—but not naked time.
Rather it is process, evolution, the events in time, but these
events are somehow inseparable from the framework of time it-
self. For they are not a succession of events, but every
real event is itself a succession. The fundamental fallacy
for Eergson, then, was the acceptance of any notion that would
rob time of its meaning. Mechanistic determinism does this.
For mechanism finds nothing at all present in any moment of
time that was not also present in some potential but very real
1. Hegel, GFR, 95
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sense in all previous moments of time. Under a philosophy
of mechanism all duration becomes comparable to a motion
picture that one has seen before, or to a piece of machinery
that operates in precisely the same manner over and over a-
gain. For Bergson this philosophy is a complete denial of
the facts of human experience, especially of the facts of the
science of biology. But Bergson does not stop here. He goes
on to repudiate what he calls "finalism" as well as mechanics.
By finalism, he means any theory that makes the final out-
come of events predictable or certain to any mind anywhere,
even to the mind of God. For this too would make time mean-
ingless. It would allow much variety in process, perhaps,
but allow no variety in the final conclusion. And for Eerg-
son, if duration is real, then real novelty is constantly
appearing. And if real novelty is constantly appearing, then
the final development is itself in the making. Bergson does
not deny that some things about the outcome may be known, but
"radical finalism" he finds abhorrent. He says,
Radical mechanism implies a metaphysic in which
the totality of the real is postulated complete
in eternity, and in which the apparent duration
of things expresses merely the infirmity of a
mind that cannot know everything at once. But
duration is something very different from this
for our consciousness, that is to say, for that
which is most indisputable in our experience.
We perceive duration as a stream against which
we cannot go. It is the foundation of our be-
ing, and, as we feel, the very substance of the
world in which we live. It is of no use to
hold up before our eyes the dazzling prospect
of a universal mathematic; we cannot sacrifice
experience to the requirements of a system.
That is why we reject radical mechanism. But
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radical finalism is auite as unacceptable, and
for the same reason.
^
Bergson puts some qualifications on his belief in free will,
to be sure. He regards intuition as superior to intellect.
He does not trust man' s judgment of right and wrong when it
is reasoned out. Eut at the moment that matter may rest.
It is enough for now to observe that Bergson rejects mechan-
ism with all the vehemence at his command,
vii. William James.
Like Bergson, William James (1842 - 1910) had a chief
tenet in his philosophy that did not deal directly with free-
dom, but which had a mighty influence on the freedom situa-
tion. James' main contention was that parts are more impor-
tant than wholes, if, indeed, wholes can be found at all.
It is the absolute monist, Kegel, for example, that James
regards as his adversary. He paraphrases the philosophy of
Hegel as follows: "Any partial view whatever of the world
tears the part out of its relations, leaves out some truth
concerning it, is untrue to it, falsifies it. Nothing less
than the whole of everything can be the truth of anything at
all." 2 But for James, "There is no whole in the physical
world. He suspects, furthermore, that there is no whole
in the non-physical world either. When he speculates as to
the relation of individual consciousnesses to each other and
to the entire universe, he sees no reason why one has to choose
1. Bergson, CE, 45 .
(Tr. Mitchell)
2. James, APU, 90.
3. James, APU, 196
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between believing that all minds may "be members of a world-
experience defined expressly as having all its parts co-con-
scious or known together" on the one hand, and yet be quite
distinct and separate from each other on the other hand. To
deny this, he thinks, is equivalent to saying that "horsemen
cannot walk." 1 He calls this "vicious intellectual! sm.
"
2
Toward the end of one of James most famous books, A Plural -
istic Universe , he sums up his outlook as follows:
Is the manyness in oneness that indubitably charac-
terizes the world we inhabit, a property only of
the absolute whole of things, so that you must pos-
tulate that one—enormous—whole indivisibly as the
prius of their being any many at all- -in other words,
start with the rationalistic block-universe, entire,
unmitigated and complete?—Or can the finite elements
have their own aboriginal forms of manyness in one-
ness, and where they have no immediate oneness still
be continued into one another by intermediary terms
--each one of these terms being one with its next
neighbors, and yet the total "oneness" never get-
ting absolutely complete?
3
James' defense of pluralism as far as human persons are con-
cerned amounts to this, that men may be inter-related without
losing their independence. The same is true of the relation
between G-od and men. And again the same is true between men
and the physical universe. Dependence in some sense does not
necessarily exclude independence in some other sense. To say
that man is physically determined in some sense is not to say
that he is altogether determined physically. To say that man
responds to some instincts without the superimposition of
1. James, APU, 221.
2. James, APU, 60.
3. James, APU, 327.

conscious will, or that man acts as his environment requires
on occasion, is not necessarily equivalent to saying that
all of a man 1 s life consists of such response and reaction,
nor even that at any moment in his life can it necessarily
be entirely explained in such a manner. James fought val-
iantly and successfully to defeat the all-or-nothing attitude
in philosophy. Interpreted in terms of freedom, this means
that there may be a certain amount of cause-and-effect rela-
tion, even in the consciousness of man, but that this
does not necessarily mean determinism. Rather it means what
will later be referred to in this writing as loose jointed
connect ionalism, or practical or approximate causation, as
distinguished from absolute or mechanical causation,
viii. Whitehead.
In the philosophic system of Alfred North Whitehead
(1861 - 19^7) there are five terms which bear on the problem
of freedom. They are creativity, organism, will, determinism,
and abruptness. Creativity is the fundamental categorjr for
Whitehead. All that is is creative. What the "elan vital"
is for Bergson, what the "nisus" is for Samuel Alexander,
creativity is for A. N. Whitehead. His whole universe is one
that is constantly creating and renewing itself. He says,
The other side of the evolutionary machinery, the
neglected side, is expressed by the word, creative-
ness. The organisms can create their own environ-
ment •
1. Whitehead, SI£W, I63
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Whitehead asserts not only the creative capacity of human be-
ings, but of all living things, in fact, of all objects what-
soever including sticks and stones, potentially at least. The
concept of organism, according to Whitehead, is impossible to
harmonize with the notion of mechanism.
A scientific realism, based on mechanism, is con-
joined with an unwavering belief in the world of
men and of higher animals as being composed of self-
determining organisms. This is radical inconsis-
tency
.
^
For Whitehead all actual entities are creative by nature, but
the more highly organized the society of actual entities into
any one organism, the more completely free and creative such
a society is. A human being, as the most elaborate organism
we know, is by so much the most creative and free that we
know. The total pattern of an organism has a power of con-
trol over its own parts and may modify them, as 'Whitehead
sees it.
The prompt self-preservative actions of living
bodies, and our experience of physical actions
of our bodies following the determinations of
will, suggest the modifications of molecules in
the body as a result of the total pattern. 2
Here is a recognition of the will and the clearest possible
assertion as to its free power to act. Whitehead rejects the
determinism of John Stuart Mill in these words:
Mill* s doctrine is generally accepted, especially
among scientists, as though in some way it allowed
you to accept the extreme doctrine of materialistic
mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable con-
1. 'Whitehead, SKW, 110. 2. Whitehead, SMW, 215

sequences. It does nothing of the sort. Either
the bodily molecules blindly run, or they do not.
If they do blindly run, the mental states are ir-
relevant in discussing the bodily actions.
^
Whitehead also rejects "vitalism" as "an unsatisfactory com-
promise." 2 His system is a combination of freedom and par-
tial determinism, as with all philosophers who believe in free-
dom. The fifth concept in Whitehead having to do with freedom
is oddly worded. He calls it "abruptness."
By "abruptness" I mean that what is remembered, or
anticipated, or Imagined, or thought, is exhausted
by the finite complex concept. In each case there
is one finite eternal object prehended within the
occasion as the vertex of a finite hierarchy. This
breaking off from an actual illimitability is what
in any occasion marks off that which is termed men-
tal from that which belongs to the physical event
to which the mental functioning is referred. 3
Whitehead uses the term "abrupt" to characterize mental acts
distinguishing them from physical acts. He simply means
that mental acts may suddenly occur as causeless phenomena.
On his theory of creativity, this may be said of physical
acts also, but the difference in the degree of originality
makes the mental acts abrupt in comparison. Like Leibniz,
Whitehead was a pan-psychist
,
but quite unlike Leibniz,
Whitehead extended to all things a degree of freedom and
creativity. In order to bridge the gulf between mind and
matter, Leibniz felt bound to extend to mind some of the
characteristics of matter, including determinism. But White-
head bridged the same gulf by extending to matter the
1. 'Whitehead, SMW, 114
2. Whitehead, SMW, 115
3. Whitehead, SMW, 246-47.

42
.
characteristics of mind, including freedom.
2. Prominent exponents of determinism.
Thus far in our survey of the history of the problem
of human freedom, much more consideration has been given to
the advocates of freedom than to its opponents. The reason
for this now appears. The outstanding exponents of deter-
minism were being withheld until now when a somewhat more ex-
tended examination of their thought might be undertaken,
i. Spinoza.
Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677), or Benedict de Spinoza,
as he was sometimes called, was a Jewish philosopher of Hol-
land. He had read Descartes and shared his desire to see the
philosophy of Aristotle brought into harmony with the science
of Francis Bacon. But Spinoza, by virtue of early Jewish
training, and some later training as well, became acquainted
with Aristotle as interpreted by Philo and i.aimonides, and he
thereby acquired a concept of Aristotle that was free from
the stylized version accepted generally in the church, fol-
lowing the- teaching of Augustine, Aquinas, and others. Spin-
oza had a passion for unity and consistency. Nothing was to
be left a loose end and unexplained. A system of thought to
be true, as he conceived it, must explain everything. The
result was that his description of the universe made it ap-
pear a "rationalistic block-universe
,
entire, unmitigated
and complete, as James would say. In such a universe
lT James, APU, 327.
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nothing was left to chance. "In rerum natura nullum datur
contingens; sed omnia ex necessitate divinae naturae deter-
minata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum."
1
Human
freedom left loose ends just as chance did, so that had to
go too.
Nempe falluntur homines, quod se liberos esse
putant; quae opinio in hoc solo consistit, quod
suarum actionum sint conscii, et ignari causarum,
a quibus determinantur . Haec ergo est eorum lib-
ertatis idea* quod suarum actionum nullam cognos-
cant causam. ’
2
Spinoza, far more consistent than most thinkers, makes specif
ic application of this principle to mind and its operations.
In Mente nulla est abseluta sive libera volun-
tas; sed Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determi-
natur, a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata
est, et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in inf ini turn.
He gives a clear statement of how it is that man imagines him
self to be free.
Thus an infant believes that of its own free will
it desires milk, an angry child believes that it
freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes
that it freely desires to run away; further, a
drunken man believes that he utters from the free
decision of his mind words which, when he is sober,
he would willingly have withheld; thus, too, a
1. Spinoza, 2th . . I, 29. "Nothing in the universe is contin
gent, but all things are conditional to exist and operate
in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine na-
ture." (Tr. Elwes . )
2. Spinoza, Eth
. .
II, 35, scholium. "Men are mistaken in
thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of
consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of
freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any
cause for their actions." (Tr. Elwes.
T
3. Spinoza, Eth .
.
II, 48. "In the mind there is no absolute
or free will, but the mind is determined to wish this or
that by a cause, which has also been determined by an-
other cause, and this last by another, and so on to in-
finity." (Tr. Elwes.)
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delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and
others of like complexion, believe that they
speak from the free decision of their mind, when
they are in reality unable to restrain their im-
pulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less
clearly than reason, that men believe themselves
to be free, simply because they are conscious of
their actions, and unconscious of the causes
whereby those actions are determined. 1
Not all necessity is alike, however. Aristotle had listed
two kinds of necessity: necessity by its own cause, and ne-
cessity by its own nature. In modern terminology these are
referred to as internal and external necessity. This dis-
tinction appears in Spinoza when he says that the man who is
led solely by emotion or '‘opinion" is a slave, and contrari-
wise the man who is led by reason is "free." But it is clear
from the foregoing that by "free" he means merely a different
sort of determinism. Let us see what Spinoza has to say.
"Ad omnes actiones, ad quas ex affectu, qui passio est, deter-
minamur, possumus absque eo a Ratlone determinari .
"
2 Spinoza
does not mean to imply that the individual person can decide
for himself whether reason or emotion shall guide him in any
given situation. All he means to say is that sometimes it is
the determination of the one and sometimes the determination
of the other, and in any given situation it could conceivably
be either depending on the circumstances preceding. The only
freedom Spinoza recognizes is the freedom that comes from the
1. Spinoza, Eth
. .
Ill, 2, note. (Tr. Elwes)
2. Spinoza, Eth
. .
IV, 59. "To all the actions, whereto we
are determined by emotion wherein the mine? is passive, we
can be determined without emotion by reason." (Tr. Elwes)

leadership of reason. "Homo liber, hoc est qui ex solo
Rationis dictamine vivit,..." 1 "Ilium liberum esse dixi,
qui sola ducitur Ratione."2 What is very clear in Spinoza
is that the guidance of reason moves from previous cause to
subsequent effect in such a way as to make the future entire-
ly predictable in terms of the past. This is to say that
reason in Spinoza is determined. It is utterly unlike the
operation of mind in Whitehead where such operation is spo-
ken of as "abrupt." What Spinoza is saying, then, is this:
Man is free when he is led by the determination of reason.
In such a statement, what does Spinoza mean by "free?" He
means more nearly what we would call right, or virtuous.
This can be discovered by asking Spinoza, what would happen
if a man freely wished to do something unreasonable, but
wished it under the guidance of reason and not of passion.
Spinoza would reply, of course, that this is quite impos-
sible, that it is in fact a contradiction in terms. Nothing
can be under the guidance of reason and yet be unreasonable,
both at the same time. Spinoza would be required to reply
in this manner or his whole point would collapse. Yet in
this reply there lies exposed an ambiguity in the word, rea-
son. Fart of the time it means the attempt of the mind to
think logically and part of the time it means reason in the
normative sense of right reason. To fail to see the ambiguity
lT Suing za. 1th .. ~IV. 67, demonstratio . "A free man is one
who lives under the guidance of reason." (Tr. Elwes)
2. Spinoza, Eth.
,
IV, 68, demonstratio. "I call free him
who is led solely by reason." (Tr. Elwes)
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here is equivalent to asserting that to attempt to think
logically is synonymous with doing so. Yet most human expe-
rience would bear witness to the fact that not all efforts
at logical reasoning are crowned with success. When, there-
fore, Spinoza says that a man who is led by reason is free,
what he means on close analysis is this: When a man is led
by right reason he succeeds in possessing what he ought to
want, that is, he experiences a joy in the possession of
those qualities which his best nature wants and his deepest
nature needs. Neither the truth nor the significance of
this statement need be questioned. It is a profound observa-
tion. But it is not a description of freedom, as we under-
stand it. It is only another aspect of determinism.
It is important to observe the basis of Spinoza* s
philosophical determinism. It is not a conclusion that he
comes to; it is rather an assumption he makes at the start.
Kis third axiom at the beginning of his first book of Ethics
reads as follows: "Ex data causa determinata necessario
sequitur effectus, et contra, si nulla detur determinata
causa, impossible est, ut effectus sequatur." 1 This axiom
finds expression in a premise of a later proposition: "No-
tandum, dari necessario uniuscujusque rei existentis certam
aliquam causam, propter quam existit." 2 This same axiom
Spinoza. Eth ..~T. axiomata, III. "From a given definite
cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other
hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible
that an effect can. follow." (Tr. Elwes)
2. Spinoza, Eth.
,
I, 8, scholium II, notam III. "There is
necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause
why it should exist. (Tr. Elwes)

47 .
appears again in another proposition: "Cujuscunque rei
assignari debet causa seu ratio, tarn cur existit, quam cur
non existit."^- Spinoza had a horror of the unexplained ap-
pearance of anything genuinely new. There was no emergence.
There was nothing abrupt. Time for him was not real dura-
tion, as for Bergson, but something unreal and unimportant.
Truth for him was not to be found under the aspect of time
but sub specie aeternitatis . That nothing comes out of
nothing, ex nihilo nihil fit , was the one great postulate
of cosmology. Spinoza never argued this matter. He regarded
it as obvious. To him it was unthinkable that any occurrence
could be causeless, and that was an end to the matter. "That
a man, from the necessity of his own nature, should endeavor
to become non-existent," he exclaims, "is as impossible as
that something should be made out of nothing." 2
For our present purposes two observations must be made.
The first is what this deterrainist philosophy does to moral
values, and the second is the difficulty of holding to such
a determinist philosophy. By virtue of Spinoza's disarming
consistency and meticulous care he shows us himself what de-
terminism does to the idea of repentance, for example: "Po-
enitentia est Tristitia concomitante idea alicujus facti,
1. Spinoza, Eth
. .
I, 11, aliter. "Of everything whatsoever
a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its exis-
tence, or for its non-existence." (Tr. Elwes)
2. Spinoza, Eth., IV, 20, note. (Tr. Elwes)
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quod nos ex libero Mentis decreto fecisse credimus."^- Here
Spinoza admits—or contends, as you prefer—that if we would
rid ourselves of the mistaken notion of freedom, we would
never have any reason to repent, for no matter how much evil
we did, we would not be responsible for it. Yet in spite of
man's supposed inability to change himself, his environment,
or any other person, Spinoza is forever exhorting man to do
it anyhow, at least by implication. In his Tractatus Theo -
loKico-Politicus he pleads for political freedom for all
people.
2
If there is no freedom in the metaphysical sense,
how could man make use of political freedom if he had it?
Spinoza brings his Ethics to a close with these thoughtful
words, "Omnia praeclara tarn difficilia quam rara sunt. "5
Eut if there is no freedom, what meaning is there to the word,
difficulty? If I am predestined to put forth effort, in spite
of my knowledge that the outcome is already foreordained any-
way, and if I am to acquiesce in this situation knowing that
certain peace of mind will be my reward, even this implies my
power to acquiesce or to refuse to acquiesce. This is freedom.
If this is denied, as Spinoza would have to deny it, then all
he could say is, "I am pre-deterrained to ask you to seek that
which is excellent and it may be that in so doing I have
1. Spinoza, Eth
. .
Ill, affectuum definitiones
,
XXVII. "Re-
pentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action,
which we believe we have performed by the free decision
of our mind." (Tr. Elwes)
2. Spinoza, TThP
,
87 & 90-91.
3. Spinoza, Eth
. . V, 42, scholium.
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supplied the necessary element which will predetermine you
to seek it." This is consistent enough, so far, hut it is
not quite plain what function effort performs in the reali-
zation of the good. If there is no freedom, it performs no
real function, but is a vice and the source of pain and
frustration. Thus the Schopenhauer!an denial of will and
the ideal of the life of mere contemplation may be the log-
ical conclusion of determinism. Yet how can I deny my will
without exercising it?
ii. Mill.
John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) introduces the question
of liberty or necessity with the query as to whether "the law
of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions
as to other phenomena. He then proceeds to define deter-
mini sts as those who accept an affirmative answer and the in-
determinists as those who prefer a negative one. He t^en as-
serts that the affirmative answer is the one he considers the
true one. In defense of this point of view, he says,
Given the motives which are present to an indi-
vidual' s mind, and given likewise the character
and disposition of the individual, the manner in
which he will act might be unerringly inferred;
that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew
all the inducements which are acting upon him,
we could foretell his conduct with as much cer-
tainty as we can predict any physical event.
This proposition I take to be a mere interpreta-
tion of universal experience, a statement in
words of what every one is internally convinced
of .2
1. Mill, SOI
,
58.1. 2. Mill, SOL, 581-82

It Is not difficult to observe in this revealing passage the
foundation stone on which the determinism of John Stuart Mill
rests. He here contends that the predictability of human
action implies the operation of causality, and since causal-
ity in the physical world is assumed to be absolute, it is
reasoned that there is no adequate ground to question its ab-
soluteness in the realm of human volition. If one, why not
the other?
Although worded very differently, the determini st doc-
trine of Mill is a close parallel to the determini st doctrine
of Spinoza. Spinoza could not entertain any idea of some-
thing coming out of nothing, so absurd it seemed to him. In
the physical realm this appeared to be manifestly impossible.
Spinoza reasoned that since "ordo et connexio idearum idem
est, ac ordo et connexio rerum, 1,1 then this must be impos-
sible in the realm of ideas as well. This is the same line
of thought that Mill has entertained. He observes the pre-
dictability of events in the natural order. He finds tbe
supposed law of causality explaining the possibility of this
predictability. But human actions are predictable also.
Hence, human actions must operate on the law of causality
too. That is to say, both Spinoza and Mill are willing to
rest their case for human determinism on the proposition that
all events in the physical order are determined absolutely.
1. Spinoza, 2th., II, 7. "The order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of things."
(Tr. Elwes)
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Mill is careful to explain that he does not mean by
determinism what he fears many men do mean by it. It is not
"irresistibleness."-*- "We only mean... if nothing prevents. "1
"A feeling of uncontrollableness .. .is a mere illusion. . .Hu-
man actions. .. are never uncontrollable."! He even goes so far
as to say,
The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precise-
Iv that portion of the truth which the word Neces-
sity puts out of sight, namely the power of mind to
co-operate in the formation of its own character,
has given to its adherents a practical feeling
much nearer to the truth than has generally (I be-
lieve) existed in the minds of necessitarians. The
latter may have had a stronger sense of the impor-
tance of what human beings can do to shape the
characters of one another; but the free-will doc-
trine has, I believe, fostered in its supporters a
much stronger spirit of self-culture
.
2
Notwithstanding all these attempts to free determinism from
"confusion and misapprehensions," 2 Mill is still a determin-
ist. Will is determined by motives, and habits of willing
are determined by purpose. These motives and purposes are
in turn determined by environment and experience and heredity
and the interplay of many factors, which are also determined
by other causes, "et sic in infinitum, "5 as Spinoza had said.
Mill' s attempt to mitigate the consequences of determinism
was later noted by Whitehead, whose comment may be repeated
here:
Mill* s doctrine is generally accepted, especially
among scientists, as though in some way it allowed
you to accept the extreme doctrine of material-
1. Mill, SOL, 583.
2. Mill, SOL, 585.
3. Spinoza, Sth . II, 48.

istic mechanism, and yet mitigated its unbelievable
consequences. It does nothing of the sort. Either
the bodily molecules blindly run, or they do not.
If they do blindly run, the mental states are irrel-
evant in discussing the bodily actions. 1
iii. Thomas Huxley.
Thomas Henry Huxley (1825 - 1895) was an English biol-
ogist and prolific writer. Much of his writing is in the
field of philosophy. He was a follower of Charles Darwin who
was only sixteen years his senior. He came to realize that
the physical bodies of animals, including the human animals,
are made up of levers and liquids and tissues that operate
very much the same as levers and liquids and tissues do out-
side of the human body. He says,
In the seventeenth century, the idea that the phys-
ical processes of life are capable of being ex-
plained in the same way as other physical phenom-
ena, and, therefore, that the living body is a
mechanism, was proved to be true for certain class-
es of vital actions; and, having thus taken firm
root in irrefragable fact, this conception has
not only successfully repelled every assault which
has been made upon it, but has steadily grown in
force and extent of application, until it is now
the expressed or implied fundamental proposition
of the whole doctrine of scientific Physiology. 2
In the remainder of this essay he outlines the belief of phys
iolo gists that brain, sensations, bodily motions, transmis-
sion of impulse, and even memory are all the working of cells
in the body, which operate in mechanical fashion, and reveal
the fact that "animals are automata." 2
This is the background for Huxley* s idea of human free
dom to which he gives clear expression.
1. Whitehead, SMW, 114 2. Huxley, S&C, 199

53
Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause
for every event, in the case of the phenomena of
the external world, compels us, with equal co-
gency, to seek it in that of the mind. The only
meaning of the law of causation, in the physical
world, is, that it generalises universal experi-
ence of the order of that world; and, if experi-
ence shows a similar order to obtain among states
of consciousness, the law of causation will prop-
erly express that order. That such an order ex-
ists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man. 1
If, then, the events in the succession of conscious states
disclose a relationship between the preceding one and the
succeeding one, corresponding to the relationship between
events in the physical world order, and we see fit to call
this relation a causal relation in the one case, why should
we hesitate to call it causal relation in the other case
also? Here again is the same manner of reasoning found in
both Spinoza and in Mill. The full and complete determina-
tion of events in the physical order in terms of events pre-
ceding is assumed. Similarities between this order and the
order of events in mind is observed. The operation of the
law of cause and effect in the second order is then asserted.
The cogency of this line of argument is admitted, provided the
major premise is accepted. But no determinist feels it nec-
essary to defend it. It is his minor premise that he feels
called upon to defend, the premise that asserts that events
in the psychological order also reveal relations suggesting
causation. This is the assertion that Huxley contends that
1. Huxley, Hume, 214
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every sane man acknowledges. "We are as firmly convinced of
the fixed order of thoughts as we are of that of things," 1
he declares. He would be astounded to be told that anybody
ever did or would doubt "the fixed order of things."
In his further discussion of freedom Huxley easily
reconciles his doctrine with the oft -heard claim, "I can do
as I like." "The answer is; nobody doubts that, at any rate
within certain limits." 2 Quoting freely from Hume he even
attempts to reconcile moral responsibility with determinism,
on the ground that without causal relationships between pur-
pose and act, there never could be any knowledge of what the
purpose was. This is not convincing. Surely there can be
a causal connection that is pliable; we are not compelled to
choose between connections made of reinforced concrete on the
one hand and no connections whatever on the other. But Hux-
ley will not have it so. This is how he sees it:
So far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral
responsibility, it is the foundation of all praise
and blame; and moral admiration reaches its climax
in the ascription of necessary goodness to the
Deity .3
iv. McTaggart.
John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1866 - 1925) was a
British philosopher and lecturer in Trinity College in Cam-*
bridge. In his book, Some Dogmas of Religion , he devoted
Chapter V, a chapter of nearly fifty pages, to the problem
lT Huxley. Hume
.
216.
2. Huxley, Hume
.
220.
3. Huxley, Hume . 223.
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of "Free Will." He began with the assertion that the
word, freedom, is ambiguous and in need of definition. He
outlined four different kinds of freedom, or possible views
of freedom. First, the freedom of self-determination. By
this he means that the forces which determine the actions
of a person that arise from within the nature of that person
may be regarded as of a different sort from those that arise
in the physical universe external to a man. Thus, if a man
is dying, and I fail to give him any assistance because I
am chained to a stake, I am not free; but if a man is dying
and I fail to give him any assistance because I have no idea
what to do for him, I am free, because my ignorance may be
thought to arise out of my own nature. I may not have any
responsibility for my ignorance, but in some sense it is
less inevitable than a chain, and so may be thought to be a
relative sort of freedom.
Second, the freedom of self-direction. This means
that only those actions that arise from the will of a person
may be said to be free--and even these again may be only
relatively so—as opposed to actions which arise from parts
of a person* s nature other than the will. To turn to the
case of the dying man again, from the point of view now con-
sideration, my failure to help him, if it arose from my ig-
norance of what to do for him, would not be an illustration
of freedom, but of determinism. But if I failed to help him
because it required lifting him and I did not choose to put
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forth the work involved in that, I would will not to help him,
and that would be a free act on my part. But again it might
be only relatively free, as it might well be that I had been
trained to be lazy and selfish and unsympathetic. Hence, this
form of freedom may be reconciled with determinism, also.
Third, the freedom of self-realization. By this kind
of freedom McTaggart has reference to the power which a goal
or purpose or even the entelechy of Aristotle has over a man
or other beings. Whenever that purpose finds free expression,
there is freedom. The tree that grows unhampered by drought,
the saint living out the perfect life he has chosen for him-
self, and the woman with her child all illustrate this kind of
freedom. Whether a man ever does evil under freedom of this
sort—that is, whether a man* s goal can be ultimately evil--
is subject to vigorous debate. Some would say that men are
evil only from bondage. Thus, "virtuous action will be called
free, in this sense, when wicked action is not." 1 But here
again there is no certainty that goals and purposes are entire-
ly self-selected by man any more than the entelechy in the
acom is chosen by the oak tree. Thus, this form of freedom
also may be regarded only as determinism in another form.
Fourth, the freedom of self-indeterminaticn. This means
absence of complete determination. This is free will. It as-
sumes a break in the causal series of events, or an absence of
such a series, at least as far as human will is concerned.
1. McTaggart, SDR, 142.

This last view is clearly the one that qualifies under the
definition adopted in the first chapter of this dissertation
Yet Dr. McTaggart felt that any of the previous three would
qualify as true views of freedom as far as ordinary demands
of philosophy need to go, in spite of the fact that the law
of cause and effect operates in such a way as to allow only
one alternative within human volition itself.
In the three determini sts previously considered, the
operation of causal law in the physical world was carried over
into the psychological realm and made to work there. The
approach of McTaggart to the problem was as follows:
I do not propose to consider whether Causality and
the Uniformity of Nature are valid of events other
than volitions. To deny that they had any valid-
ity at all would involve almost complete scepti-
cism, since no expectation of any future event would
have the least justification, and all arguments for
the existence of anything not perceived at the mo-
ment would be absolutely baseless. .. Some persons,
no doubt, are indeterminists as to the will, be-
cause they reject the law of Causality altogether,
and are indeterminists as to everything. But this
position has not sufficient influence on religious
thought in general to be of importance for our pres-
ent purpose . 1
Two things should be noted in this paragraph. First, the phrase,
"any validity at all,” as applied to "Causality and the Uniform-
ity of Nature." No one would ever deny, of course, that there
is at least some truth to the principle of causality and the
uniformity of nature. That is not even debated anywhere, and
is irrelevant. Eut when McTaggart denies the existence of
1. McTaggart, SDR, 144-45.
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genuine freedom, he must insist that causality is entire and
complete and absolute, which he does. It is, therefore, not
necessary that a believer in freedom shall establish the doc-
trine that there is not "any validity at all" in causality; it
is only necessary that he shall establish the doctrine that
it is not absolute. If causality in this universe turns out
to be 99% true, we do not have a determinate universe, but an
indeterminate one. The phrase, "any validity at all," then,
is not one that a determinist may consistently use, and by us-
ing it he attempts to win over to his side persons who logical-
ly belong on the other side.
In the second place, McTaggart uses in this paragraph
the phrase, "indeterminists as to everything." This expression
needs a little defining, but the only reasonable interpretation
to make of it is that there may be those who believe that no-
where in the universe does there exist any causality that is
utter and absolute. Accepting this definition for the time be-
ing, let it be observed at once that this is precisely the
point of view defended in this writing. It is, therefore, dis-
appointing to find that McTaggart observes that it does not
have enough influence to be Important. This may well have been
true in his day. If so, it indicates the more sharply the im-
portance of Werner Heisenberg in our day, as we shall discover
in the next chapter. In contrast to Heisenberg, Professor
McTaggart makes clear his faith in non-variable causality in
nature, and his faith that all men will agree with him.

It is perfectly impossible for anyone to explain
why a particular drop of rain falls where it does
rather than half an inch away. Yet no one sup- ,
poses that this event is not completely determined.
Today this last statement could not be made.
Professor McTaggart finds indeterminism inconsistent
with two important principles: Validity of morality and pre-
dictability. By the validity of morality 2 he means that any
attempt to call any act moral or immoral implies that behind
the act is a purpose or character that is more or less abiding.
Eut to assert this is to assert connections between that act
and previous thought, desires, and perhaps previous acts, and
these in turn are to be accounted for by environment, etc. Of
course, no one denies this. The question is not whether there
are relations with previous purposes, thoughts, sensations,
and the like; the question is whether these relations are ab-
solutely binding. We are not shut up to the alternatives of
no relations or relations as rigid as steel girders. The sec-
ond inconsistency, that of predictability , ^ rests on the same
misunderstanding. All trade, government, and other social in-
tercourse rests on predictability, as he very properly says,
but inflexible determinism is not required.
It is clear that McTaggart’ s determinism rests on his
fear of disconnectedness. He, like Mill, feels that pnly de-
terminism can guarantee continuity of character in persons and
predictability both in persons and in nature.
1. McTaggart, SBR, 149.
2. McTaggart, SLR, 177.
3. McTaggart, SDR, 182.
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3. The essence of the issue.
Spinoza rejected freedom because he observed, quite
rightly, that true freedom involves somewhere an ex nibilo .
Mill and McTaggart rejected it because they believed that it
endangered predictability in both mind and matter. Huxley
rejected it because he found none in nature and believed that
man is a part of nature. What do these men have in common?
To begin with, they all believed that in inanimate nature, and
in the world of plants and animals as well, the determinate
law of cause and effect works inexorably. None of them antic-
ipated that it would ever be seriously doubted. Furthermore,
all of them, including Spinoza and Huxley, believed that un-
certain relations between events could not account for the pre
dietability and apparent certainty in the order of events in
the psychological order as well as in the physical order. All
of them rejected—without very much careful considerati cn
—
the possibility of indeterminate connectionalism, an order of
events that is loose at the joints. They would be compelled
to say that shoulders and hips disconnect the limbs from the
body, for all of them implied that the other alternative to
determinate connections is no connections at all.
Behind the problem of human freedom certain other ques-
tions emerge: Can something come out of nothing? Will a con-
nectionalism that is loose at the joints account for the struc
ture of events in our world? Is time real and linear, invol-
ving a real succession of events, or is it unreal and circular
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forever repeating itself? These and many other questions tie
in with the problem of freedom. But behind them all lies an-
other question, the backdrop for all the ethers: Is there any
empirical evidence to show whether there is or is not any such
thing in this universe as determinate connections, even in the
physical world? Can we now say whether the assumption of all
determinists, that the physical order of events is a completely
determined order, is true or false? If it can be shown to be
false, then we have a strong indication as to what the answers
to these other questions would have to be. If it can be shown
to be true, then we have a similar indication but with oppo-
site answers. This, then, is a basic question: Is our phys-
ical universe determined?

CHAPTER THREE
THE HEISENBERG PRINCIPLE
1. Life and work of Dr. Werner Heisenberg.
Werner Heisenberg was bora December 5, 1901, the son
of August Heisenberg and Annie Wecklein, in the city of Wurz-
burg, Germany. He was educated at the University of Munchen
and at Gottingen University. His early rise to preeminence
was phenomenal. He received his degree of doctor of philos-
ophy in 1923 at Munchen, when he was 22 years of age. One
year later he was Privatdozent at Gottingen. Two years more
and he was a Lektor at the University of Copenhagen. The
next year he became a full professor at the University of
Leipzig, where he remained from 1927 until 1941. 1 As early
as 1926 he was giving lectures on atomic physics and the quan-
tum theory. He has been a prolific writer in the field. He
is now the director of Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut fur Physik in
II
Gottingen. He has a wife and six children, three sons and
three daughters. The family attends the Lutheran Church. 2
Dr. Heisenberg had three great teachers in his life.
He studied physics with Arnold Sommerfeld in Munchen, with
Max Bom in Gottingen, and Niels Bohr in Copenhagen.
He won his first reputation at the age of 21, when
he introduced half quantum numbers for treating
the natural multiplicity of spectral lines, and
1 . Who 1 s Who 1947 . 2. Wer ist* s . 1935*
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their Zeeman effect, i.e. their splitting in a
magnetic field into groups of polarized lines.
The idea of half quantum numbers was so origi-
nal and new that it created a real sensation when
its youthful author defended it in a modest but
very convincing way at a scientific congress in
Gottingen against a whole group of colleagues,
headed by Niels Bohr. 1
The greatest of these teachers was Niels Bohr who carne to be
director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics in Copen-
hagen six years before Werner Heisenberg arrived in the city.
Bohr himself was only forty-one years old at the time and
the holder of the Nobel Prize in Physics for 1922, four years
before. He was working in the field of radiation and attempt-
ing to discover the size of the "discrete units" or "quantum
jumps" when an electron moves from one permissible orbit to
another, and the precise reason for these jumps. "The genius
of Bohr is not to be underestimated." 2 During the two years
that Heisenberg was at Copenhagen he worked closely with
Eohr and became intensely interested in the theoretical as-
pects of modern physics and the assumptions that seemed to
be required. It was the first year after he left Copenhagen
and went to Leipzig, 1927, that he published in Zeitschrif
t
fur Phvsik . his article entitled, "Uber den anschaulichen In-
halt der quantentheoretischen Einematik und Mechanik." Here
the doctrine of uncertainty first found utterance. And Heis-
enberg was then twenty-six years of age.
In 1930 Dr. Heisenberg was invited to come to Chicago
T7 Ladenburg and Wigner, POS, 87-89.
2. Northrop, S?P, 130.
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to give a series of lectures. He did so and these lectures
were published both in English in Chicago and in G-erman in
Leipzig.
1
In the foreword to the English edition, Arthur H.
Compton has this to say,
Professor Heisenberg's leading place in the devel-
opment of the new quantum mechanics is well recog-
nized by these who have been following its growth.
It was in fact he who first saw clearly that in
the older forms of quantum theory we were describ-
ing our spectra in terms of atomic mechanisms re-
garding which we could gain no definite knowledge,
and he who first found a way to interpret (or at
least describe) spectroscopic phenomena without
assuming the existence of such atomic mechanisms.
Likewise, "the uncertainty principle" has become
a household phrase throughout our universities,
and it is especially fortunate to have this oppor-
tunity of learning its significance from one who
is responsible for its formulation.
-
Two years later Heisenberg received the Nobel prize in Physics
for his development of quantum mechanics leading to the dis-
covery of the allotropic forms of hydrogen. 3 This was in 1930.
He was then twenty-nine years old.
Werner Heisenberg has done his work in the field of
theoretical physics. He has tried to persuade physicists to
abandon assumptions and picture thinking that he felt pre-
vented progress in the field and prevented further grasp of
a proper understanding of how electrons do actually operate,
and he has tried to persuade them to accept notions more
mathematical in character which he believed would result in
clearer comprehension and rid them of conflicts and mysteries.
1. Heisenberg, PPQ,T. 3. Ladenburg and Wigner, POS,
2. Heisenberg, PPQT, vii
.
91.
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The older classical concepts of Newton had broken down en-
tirely, but there were none to take their places.
Throughout the 19th century most physicists re-
garded Newton's dynamical lav/s as sacrosanct.
Luring the 20th century it has, however, become
increasingly clear that many phenomena, especial-
ly those connected with radiation, defy explana-
tion on Newtonian principles. 1
Newton required correction in both directions, in the realm
of astronomy, the macrocosm, and this correction led to rela-
tivity, and also in the realm of atomic physics, the micro-
cosm, a correction that led to quantum mechanics. The history
of quantum mechanics began with this century and although its
history is thus brief it may even now be divided into three
periods. 1 The first period is from 1900 to 1913* This pe-
riod was dominated by Max Planck who developed the "constant
of action," h, with the numerical value of 6.61 x 10-21 erg-
second. The truth of this constant was proved but its mean-
ing was obscure. The second period was from 1913 to 1926 and
the chief accomplishment of the period was the work of Niels
Eohr who worked out a correct formula for the frequency of the
spectral lines of atomic hydrogen, and the codification of
spectra.
But the true quantum mechanics appeared in 1926,
reaching fruition almost simultaneously in a va-
riety of forms, viz., the matrix theory of Max Born
and Werner Heisenberg, the w^ve mechanics of Louis
V. ae Broglie and Erwin Schrodinger, and the trans-
formation theory of Paul A. M. Dirac and Fascual
Jordan. These different formulations are in no
sense alternative theories, but rather different
aspects of a consistent body of lav;. 1
17 Van Vleck
.
Bnc~Brit .. XVIII, 815.
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2. Scientific work leading up to Heisenberg's principle.
Dr. Werner Heisenberg is credited with first formula-
ting the principle of indeterminism. But several others were
involved, and not a little history preceded. As far back as
1919 F. Exner of Vienna was contemplating the fact that the
laws of the macrocosm appeared to operate with great regular-
ity while the corresponding laws seemed to operate in the
world of the microcosm with great irregularity. In his at-
tempts to account for this phenomenon he anticipated the in-
determinism principle and suggested that perhaps both sets
of laws were mere statistical probabilities in which the un-
certainty was negligible when viewed on the larger scale, but
discoverable on the small scale.-1- Another source of the Heis
enberg principle was the work of Boltzmann in which he discov
ered that the second lav/ of thermodynamics, which says that
entropy tends to increase, is not a causal law but is merely
a statistical law. This is another way of saying that there
is no "force" at work to produce this effect and that further
more it does not always work that way, but simply that there
are so many more opportunities for entropy to increase than
there are for it to decrease that it is a safe prediction
that over a large enough field of space and time, this law
will operate. 1
But the fact that general principles operate with
statistical accuracy in the large and then break down in
1. Reichenbach, PFQM, 1

failure in the minute does not prove that all such principles
reflect fundamental uncertainty. On the contrary it would
usually be assumed that such a situation called for closer
calculation and more refined methods. In fact this is just
the way Planck first discovered the quantum theory, for such
a doctrine has no meaning except in working with very small
numbers of electrons as in the case of light radiation.
Thus, if a great many quanta are involved, the
Planck idea that there is a discrete, indivisible
quantum unit loses importance, just as to a mil-
lionaire it would make little difference whether
the smallest unit of currency is a cent or a dol-
lar. 1
Here, then, was an uncertainty that led to certainty. But
when Heisenberg began work on the problem of the relation of
velocity of a light particle to the position of that light
pafticle, he encountered what seemed to him a different situ-
ation. He concluded that here was an uncertainty that must
forever remain uncertain.
Before an attempt is made to formulate the Heisenberg
principle in detail, note should be made of a possible philo-
sophical approach to the uncertainty relation. Several scien
tists foresaw the need of something of the sort, and at least
one philosopher did also. A. N. Whitehead discusses at some
length what he calls, the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.
One example of this fallacy, in his thinking, is "simple lo-
cation. "3 Putting these terms together we may speak of the
TT Van Vleck. Enc7~Brit .. XVIII, 815
.
2. Whitehead, SMW, 75.
5. Whitehead, SMW, 72.
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"fallacy of simple location." This fallacy may be traced
back to the Aristotelian notion of a world "at rest." 1 But
to twenthieth century scientists, Whitehead points out, there
is neither world at rest nor simple location. Even if I do
allow myself to think of a rock as "here" at my feet, I must
remember that that rock is the recipient of gravitational
forces emanating from the earth, from all the heavenly bodies,
and from a million other stones and sticks and particles of
matter, and not only so, but the stone "here" at my feet is
itself exercising gravitational force upon the earth and all
the heavenly bodies and all the million sticks and stones and
particles of matter. Moreover the earth is certainly not at
rest; it is doubtful if the position of the stone with refer-
ence to the earth remains constant; and it is very certain
that the electrons within the atoms of the stone are not at
rest nor will they become so as long as the temperature of the
stone remains above zero, absolute scale. What then becomes
of cur idea of simple location?
My theory involves the entire abandonment of the
notion that simple location is the primary way in
which things are involved in space-time. In a
certain sense, everything is everywhere at all
times. For every location involves an aspect of
itself in every other location. 2
These words were published two years before the principle of
uncertainty came into print. It is possible, though unlikely,
that Heisenberg read them before he wrote his "Uber den
lT Whitehead, SMW, 68-69. 2. Whitehead, SMW, 133.
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anschaulichen Inhalt..." But in any case the important con-
nection is not the historical one but the logical one. The
Heisenberg principle is to be understood in the light of the
fact of empirical observation that no light particle may be
identified by the phrase, "this one here." It is never any-
where long enough for the observer to be able to say that.
Much less can it be identified by its velocity. But it can
be identified by discovering a series of points through which
it is passing at a given rate of speed in a given series of
moments. The physicist' s way of expressing this is to refer
to the product of position and velocity, which he calls two
"conjugate co-ordinates." It is to this product that the
Heisenberg principle applies.
At first sight it may seem curious that the uncer-
tainty extends to the product of the two coordin-
ates rather than to each separately. As we have
seen, the reason is, that the fact of observing
implies a transfer of action, that our subsequent
analysis into conjugated coordinates is arbitrary.
Though we do not always realize it, any statement
we make about one coordinate implies a statement
about the other. If we say that a particle has a
given position, we imply (wrongly, in general, as
has been shown) that it is not moving away from
that position, in other words that it has no mo-
mentum. Again, if we state that a particle has a
certain momentum we imply (wrongly once more) by
the word particle that the momentum is located at
an ascertainable position. A statement about one
of the coordinates involves an implication as to
the value of the other. 1
We have to approach the problem, then, by laying aside our
Newtonian idea that we have a material particle here which
1. Lindemann, FSQT, 42-43
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has the characteristics of position and velocity. The only
particle there is is a relationship between position and ve-
locity, expressed thus: position-velocity, or q x p.
3. Various statements of the principle of uncertainty.
In the year 1927 Werner Heisenberg first gave expres-
sion to the principle of uncertainty, or, as it is sometimes
called, the principle of Indeterminism. This appeared in an
article of his in Zeitschrift fur Fhyslk entitled, "tJber den
anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Einematik und
Mechanik." The passage containing his uncertainty principle
is worded as follows:
Im Augenblick der Ortsbestimmung, also dem Augen-
blick, in dem das Lichtquant vein Elektron abge-
beugt wird, verandert das Elektron seinen Impuls
unstetig. Diese Jinderung ist urn so groszer, je
kleiner die Wellenlange des benutzten Lichtes, d.
h. je genauer die Ortsbestimmung ist. In dem
Moment, in dem der Ort des Elektrons ‘tjekannt ist,
kann daher sein Impuls nur bis auf Groszen, die
jener unstetigen Xnderung entsprechen, bekannt
sein; also je genauer der Ort bestimmt ist, desto
ungenauer ist der Impuls bekannt und umgekehrt;
hierin erblicken wir eine direkte anschauliche
Erlauterung der Relation
PQ — QP = h/2lfi.
Sei q-j_ die Genauigkeit mit der der Wert q be-
kannt ist (q]_ ist etwa der mitt le re Fehler von
q) , also hier die Wellenlange des Lichtes, p-^,
die Genauigkeit, mit der der Wert p bestimmbar
ist, also hier die unstetige Xnderung von p beim
Comptoneffekt
,
so stehen nach elementaren Formeln
des Comptoneffekt s p^ und q^ in der Beziehung
Pi q^h. (I ) 1
1. Heisenberg, Ual, 175* In the moment of position deter-
mination, thus in the moment in which the light quantum
is bent away from the electron, the electron alters its
motion unsteadily. This change is by so much the greater,
the smaller the wave lengths of the light used, and hence

Thus, Heisenberg says, if the position of the electron is
known with certainty, the velocity turns out to be impossible
of measurement. A little later in the same article he points
out that the same situation obtains if the velocity is deter-
mined with certainty and one attempts to discover the exact
position.
Die Bestimmung der G-eschwindigkeit wird urn so gen-
auer, Je langwelliger das benutzte Lichte ist, da
dann die G-eschwindigkei t sanderung des Teilchens
pro Li cbt quant durch Comptoneffekt um so geringer
wird. Die Ortsbestimmung wird entsprechend un-
genau, wie es der Gleichung (1) entspricht. 1
According to Heisenberg, then, there will always be at least
one uncertainty, either one of position or one of velocity,
if the attempts at precision go far enough, for the more one
knows about the exact position of any electron, the less he
the more strictly the position is determined. In the
moment in which the position is known, its motion can be
known only to the extensions which correspond to every
unsteady change. Thus ever more strictly the position
is determined, the more uncertainly is the momentum
known and the contrary. We perceive here a direct appar-
ent explanation of the relation PQ - QP = h/2 i. If
is the accuracy in which the value q is known (q^_ is, let
us say, the average error of q) thus here the wave lengths
of light, P]_, the accuracy in which the value p is deter-
minable, and so here the unsteady change of p in accord-
ance with the Compton effect, then they stand in accord-
ance with an elementary formula of the Compton effect p^
and in the relation
P]_ q1 h. (1)
1. Heisenberg, Ual
,
177. The determination of the velocity
becomes so much the more exact as the longer the waves of
the light that is used, since the variation in the veloc-
ity of the particle on account of the quantum of light
will be by so much the smaller in accordance with the
Compton effect. The determination of the position will
be correspondingly inexact, as it corresponds to equation
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will know about the exact velocity, and vice versa . The prin-
ciple of uncertainty may be expressed in three parts as fol-
lows :
1. There is an inevitable uncertainty as to the posi-
tion or the momentum, mass times velocity, of the electron in
the atom at any given moment.
2. The uncertainty of the one will vary inversely with
the uncertainty of the other. This is known as "the law of
inverse correlation of kinematic and dynamic parameters." 1
3. The product of these two uncertainties approach a
minimum which it cannot pass. This minimum is a constant,
h, the constant worked out by Max Planck which is equal to
6.61 x lO"2^ erg-second.
There are many different ways of expressing in mathemat-
ical forms and diagrams this principle of Heisenberg in con-
trast with the certainty view of Isaac Newton. Here are three
such ways:
1. Newton Heisenberg
A>B A>B
p
The first symbol means, if A, then E; or if we may be sure of
A occurring, then we can be positive that E will follow. But
the second symbol on the right means, if A, then B, not with
certainty, but with the probability of p.
1. Reichenbach, PFQM, 11.
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2. Newton Heisenberg
q q
By this graph on the left classical physics means to say that
if at any given time the position, q, and the momentum, p, of
a given particle is known, then both position and momentum
can be predicted with certainty for any other time. But in
the graph on the right, the indeterminacy of the Heisenberg
principle is expressed. This means that under the given con-
ditions the new position and momentum can be known only as
lying within a tiny area, in which the product of the length
and the width will be 6.61 x 10“^ erg-second or h.
3. Newton Heisenberg
'Ll 'Ll
A A
If position, q, and momentum, p, are multiplied together to
form a single factor, A, then according to classical physics,
A can be known with a probability of one, as expressed in the
diagram on the left. But in the view of Heisenberg this fac-
tor, A, can be known only on a bell-shaped probability curve,
as in the diagram on the right.
Since all laws of physics and chemistry are based on
the activity of the electrons and other particles in the atoms,
then all physical laws are immediately affected by these con-
siderations. All laws of falling bodies, expanding gases,
light, heat, the movement of the stars and the planets in
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their orbits, the movement of the muscles in the body of a
human being, even the movement of cells in the brain, in fact
every change that takes place in the entire physical uni-
verse, are all seen to be affected if this theory is accepted.
"The principle of indeterminism constitutes a basic recogni-
tion of the incompatibility of a precise simultaneous knowl-
edge of both position and velocity" 1 of any particle anywhere
in the universe.
4. The reception of this view in science and philosophy.
The immediate meaning of the Heisenberg principle is
clear and well agreed upon. But its deeper implications are
not entirely clear and they are vigorously argued. Whether
this principle solves more problems than it creates is still
more vigorously debated. For many thinkers it represents a
flight from common sense and threatens to take all science
along with it; for others it constitutes release from old
conventional notions and the beginning of a new era of un-
derstanding. Niels Eohr, needless to say, exhibits pride in
the labors of bis famous pupil and collaborator.
Heisenberg's theory constitutes a bold departure
from the classical way of describing natural
phenomena, but may count as a merit that it deals
only with quantities open to direct observation. 2
Although he is not quite sure in how far he is in agreement
with it, F. W. Bridgman does not hesitate to pay tribute to
its importance. He speaks of the principle of uncertainty as
T7 Miller, SAR, 80. 2. Bohr, Enc. Brit .. II, 644.
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a "principle which I believe is fraught with the possibility
of greater change in mental outlook than was ever packed into
an equal number of words. "1 Its importance for Eridgman is
that from the standpoint of his "operational! sm" the Heisen-
berg principle makes clear the impossibility of recognition
of cause and effect as a universal law.
The same situation confronts the physicist every-
where; whenever he penetrates to the atomic or
electronic level in his analysis, he finds things
acting in a way for which he can assign no cause,
and for which the concept of cause has no meaning,
if Heisenberg's principle is right. This means
nothing more nor less than that the law of cause
and effect must be given up. 2
Bridgman' s explanation for the failure of this law of cause
and effect is, however, his own.
The precise reason that the law of cause and ef-
fect fails can be paradoxically stated; it is not
that the future is not determined in terms of a
complete description of the present, but that in
the nature of things the present cannot be com-
pletely described.
^
Other observers have noted that one may distinguish between
an interpretation of Heisenberg in terms of physics and an
interpretation in terms of philosophy. This is the view of
William Seifriz.
There are two aspects of Heisenberg 1 s principle,
the physical and the philosophical. On the phys-
ical side the evidence in favor of the princi-
ple is overwhelmingly convincing. . .This is Born’s
"principle of limited measurability," and Whit-
taker’s "postulate of impotence .Unless I am
very much mistaken, Planck, who opposed the prin-
ciple of indeterminism, did so on mathematical
l7 Bridgman, NVS, 446 2. Bridgman, NVS, 448
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as well as philosophical grounds. In any case,
the philosophy of Heisenberg' s principle is quite
another matter. 1
For Seifriz the Heisenberg principle is unacceptable al-
together from the standpoint of philosophy, although he does
not explain exactly how it can be so whole-heartedly accepted
in physics and so thoroughly rejected in philosophy.
When Heisenberg tells us, as he did tell us, that
the uncertainty principle presents an insurmount-
able barrier, a wall over which we shall never see,
he is throwing physics back into the mysticism and
vitalism of the distant past. That is a tragedy.
Physics can claim its place of honor in the sun of
knowledge only so long as it adheres to the prin-
ciples of causality functioning in a realistic
world.
2
Mr. Seifriz is especially disturbed by Mr. Heisenberg' s cer-
tainty of future ignorance, "'We now know that we shall never
know.'" 2 Seifriz is not willing to forsake causation.
The fallacy in indeterminism lies in its implica-
tion, that there can be no approach to a represen-
tation of nature as determinate .. .The "new" physi-
cists have done for the atom precisely what some
biologists have long done with life.
3
Possibly the severest critic that Heisenberg has is F.
S. C. Northrop. He deals with indeterminacy at some length
in his book, Science and First Principles .
Place one of our contemporary physicists in a New
England trout stream, and he could easily convince
himself that reality is nothing but water, so great
is his capacity to concentrate upon that which is
most immediately observable at the moment. The
fact that his rod is made of solid matter and that
he is standing upon a rock-bottomed brook would
1. Seifriz, CII, 30-31
2. Seifriz, CII, 30.
3. Seifriz, CII, 31
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enter into his philosophy no more than the fact en-
ters into his physics that his measured quantities
are determined with rods and clocks which are phys-
ical objects and that the experiments which his
science performs are meaningless unless the physi-
cal theory of nature is assumed. 1
This position of Northrop' s will be examined carefully in the
fifth chapter of this dissertation, but here let it be asked
whether the word, disturbing, might not be substituted for the
word, meaningless, in the last sentence of the above quotation
without destroying the logical value of the paragraph. Fur-
thermore it is a question whether one can assume that "one'
s
rod is made of solid matter and that he is standing upon a
rock-bottomed brook" without begging the question at issue.
But in the mind of Northrop physical concepts and physical
models are utterly indispensable to science.
The desire for physical models does not have its
basis, as so many of our contemporary scientists
assume, in the perverse tendency of the human
mind to think in terms of images, but in the ra-
tionale of all modern and contemporary experimen-
tal procedure. It must never be forgotten that
the experimental method of physical science did
not arise until science accepted the physical
theory of nature. 2
His detailed criticism of Heisenberg is reserved for the fifth-
chapter of this dissertation, but Northrop summarizes his
criticism of indeterminacy with the assertion that it runs
"the risk of making the existence of science a mystery and a
rational account of natural processes impossible. "3 One can
certainly detect in these words a hint of the proposition
1. Northrop, SFP, 131.
2. Northrop, SFF
,
131-132
3. Northrop, SFP, 143

implicit in the mind of Northrop and many others that an in-
determinate account of nature would be mysterious and irra-
tional. It suggests that determinacy is less a conclusion
we come to than an assumption we start with. With us, as with
Spinoza, it is an axiom, and axioms can often be revised only
with great mental anguish. Among some philosophers, however,
especially among those appreciative of the values of religion,
the principle of indeterminacy comes as a ray of hope point-
ing to a possible solution of an otherwise insoluble dilemma.
In this mood Carl Wallace Miller, in his book, A Scientist* s
Approach to Religion , says, “Thus the prize example of the
application of the causality principle ceases to be convinc-
ins." 1
Among scientists generally, concerned with experimen-
tal research and willing to leave much interpretation and all
speculation to others, Heisenberg enjoys a better reception
than among philosophers, for Heisenberg gives physicists a
way of accounting for their difficulties and a formula for
making their figures add up. Karl K. Darrow, for example, a
research physicist for the Bell Telephone Laboratories in New
York City, has this to say:
A group of electrons all close together and all
having the same momentum is an impossibility. Heis-
enberg did not recoil from this conclusion, which
he expressed by saying that if the uncertainty of
position is small the uncertainty of momentum is
great and vice versa .
2
l7 Miller, SAR, 81. 2. Darrow, Enc . Brit .. XVII, 881.
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Frederick Seitz in the department of physics in the Carnegie
Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, says
that mathematical methods in quantum mechanics, as opposed
to physical concepts, "have been widely used with outstand-
ing success in the exploration of the magnetic properties
of solids, for example, in the "theory of ferromagnetism
developed by W. Heisenberg, F. Block, and a number of other
investigators." 1 According to Richard M. Bozorth, research
physicist in the Bell Telephone Laboratories in Murray Hill,
New Jersey, the "quantitive theory of ferromagnetism. . .is
now attributed to the ’exchange forces’ derived from quantum
theory by W. Heisenberg." 2 The theory of "exchange forces"
is related to indeterminism.
There is little question about the status of Heisen-
berg as a scientist, both before and since the appearance of
the principle of uncertainty. At worst the principle of in-
determinism is a useful tool in the laboratory. Apparently
it is not the scientists, at least not the physicists, who
are skeptical about it. The situation is that there are cer-
tain philosophers who believe that scientists stand in danger
of betraying their own basic postulates, that without causa-
tion science will have no foundation to stand on. The ques-
tion of whether this is true will be discussed in the next
chapter in which the main thesis of this writing will be put
forward.
1. Seitz, 2nc . Brit.
.
XX, 950. 2. Bozorth, Enc . Brit
.
.
XIV,
637.
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It must not be forgotten that the name Heisenberg is
connected with other work in physics than simply his work on
the principle of uncertainty. But this product of his mind
had gone far toward making the world wonder if old concepts
are adequate to new discoveries and stands an excellent
chance of going much farther than it has yet gone toward
dethroning old dogmas and crowning many new ones, even as
the principles of Copernicus and Newton did in another age.

CHAFTER FOUR
THE EFFECT OF INDETERMINACY ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE
The second chapter of this dissertation reviewed the
history of the problem of human freedom and traced it back to
its sources in ancient Greek thought. The third chapter de-
scribed the principle of Indeterminacy which has appeared so
recently in theoretical science. Now let us consider the bear-
ing that indeterminacy has on the ancient problem of human
freedom. Does it prove that human freedom is a fact? Is it
entirely irrelevant to human freedom? Does it have an impor-
tant bearing on the problem, but fall short of proof? Conten-
ders will be found for all three of these positions. Cautious
observers are fearful that the relation between indeterminacy
and human freedom, if any, will be overstated and they point
out that the bearing is only indirect at best. But indirect
though it is, the road is surely not a very long one. It is,
in fact, a road, of three steps, as follows: 1. Indeterminacy
has an influence on our idea of absolute causation. 2. Wheth-
er causation is absolute or otherwise influences our idea of
determinism. 3. Whether determinism is a fact or otherwise
has a bearing on our idea of human freedom. This is the pro-
cess which we must trace step by step.
1. The effect of indeterminacy on absolute or mechanical
causation.
One of the fascinating things about Heisenberg is that
from the very earliest formulation of his principle of

82
indeterminacy he saw clearly its bearing on the causal law.
This constitutes a philosophical reflection which would have
occurred to the mind of most men sometime later, if at all.
But to Heisenberg it was apparent.
Aber an der scharfen Formulierung des Kausalgesetzes:
"Wenn wir die 3-egenwart genau kennen, konnen wir die
Zukunft berechnen," ist nicht der Nachsatz, sondern
die Voraussetzung falsch.-*-
This statement of his appeared in the article in Zeitschrift
fur Phvsik in 1927 in which the original formulation of the
uncertainty principle was made. That statement was followed
by this one:
Da nun der statistische Charakter der Quantentheorie
so„eng an die
fl
Ungenauigkeit aller Wahrnehmung ge-
knupft ist, konnte man zu der Vermutung verleitet
werden, dasz sich hinter der wahrgenommenen statis-
tischen Welt noch eine "wirkliche" Welt verberge,
in der das Kausalgesetz gilt. Aber solche Sneku-
lationen schelnen uns, das betonen wir ausdrucklich,
unfruchtbar und sinnlos.
2
Whether such speculation is "unfruchtbar und sinnlos" for Heis-
enberg because it deals with ultimate reality that physics can
never know, or whether it is "unfruchtbar und sinnlos" because
it pleads for a return to obsolete ideas away from which phys-
ics is rapidly moving, is a moot question and one of the most
1. Heisenberg, Ual, 197. "But in tbe exact formulation of the
causal law: 'If we know the present time exactly, we can
compute the future,' there is not the final conclusion but
a presupposition which is false."
2. Heisenberg, Ual, 197. "Since then the statistical charac-
ter of the quantum theory is so closely tied to the uncer-
tainty of all observation, one can be seduced to the con-
jecture, that behind the observed statistical world a
"real" world may still hide, in which the causal law is
valid. But such speculations seem to us, which we express-
ly emphasize, unfruitful and meaningless."
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difficult points in this problem. At one point Heisenberg
seems to say the one and at another point he seems to say the
other. It is a question to which no final answer can be giv-
en, but it will receive further discussion in the next chapter.
However it is even more important to observe that as far as
Heisenberg is concerned it makes no difference which interpre-
tation you take for to him the law of cause and effect, in
physics, at least, is a thing of the past in any case. This
is the burden of his paper and the concluding words of his
article.
Die Physik soli nur den Zusammenhang der Wahrnehmun-
gen formell beschreiben. Vielmehr kann man den-wah-
ren Sachverhalt viel besser so charakterisieren:
Weil alle Experiment e den G-esetzen der Quantenmeeh-
anik und damit der Glei chung (1) unterworfen sind,
so wird durch die Quantenmechanik die Ungultigkeit
des Kausalgesetzes definitiv festgestellt .1
Little room is left for doubt that in the mind of Werner Heis-
enberg the causal law must be abandoned in molecular physics.
Three years later in his lectures in Chicago he said:
Wie aus dem bisher G-esagten hervorgeht, zwingen die
Erfahrungen aus der Welt der Atome zu einem noch
viel weitergehenden Verzicht auf bisher gewohnte
Begriffe. In der Tat beruht unsere gewohnliche
Naturbeschreibung und insbesondere der Gedanke
einer strengen G-esetzmaszigkeit in den Vorgangen
de^ Natur auf der Annahme, dasz es moglich sei,
Phanomene zu beobachten, ohne sie merklich zu be-
einflussen. Einer bestimmten Wirkung eine
1. Heisenberg, Ual
,
197. "Physics is obliged to describe only
the formal connections of observations. Rather one can
characterize the true state of affairs much better this
way: Since all experiments are subject to the laws of
quantum mechanics and thereby to the laws of equation (l),
therefore through quantum mechanics the nullity of the caus-
al law is definitely established."

bestimmte Ursache zuzuordnen, hat nur dann ©inen
S^nn, wenn wir Wirkung und Ursache beobachten
konnen, ohne gleichzeitig in den Vorgang storend
elnzugreifen. Das Kausalgesetz in seiner klas-
sischen Form kann also seinem Wesen nach nur fur
abgeschlossene -Systeme definiert werden. 1
Eut isolated systems can never be observed. When they are ob-
served they cease to be isolated. The conclusion to which we
are driven is simply that if causation, in its classical
sense, could be true, it would have to remain unverified and
unverifiable
.
But all of the foregoing argument presupposes something
which must here be considered. It presupposes that man must
stand off and look at the causal system to know anything about
it. It presupposes that we are talking about causal laws in
nature only. If on the contrary we assume that man himself is
a part of the causal system and that he observes the laws of
nature not because he freely chooses to do so, but rather be-
cause he is caused to do so by forces beyond him, then the re-
quirement that the system must be isolated to be observed dis-
appears, and then we may count the eyes and mind of man as a
1. Heisenberg, PPQT, 47-48. "As is clear from what has been
said, experiences in the world of atoms require even
greater renunciation of hitherto familiar concepts. In-
deed our usual description of nature and especially the
view of strict measurability of law in the events of na-
ture depend upon the assumption, that it is possible to
observe phenomena without noticeably influencing them.
Coordinating a definite result to a definite cause has
meaning only when we can observe the result and the cause
without simultaneously disturbing the event. The law of
causality in its classical form, because of its very na-
ture, can be defined only for isolated systems."
.
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part of the system under observation. This is, of course,
precisely what determinists wish us to do. Heisenberg consid-
ers this point of view and quickly masters it.
Wurde man die Meszinstrumente zum System rechnen
...so wurden die oben als unbestimmt angesehenen
Anderungen des Svstemvektors Jetz bestimmt. Den
Nutzen hieraus konnte man Jedoch nur ziehen, wenn
unsere Eeobachtung der Meszinstrumente von Uribe-
stimmtheit frei ware. Fur diese Beobachtungen gel-
ten aber die gleichen ifberlegungen wie oben, und
wir muszten etwa auch unsere Augen mit ins System
einschlieszen, urn an dieser Stelle der Uribe stimmt-
,heit zu entgehen usw. Schlieszlich konnte man
die Kette von Ursache und Wirking nur dann quan-
titativ verfolgen
ft
wenn man das ganze Universam in
das System einbezoge—dann ist aber die Physik ver-
schwunden und nur ein mathematisches Schema ge-
blieben. 1
In other words we may take our choice between causation as
defined traditionally or science based on observation; but
we cannot take both.
There is another way of saying this: We may take our
choice between causation as defined traditionally or phenomena
as described in space and time; but we cannot take both. Heis-
enberg puts this in the form of a chart, as follows:
1. Heisenberg, FPQT, 44. "If one were to regard the measur-
ing devices as a part of the system. . .then the changes
considered above as indeterminate, might become determin-
ate. But use could be made of it only if our observation
of the measuring instruments were free of indeterminate-
ness. For these observations, however, the same consid-
erations are valid as for those given above, and we should
be forced to include our own eyes within the system in or-
der to escape indeterminateness in this situation, etc.
Finally one could quantitatively complete the chain of
cause and effect only if he included the whole universe
in one system—but then physics has vanished and only a
mathematical system has remained."
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Klassische Theorie Quantentheoriel
EntwecLer Oder
Raum-Zeitbeschreibung Raum-Zeit-
beschreibung
Mathematisches
Schema nicht in
Raum und Zeit
Kausalitat Uribestimmt-
heit srelationen
Kausalitat
This is a way of saying that if one tried to have an observa-*
tional science and keep the causal law intact in his system
he would find that he had to dispense with the notion of real
space and time. This is in perfect harmony with modern phi-
losophy which finds the reality of time synonymous with emer-
gence of novelty and creativity, which in turn is in harmony,
of course, with indeterminacy or any other move to banish ab-
solute causality. Medieval minds faced with this same alter-
native would easily have made the choice of real causality
and let real time and space go as unnecessary. But modem
minds in the general field of metaphysics take time seriously
and regard it as real, following Alexander, Bergson, White-
head, and others. Now comes modern science--and physics at
that--seeking admission into this company of those willing to
dispense with causality if only real time and space may be
saved thereby. This unexpected confirmation in experimental
science of a viewpoint reached in speculative philosophy must
not go unnoticed by philosophers laboring in the field of
1. Heisenberg, PPQT, 49
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religion* Such mighty questions as human freedom, chance, and
the finiteness of God are all touched by this new coalition of
streams of thought
.
2. The relation of causation to determinism.
Causation in the classical sense in which it is used
in this writing and in Heisenberg is virtually synonomous with
determinism. Determinism is only a generalization of the cau-
sation principle. It is customary, however, to think of de-
terminism as all inclusive and covering the realm of human
thought and action as well as activity in the non-human world,
usually referred to as the realm of nature. Naturally scien-
tists are wary about applying principles discovered in inan-
imate nature of human consciousness. Erwin Schrodinger prob-
ably goes a little farther than most scientists when he says,
"It has become the orthodox view of physicists today, that
the momentary state of a physical system does not determine
its movement or development, to follow. He then clears up
an ambiguity by saying that this is "not only unobtainable
but also unthinkable." He accounts for the long hold of de-
terminism on human thought by saying, "The apparent determi-
nate of inanimate Nature" is accounted for by the relatively
small "margin of indeterminacy" in large systems.
But some philosophers looking at the same facts are
inclined to go much farther even than this. F. A. Lindemann
comes to a definite conclusion:
1. Schrodinger, IFW, 13

With this distinction /between past and future/
the principle of determinism, which has caused
so much trouble in morals and ethics, loses its
scientific foundation. Determinism is a gener-
alization from the principle of causality. Cau-
sality, as we have seen, is meaningless if it is
impossible to define identical circumstances.
Edgar S. Brightman feels similarly.
Until the present century, most naturalists were
atomic mechanists. That is to say, they thought
of nature as made up of atoms, and the only for-
ces at work in nature were the motions of these
atoms, which obeyed a rigid mechanical law, each
set of motions being absolutely determined by
previous motions, and so on into the infinite
regress and progress of the universe. There was
no place for freedom, for novelty, or for pur-
posive control in such a naturalism. But modern
naturalism has ceased to be rigidly mechanical,
as nineteenth century physics has given way to
the less deterministic theories of Heisenberg. 2
Since physics seems more than willing to part with de-
terminism altogether and since ethics and morals, in recent
centuries at least, have not looked upon it with favor, one
may well wonder why the idea persists at all and what purpose
it serves. One suggestion is given by Charles E. Whitmore
who feels that the "mechanical ideal" is still valuable "as
a means of explanation." But its persistence he accounts for
in these words:
The notion of mechanism had had a long and chequered
career in the history of human thought .. .The scope
and the manifold extension of this view of things
sufficiently account ... for our thinking that we un-
derstand it better than we actually do... These two
notions, of unchanging motion and unchanging mat-
ter, long dominated European thought.
3
1. Lindemann, PSQT, 146
2. Brightman, POR, 215.
3. Whitmore, TPM, 489-90
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There are still a great many thinkers who are prepared to de-
fend the notion of causation and determinism against all com-
ers. They believe that the indeterminism of this century is
a fad, a current style of thought, against which the convic-
tion of determinism with centuries of sanction to its credit
is worthy of far more weight. When they aggressively attack
indeterminism, they are able to make a good showing, for there
is still little proof of uncertainty notwithstanding the work
of Werner Heisenberg. But it is in their defensive statement
that the weakness of their position appears. Their basic
assumptions no longer go unchallenged.
It has been made clear in this dissertation that Spin-
oza, Mill, Huxley, and McTaggart all assumed the determinate
order of events in physical nature and reasoned from that to
the determinate order of events in human character, mental
decision, and consequent physical act. It did not occur to
any of them that this axiom would even be questioned. But
now it is in question. The main ground on which determinism
has always rested—the assumed determinism in the physical
order—is questioned. From the standpoint of value judgment
it is perhaps even more important to observe that the mean-
ing and utility of determinism as a working hypothesis is the
precise point where the question is raised. True, the assumed
determinism of physical nature has never been the sole founda-
tion of the philosophic doctrine. There is the question of
how there can be an ex nihilo . There is the question of
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connections between events and predictability, in both the
world of human consciousness and the world of inanimate na-
ture. In fact, it is now clear that if determinism is to sur-
vive at all, it must be on these latter bases.
3. The relation of determinism to human freedom.
Scarcely anyone will deny that the prize example of
determinism turns out to be something a little short of de-
terminism. This discovery raises the suspicion that perhaps
there is, then, no rigid determinism in the world after all.
But it does not prove any such conclusion. It may mean,
merely, that nineteenth century determini sts were unfortu-
nate in their choice of analogy and argument. For surely
there is also the undoubted fact of connections between
events in consciousness. There is no one who would try to
deny that in very large measure predictability of human "choice"
is possible. It is, in fact, a daily experience. But is any
thinker justified in assuming that the assertion of human free-
dom is equivalent to denying the presence of connections be-
tween connections that are as rigid as reinforced concrete on
the one hand and complete absence of all connections alto-
gether on the other hand? Or if some connections are allowed
in an order of freedom, they are thought to be too loose
and uncertain to account for predictability. This is the clear
meaning of the words of John Stuart Mill, for example:
Given the motives which are present to an individ-
ual* s mind, and given likewise the character and
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disposition of the individual, the manner in which
he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if
we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the
inducements which are acting upon him, we could
foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we
can predict any physical event. 1
What all deterministic thought seems to leave out of account
is the possibility of loose-jointed connectionalism between
events in time, events that are tied together with string or
rubber bands rather than events that are welded together in
a rigid framework. If an order of events that is neither
totally determined on the one hand nor totally free on the
other hand, whatever a totally free order could possibly mean,
may be allowed as possible, then freedom of human choice and
connection of events with a valid basis for prediction re-
enter the realm of possibility. We come, therefore, to the
conclusion that there is no essential and inevitable conflict
between predictability and freedom, since no one has ever
ventured to suppose that freedom means utter absence of re-
lations between events. This matter will need a little more
attention presently, but first, consideration must be given to
this question of how there can be an ex nihilo
.
as this seems
to be the sole ground remaining upon which determinism might
still rest.
It has long been abhorrent to orderly minds to imagine
that something could come out of nothing. This is comparable
to pulling a rabbit out of the hat. It is magic. It is the
1. Mill, SOL, 581-82

direct antithesis of the painful accumulation of principles
that have grown out of the patient work of generations of
scientists. For the one thing non-superstitious minds are
positive of is that for every event there is some sufficient
explanation. If a dish falls off a shelf in the night, some-
thing made it fall. If boards in an empty house squeak and
rattle, there is some natural explanation. The one explana-
tion that is unthinkable to sane minds is that the boards
of their own free will just take a notion to squeak and rat-
tle. To deny any of the foregoing would be akin to plunging
us back into primitive animism. It would be in danger of de-
serting our world of order and returning to a world of caprice.
The determinists—Spinoza in particular—have been
astute enough to see that freedom of human choice means that
somewhere there is an uncaused factor. Freedom is impossible
unless there is an element that is itself without determina-
tion by previous causation, and yet that is capable of start-
ing a new chain of events connected in a relationship that is
at least partially causal in character. How can this be?
Here is a puzzling and apparently contradictory situation.
It is this that is referred to as something ex nihilo .
It is vain to imagine that the foregoing dilemma can
be escaped simply by saying that freedom creates nothing new,
but only determines the direction that existing things shall
take. We must still account for the origin of the force that
decided the direction, or else we must frankly acknowledge
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that we cannot account for it. If we attempt to say that
absolute deteriiinism reigns in the inanimate world of nature,
but freedom is possible in the realm of human intelligence
—
and this is a trap into which some men of science have fallen
—we only revert to the Cartesian dualism and render the
problem of interaction utterly insoluble. We must at all
costs avoid such a position.
Let us assume for a moment that something out of noth-
ing is possible and consider what can be said in its favor.
Let it be noted, first, that either there are emergent
forces in this universe that are actually ex nihilo and unex-
plainable or else the operation of chance is entirely impos-
sible. For chance is one form of an ex nihilo relation.
This is clear from the definition of chance, for chance means
the absence of necessary connection between preceding and sue
ceeding events in time. To a determini st there is no such
thing as real chance. To him "chance" means merely man' s ig-
norance of real causes so that when a nickel is flipped it
comes down heads or tails by a process unknown and hence un-
controllable by man, but yet by a process by no means un-
caused by previous events. Thus for the determini st, "chance
is illusory. But for the indetermini st chance is real. As
we will see in chapter six Dr. Heisenberg certainly believes
that chance does operate in this universe. It is not clear
whether all those who abhor the ex nihilo situation and re-
fuse to credit it understand that they are ruling out all

94
chance because they are ruling out the possibility of any-
thing else having occurred except that which actually did
occur, given all the factors that really were involved.
Let it be noted, in the second place, that many mod-
ern philosophers give direct challenge to the ex nihilo
dogma by defending the doctrine of emergence in some form.
The nisus of Samuel Alexander, the 4lan vital of Henri
Bergson, and the creativity of Alfred North Whitehead are
all uncaused and unexplainable because they are all ex
nihilo .
Let it be noted, in the third place, that in dis-
cussing the ex nihilo problem we are discussing the whole
problem of determinism all over again. Nothing new is
introduced under this v/ording of the problem. To assert
that ex nihilo nihil fit is equivalent to asserting that
determinism is true; to deny it is equivalent to assert-
ing determinism as false. There is little more to be said.
Everything, therefore, that can be said in favor of human
freedom at all is to that extent a repudiation of the ex
nihilo dogma.
Does it turn out, then, that our sense of certainty
in predicting effects from causes is a delusion? Has
science misled us into believing that our world is rational
and understandable when actually it is not? To many it will
seem so. But such is not quite the case. To answer this
question our attention needs to be turned to what may be
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called practical or approximate causation.
4. Human freedom and practical or approximate causation.
Most of the thinkers who have labored in this field
and wrestled with this problem end up with the conclusion
that somehow there must be both determinism and freedom.
Here is the viewpoint of Carl Miller:
A. . .recognition of the joint operation of deter-
minism and free will in the field of human behav-
iour would seem to constitute the most satisfying
solution of this puzzling dilemma.
Blanchard W. Means of Hartford outlines three positions, as
follows: determinism, indeterminism, and partial-indeter-
minism. He then has this to say:
These three positions exhaust, I think, the imme-
diate interpretations of scientific probability.
Of these the first two, I suggest, equally ex-
clude freedom, while the third points directly
to a valuational factor in reality.
Edgar Brightman comes to a somewhat similar conclusion: "It
is absurd to regard freedom either as non-existent or as all-
determining. " 3
These statements are representative of current opinion
on the question, but the first two suffer from confusion in
the terminology. Mr. Miller forgets that determinism cannot
operate jointly with anything that is not itself determin-
istic, for determinism is absolute and any mixture of deter-
minism and freedom is not determinism at all, not even as an
1. Miller, SAR, 85
2. Means, FIV, 87.
3. Brightman, POR, 381
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ingredient of the mixture. Mr. Means is confused at the
other end of the scale for he fails to realize that indeter-
minism is always partial. What one could possibly mean by
total indeterminism is hard to understand. The terms deter-
minism and indeterminism, in other words, are not parallel
terms. Determinism always means total determinism; indeter-
minism always means partial indeterminism. Any indetermi-
nisn at all is indeterminism. This is the way Dr. Heisenberg
uses the word, Unb e s timmth e i
t
.
The belief that defenders of human freedom are try-
ing to get rid of all relations between events in time,
either in physical nature or in human consciousness, is,
of course, ludicrous. Certainly Heisenberg has no such
idea. Indeed he assigns a mathematical value to the uncer-
tainty factor, as we have seen. This mathematical value is
_p7
h, Planck’s constant, or 6.61 x 10 erg-second. This
fraction is, of course, an exceedingly small one. It con-
sists of a numerator of 6.61 and a denominator of the digit,
one, followed by twenty-seven zeros. For non-physicists
this fraction needs explanation.
A dyne is a unit of force that can give one gram of
mass a velocity of one centimeter per second in one second.
An erg is a unit of work that employs a dyne of force mov-
ing some object a distance of one centimeter. Work, and
ergs, which are units of work, are thus products of force
and distance. An erg second is an erg at work for one
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second, thus adding the element of time to that of distance.
An erg second is expressive, therefore, of both space and
time. The tiny fraction described above is expressed in
terras of erg seconds. It means that no uncertainty in mo-
lecular physics is discoverable until one attempts to deter-
mine a combination of position and momentum more accurately
27
than 6.61 over 10 part of one erg-second. As we contem-
plate the meaning of that fraction with twenty-seven zeros
in the denominator, we will not worry lest all connections
and relations between events be entirely driven out; rather,
we will wonder if we have not made too much of the cele-
brated Heisenberg principle of "indeterminacy. M There are
those who believe so.
Because h is so small, the indeterminism caused
by the uncertainty principle is of no consequence
in our ordinary experience. For instance, the
resulting error in the position or velocity of
a rifle bullet would be completely inconsequen-
tial even for the most refined ballistic calcu-
lation . 1
It should be clear that indeterminacy that is as small as
this is no threat to an orderly universe. The lav/ of cause
and effect is not challenged as far as usual daily expe-
riences in the physical world are concerned. If the Heisen-
berg principle has any real bearing on the problem of hu-
man freedom, conscious mind must be conceived as having
the power to control a series of indeterminacies very close
1. Van Vleck, Enc . Brit
., XXII, 679.

98
to the origin of the directive process in such a way that
much greater differences appear further along in the same
process. An analogy may make this point clear.
Let us suppose that a train is starting out from New
York City going in a westerly direction. The intention is
that it will eventually arrive in San Francisco, 3,100 miles
away. The direction in which the train runs is pretty well
fixed ahead of time by the placing of iron rails on which it
runs. There are, however, many sets of rails running in all
directions. Yet the train can turn to the left or to the
right only at a very few places, called switches. Even if
there are hundreds of such switches, the total length of
track involved in switches is a very tiny fraction of the
total mileage of track that runs all the way from New York
to San Francisco. Yet, small as this indeterminism is, it
is ample to give the train despatcher and the train crew
opportunity to get the train into the precise terminal at
San Francisco that they had in mind when they started out.
But, starting from the same beginning in New York City, they
could, if they had so chosen, bring the train to a final
stop at New Orleans, at Montreal, or at any other one of a
thousand places, in spite of the fact that indeterminate
iron rails are a very small fraction of the total. As defen-
ders of "partial determinism" never tire of telling us, prac-
tical or approximate causation is no deterrent to freedom,
but an indispensable foundation for it. This point will be
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discussed further in the next chapter, since the contention
may be made very logically that the extent of indeterminacy
which Heisenberg has discovered is so exceedingly small that
human freedom can scarcely be said to be accounted for on
such a tiny foundation.
Nevertheless the conclusion to which we have come is
that there is no reason to suppose that causality is ever
entire and complete. So-called determinism is not real de-
terminism at all and the terra should be dropped. Indeter-
minism reigns in this universe, but by indeterminism we mean
v/hat Heisenberg means by Unbestimmtheit
,
approximate or
practical causation. This conclusion is the same as that
of Mr. Miller:
The only apparent pathway of escape from this de-
terministic viev/ of society lies in a critical
examination of the Principle of Causality itself. 1
The concern for preservation of human freedom in phi-
losophy is not ’’much ado about nothing." It forms the nec-
essary basis for moral character and the building of a human
society. It is as much required for social science as approx-
imate causation is for natural science.
Let there be no illusions as to the crucial nature
of this investigation. If the principle /of deter-
minism/ holds sway over human lives, no individual
can be held accountable for his actions. Each act
which he performs is inexorably determined by the
train of causes which lie behind it. At no point
can he as a sovereign soul intervene for better or
for worse.
^
1. Miller, SAR, 77-78. 2. Miller, SAR, 76
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Sociologists are far from being in unanimous agreement with
this point of view. Some sociologists feel that the leader
in society has more power to bring about improvements in a
determined order than in one that is not determined.
At first sight the picture is not altogether a
black one, for it would seem to place in the hands
of society an extraordinarily potent means of prog-
ress ...The fallacy in such a conception for the
advancement of society lies in the fact that the
same principle of causality which would forbid
the individual to take steps for his own good
would also prevent society as a whole from tak-
ing similar measures.-*-
But it is in the field of philosophy of religion that
the issue looms largest. A sense of guilt for having done
wrong has always been a potent force in the redemption of
man. Devout thinkers in the field of religion feel keenly
that any philosophy that robs man of this sense of guilt
when wrong is done closes to man a main avenue of entrance
into release and happiness and a better world for all. Carl
Miller sees this point clearly and states it forcefully:
If an individual believes in the law /of determin-
ism/7’ but is unable to alter his behaviour in ac-
cordance with that belief, no harm is possible;
but if, while still believing in the law, he actu-
ally has the power to make decisions for himself,
he can choose the path of evil without any sense
of moral responsibility. It is this aspect of
determinism which has led to the irreconcilable
hostility of socially minded people. 2
1 . Miller, SAR, 76-77 2. Miller, SAR, 81

CHAPTER FIVE
OBJECTIONS TO THIS VIEW
The contention of this dissertation thus far is that
the Heisenberg principle has an important bearing on the
philosophical problem of human freedom and tends strongly
to favor such freedom. Against this contention four argu-
ments may be advanced. Consideration will now be given to
these four points of view. Stated briefly, they are as
follows: First, that Heisenberg is mistaken in that he is
guilty of inconsistency or of philosophical naivetl, or
that so-called indeterminacy really has no bearing on the
law of cause and effect. Second, that Heisenberg is quite
correct within his area of operation but that his principle
is entirely irrelevant to the problem of human freedom and
any attempt to prove the contrary is either a misinterpre-
tation of Heisenberg or a misapplication of the principle
to a realm where it does not belong and where it has no
proper function. Third, that Heisenberg is correct and the
interpretation made of him here is correct as far as it
goes, but that the area where indeterminacy has any mean-
ing is so exceedingly tiny and so f ar removed from the realm
of man’s daily living that for all practical purposes the
whole attempt to show human freedom to be actual comes to
naught and determinism still reigns supreme. Fourth, that
even if it be granted that indeterminism prevails in the
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realm of physics, it still does not follow that it reigns
in the domain of mind and human consciousness, for the deter-
mination of human thought may be argued irrespective of what
physicists may decide about the electrons in the atom. In
one or another of these four categories will be found all of
the critics of the point of vi ew that is here put forth. We
must now consider these arguments one at a time.
1. That Heisenberg is mistaken.
Many philosophers are quite certain that all this talk
about any logical connection between Heisenberg’s principle
of uncertainty and the notion of human freedom of choice rep-
resents so much confusion and error. Some of these trace
the confusion and error back to Heisenberg himself. C. Hillis
Kaiser does this, for example. In his Harvard dissertation on
Physical Causality
,
he has this to say:
It is obvious that Heisenberg is apt to overlook
the fact that, although the form of the uncertain-
ty relations is the same in both instances, the
uncertainty expressed in the general equation...
is an "intrinsic” uncertainty of the position and
momentum of the particle within its wave packet,
while the uncertainty deduced from the act of
measurement is an uncertainty imposed on the par-
ticle by the action of the measuring apparatus.
^
The contention of Mr. Kaiser is clear and consistent.
Here is a physicist who performs a great number of experi-
ments. Out of these many experiments arises the observation
that there is apparently an irreducible inaccuracy. Since
1. Kaiser, PCRD, 151-52
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.the physicist on contemplation becomes convinced that the
inaccuracy is traceable to the essential process of experi-
mentation itself, he then announces that no man will ever be
able to reduce that inaccuracy any further. It is obvious
that the margin of error, that is apparently irreducible,
is a solid fact of present human experience; but it is
equally clear that the "no-man-will-ever-be-able" part of
the argument is not a result of experiment, or observation,
but rather of speculation and reason on the part of the ob-
server. It is not unreasonable to concede the first and
deny the second, as Kaiser does. And then when the physicist
goes on to assert that with his mathematical equations he has
destroyed the time-honored law of cause and effect, much pa-
tience with him is required on the part of those who do not
want to see reasoning go very far beyond the observed facts
of experience. Kaiser contends, then, that the experiments
generalized upon by Heisenberg are capable of another inter-
pretation. An interpretation more in harmony with conven-
tional thought would be that electrons in the atom are deter-
mined and perfectly predictable, except that man in his at-
tempts to observe them disturbs them with his light and ren-
ders them unpredictable with an uncertainty that is "imposed
on" them. It is as though a man wished to observe a bird in
its flight more closely and shot it down to get that closer
view and then concluded that the bird really could not fly
at all since it would not do so on close inspection.
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This philosophic view gets excellent support from cer-
tain physicists who desire to see a much more conservative
view taken of the present situation. Mr. Kaiser is thus in
harmony v/ith Max Planck’s criticism of Heisenberg which he
expresses in Where Is Science Going ? This writing is trans-
lated by James Murphy, and includes an interview between Mr.
Murphy and Albert Einstein on the same question, which is in
English. In this book Max Planck says;
Some essential modification seems to be inevitable;
but I firmly believe, in company with most physi-
cists, that the quantum hypothesis will eventually
find its exact expression in equations which will
be a more exact formulation of the law of causality. ^
Professor Planck sees no reason to give up the lav; of causal-
ity. On the contrary he thinks that it is still an assumption
behind present investigation.
In point of fact, statistical laws are dependent up-
on the assumption of the strict law of causality
functioning in each particular case. And the non-
fulfillment of the statistical rule in particular
cases is not therefore due to the fact that the law
of causality is not fulfilled, but rather to the
fact that our observations are not sufficiently
delicate and accurate to put the law of causality
to a direct test in each case. If it were possible
for us to follow the movement of each individual
molecule in this very intricate labyrinth of proc-
esses
,
then we should find in each case an exact
fulfillment of the dynamic laws. 2
In this same volume, Mr. Murphy, the translator, quotes
from a personal interview with Albert Einstein on the same
point. These are the words of Einstein;
1. Planck, WISG, 143 2. Planck, WISG, 145
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I find that the problem of causality which is today
under discussion in physics is not a new phenome-
non in the field of science. The method which is
used in quantum physics has already had to be ap-
plied in biology, because the biological processes
In nature could not in themselves be traced so that
their connection would be clear, and for that rea-
son biological rules have always been of a statis-
tical character. And I do not understand why so
much pother ought to be made if the principle of
causation should undergo a restriction in modern
physics, for this is not a new situation at all.
Mr. Einstein then expresses his agreement with Max Flanck:
I am entirely in agreement with our friend Flanck
in regard to the stand which he has taken on this
principle, but you must remember what Flanck has
said and written. He admits the impossibility of
applying the causal principle to the inner proe-
esses of atomic physics under the present state
of affairs ; but he has set himself definitely
against the thesis that from this Unbrauchbarkeit
or inapplicability we are to conclude that the proc-
ess of causation does not exist in external real-
ity. Flanck has really not taken up an definite
standpoint here. He has only contradicted the
emphatic assertions of some quantum theorists and
I agree fully with him. 2
In continuing the interview Mr. Murphy then asked Mr. Ein-
stein this question:
You would agree, then, I imagine, that physics
gives no ground whatsoever for this extraordi-
nary application we may for convenience' s sake
call Heisenberg' s principle of indeterminacy?
3
To this question Mr. Einstein replied, "Of course I agree.
Mr. Murphy returns to Max Flanck and allows him to
up the situation:
Where the discrepancy comes in today is not between
nature and the principle of causality, but rather
1. Flanck, WISG, 209. 3* Flanck, WISG, 210-11.
2. Flanck, WISG, 210.
"3
sum

between the picture which we have made of nature
and the realities in nature itself. Our picture
is not in perfect accord with our observational re-
sults... I am convinced that the bringing about of
that accord must take place, not in the rejection
of causality, but in a greater enlargement of the
formula and a refinement of it, so as to meet mod-
ern discoveries.
1
Neither Heisenberg nor anyone else has ever denied the
possibility of the above explanation. It is the interpreta-
tion that seems simplest and easiest. But whether it really
is so simple is a grave question. Heisenberg says that it
may be true that in behind the indeterminate world of the
scientist there is another world of pure cause and effect,
but if so, man's search for it is "unfruchtbar und sinnlos."^
It is not so much that Heisenberg denies determinism in the
ultimate order as that he is uninterested in the ultimate or-
der, and believes that the observable order is the only one
worth talking about.
Die Realitatsordnung der neuen Atomphysik dagegen,
die die Phanomene ob j ektiviert
,
ohne hinter ihnen
ein in den gewohnlichen Begriffen beschreibbares
"Ding
|f
an sich" zu fordern, gibt uns vielleicht eher
die Koglichkeit, andersartige Begriffssysteme gel-
ten zu lassen--als Mittel zur Beschreibung andersar-
tiger Bereiche der Wirklichkeit
,
von aenen man hof-
fen darf, dasz sie sich eines Tages den schon gen-
auer bekannten Bereichen in einer bis ins letzte
verstandlichen Weise zuordnen werden.3
1. Planck, WISG-, 221.
2. Heisenberg, Ual
,
197.
3. Heisenberg, EnW, 30. "The order of reality of the new
atonic physics, on the contrary, which objectifies phenom-
ena, without seeking behind them a 'thing in itself,’ such
as is describable in traditional terms, gives us, perhaps
sooner, the possibility of allowing different systems or
concepts--as the means to the description of different
areas of reality, from which one may hope that they will
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Heisenberg disclaims all knowledge of "ultimate reality."
"Die Physik soil nur den Zusammenhang der Wahrnehmungen for-
mal beschreiben, he says. When asked directly by corres-
pondence the question, "Do you feel that the ultimate real-
ity of nature is beyond the mind of man to know?" he replied,
"I think we have learned from atomic physics that it is very
difficult to use such terms as 'ultimate reality' of nature."
2
In another connection Heisenberg is speaking about the past
history of an electron and he raises the question as to wheth-
er this can be calculated with certainty. He answers that he
thinks it can. But then he adds, "Ob man der genannten Rech-
nung uber die Vergangenheit des Elektrons irgendeine physik-
alische Realitat zuordnen soli, 1st also eine reine G-eschmacks
frage."3 The contention of Heisenberg is not that there is no
law of cause and effect in the ultimate nature of the universe
but simply that science has no use for such a law and that in
physics the search for evidence of it is "unfruchtbar und sinn
los .
"
From the foregoing it would seem that Kaiser is mistak-
en and that it is not Heisenberg that confuses the electrons
he finds in his laboratory with reality, but rather his
some day relate the areas already accurately known in a
manner understandable down to their ultimate constitu-
ents .
"
1. Heisenberg, Ual
,
197. "Physics is required to describe
only the relation of formal perceptions."
2. Heisenberg, letter to P. M. Hammond, October 30, 194-8.
3. Heisenberg, PFQT, 15. "Whether one must ascribe any phys-
ical reality to such a calculation concerning the past
history of an electron is thus a pure question of taste."
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Interpreters. If anyone is mistaken, it is not Heisenberg.
Of course it will be borne in mind that to say that Heisen-
berg makes no attempt to apply his principle to ultimate
reality is one thing, and to say that it cannot be done is
quite another thing. If such positivism as he expresses
were allowed to stand as final, not only would all relation
between science and religion be destroyed, but all relation
between religion and human experience itself would be de-
stroyed, and by this process religion itself would disappear.
Positivism is never a final answer. It is difficult to
imagine that Heisenberg means it to be a final answer. But
it is easy to see that it may well be a provisional scien-
tific hypothesis, which states simply that what is beyond
the experience of man is in a different category from that
which is within that experience.
But Heisenberg has a critic that is severer than Kaiser.
P. S. C. Northrop finds him guilty of inconsis tency. He says:
Two points are to be noted with reference to
this doctrine. First, it rests upon Heisenberg’s
philosophy, and second, it denies that philosophy.
The first point becomes evident the moment one
notes that this argument for indeterminism does
not hold unless one accepts his doctrine that the
only meaning a scientific concept can have is one
given in an experimental operation. Indeterminism
holds, he says, because it is experimentally im-
possible to determine the conditions for determin-
ism. In other words, the only meaning which a
scientific concept may have is one defined by a
technical experiment. But science has other ways
of arriving at meanings for its many conceptions.
The method of hypothesis is one of them; the
statistical method, a second; and the procedure
of Greek inductive natural philosophers, a third.
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Thus while Heisenberg's argument leaves science
open to a doctrine of indeterminism it cannot be
taken too seriously, since it is impossible to
define the accepted methods that science has used
in its history in terras of the restricted philos-
ophy upon which it rests.
This becomes evident in this very instance.
For Heisenberg only establishes his principle of
indeterminism by assuming electrons and their mo-
tion. These conceptions involve not merely a phys-
ical theory of nature, but the rejection of the
philosophy which makes his doctrine of indeter-
minism plausible. This philosophy permits the in-
troduction of no factors aside from mathematical
formulae which are not immediately observed.
Electrons do not satisfy this requirement .
1
Mr. Northrop believes that Heisenberg both believes
and disbelieves in a physical theory of nature with its com-
panion notion of insistence on meanings of scientific con-
cepts defined exclusively by technical experiment. That is,
Mr. Northrop finds Heisenberg guilty of denying in his con-
clusions the indispensible assumptions in his premises, and
Mr. Northrop reasons that if the premises must be set aside,
then so must the conclusions drawn from them and the whole
argument collapses.
It is true that Heisenberg begins with laboratory ex-
periment and assumes its efficacy. He then moves from that
point to an emphasis on mathematics and attempts to state his
conclusions in the form of equations. But it is difficult to
see any inconsistency in this line of procedure. Certainly
the method of hypothesis, the statistical method, and the
method of Greek induction may all be regarded as auxiliary
1. Northrop, SFP, 135-36

lie.
to the method of observation and experiment; in fact it is
quite certain that science would never get very far if any
of these methods, or all of them together, were used in any
other manner than as auxiliaries to the experimental method.
Scientific concepts defined exclusively in terms of experi-
mental method may be unduly restricted but they are scarcely
inconsistent with mathematical conclusions.
When it comes to the matter of the so-called "physical
theory of nature," the fog through which we have to peer gets
even thicker. It is difficult indeed to harmonize the inde-
terminacy of nature with our familiar notion of a physical
nature. Indeterminate nature seems to fit in better with a
non-physical theory of nature, such as a pan-psychistic view
or more likely a view of nature consisting of unconscious but
immaterial energy. But although Heisenberg does "assume elec-
trons and their motion," it is very hard to see how this as-
sumption "involves a physical theory of nature" and the "re-
jection of the philosophy which makes his doctrine of indeter-
minism plausible. By "the philosophy which makes his doctrine
of indeterminism plausible" Northrop presumably refers to
some form of idealism. But there is in reality no reason
to suppose that the discoveries of Heisenberg disprove either
realism or idealism, and they certainly do not presuppose ma-
terialism.
When Northrop says that the indeterminism of Heisenberg
begins by assuming "electrons and their motions" and that

"these conceptions involve... a physical theory of nature,"
what meaning can be given to these words other than this:
Whatever is assumed to be real is assumed to be physical; if
electrons and their motions are assumed to b e real at all,
then they are assumed to be physical. But this is a simple
case of begging the question.
No one of Heisenberg's critics denies his right to
establish whatever hypotheses he chooses to help him under-
stand the results of his laboratory experiments. But they
object to the philosophizing he does based on his assumptions.
It can scarcely be denied that he does philosophize in spite
of his declaration of ignorance of metaphysics. William Sei-
friz expresses himself in this fashion:
There are two aspects of Heisenberg's principle,
the physical side and the philosophical. On the
physical side the evidence in favor of the nrin-
ciple is overwhelmingly convincing. . .The phi-
losophy of Heisenberg's principle is quite another
matter .
1
Mr. Seifriz feels that the philosophy to which he objects is
not an interpretation of Heisenberg, but the interpretation
that Heisenberg himself makes of his own principle. The
thing he objects to is the implication that science will nev-
er again be able to return to a definite cause-and-effect re-
lation between the events of nature. He sees no ground for
such a conclusion. He grants that indeterminacy is a neces-
sary postulate for present investigation, but he sees no
1. Seifriz, CII, 30-31.
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reason for saying, "’We now know that we shall never know.’" 1
Mr. Heisenberg is very well aware of this criticism
of his thought. He answers it, as follows:
Aus diesem Grunde kann die gelegentlich ausgespro-
chene Hoffnung, es konnte s pater eine Ordnung der
relativistischen oder der atomaren Ersche inungen
mit den klassischen Begriffen vorgenommen werden,
nicht in der tatsachlichen Situation unserer Wissen-
schaft begrundet werden. Vielmehr folgt die
Tatsache, dasz es einen gewissen Erfahrungsbereich
gibt, der durch die Schrodingersche Wellen-mechanik,
nicht aber durch die klassische Mechanik gedeutet
werden kann, dasz auch die unanschaulichen Zuge
der quantentheoretischen Gesetzm&szigkeiten fur
immer einen Bestandteil der theoretischen Natur-
wissenschaft bilden miissen. Ich mochte hier als
Beispiel insbesondere die Prage besprechen, ob der
statische Charakter der Quantenmechanik endgultig
ist, oder ob man hoffen kann, dasz es spater raog-
lich sein wird, eine deterministische Erganzung
der Quantenmechanik zu finden.
2
Professor Heisenberg proceeds to show that there is no ground
whatever to suppose that indeterminacy will ever be given up
now that man has finally entered the field of atomic physics
where indeterminacy must be introduced ’'from the beginning in
order to describe the facts. ”3
1. Seifriz, CII, 30.
2. Heisenberg, PFmP, 98. "From this argument the occasionally
expressed hope, that later an order of relativistic or of
atomic phenomena could be undertaken with the classical
concepts, cannot be established in the actual situation
of our science. Rather the fact follows, that there is a
certain area of experience, which through the wave mech-
anics of Schrodinger, cannot be explained through classi-
cal mechanics, so that the inexact tendencies of the laws
of measurement in the quantum theory must constitute for-
ever an element of theoretical natural science. As an
example I might here discuss especially the question,
whether the statistical character of quantum mechanics
is final, or whether one can hope that it will be possible
later to find a determinate outcome of quantum mechanics."
3. Heisenberg, letter to P. M. Hammond, October 30, 1948.
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It is not at all the opinion of Heisenberg, however,
that present quantum theory will never need revision. This
is not what he means.
Zum Schlusz mochte ich noch die Frage aufwerfen,
an welchen Stellen die moderne Physik selbst
wieder einer Revision unterzogen werden musz.
Es ist ja von vornherein klar, dasz auch der
Anwendungsbereich der neuen Begriffe notwendig
beschrankt sein musz. Durch die Entdeckungen
der letzten Jahre ist es wahrscheinlich gewor-
den, dasz die nachsten Beschrankungen in der An-
wendung der bisherigen Begriffe durch die Exis-
tenz des Elektrons erzwungen werden.
Heisenberg then proceeds to show on what the presumed "exis-
tence" of the electron depends. It is clear from this dis-
cussion that he expects quantum theory to be revised in the
future, but not in the direction of more certainty, but rather
in the direction of less certainty. He believes that the more
man tries to find out about the activities of particles and
their nature, the more he must reconcile himself to dealing
with probabilities. To many men this will suggest skepti-
cism, the denial of the possibility of knowledge. But to Heis-
enberg it does not seem so. He believes that it should be re-
garded not as "Skeptizismus , " but
1. Heisenberg, PFmP, 101. "In conclusion I might turn to the
question, at what points modern physics itself must be
submitted to further revision. It is indeed clear, as a
matter of course, that the area of application of the
new concepts must necessarily be limited also. Through
the discoveries of recent years, it has become likely
that the next limitations in the applicability of hith-
erto existing concepts will be forced through the exis-
tence of the electron."
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sie 1st im Gegenteil nur ein anderer Ausdruck fur
die {Jberzeugung, dasz die Erweiterung unseres Er-
fahrungsbereiches iramer neue Harmonien ans Licht
bringen wird. 1
For Heisenberg the goal of thought is not so much certainty
as harmony. Or perhaps it is better to say that for him
harmony is proof of certainty, a certainty that is not to be
found anymore in laboratory experiment.
To the host of his critics Werner Heisenberg makes a
defence of himself that is clear and convincing. He insists
that his remarks apply only to the ’’Land des reinen Verstandes,”
to quote the phrase of Immanuel Kant, and that this land may
be ”eine Insel.’’ 2 And if it is, there is no way of knowing
whether the law of cause and effect operates in the "weiten
and sturmischen Oceane’’^ beyond the island, because it is
outside of the area of human understanding. All he knows,
says Heisenberg, is that physics now has no use for the law
of causation, and that apparently it will have no more use
for it as time goes on.
2. That indeterminacy is irrelevant to human freedom.
The contention that there is a genuine indeterminacy
in the observable phenomena of physics, as Heisenberg main-
tains, is a proposition that most thinkers probably accept now
as well established by scientific experiment. They may wish
1 ~. Heisenberg, PPmP, 102. ”It is on the contrary only an-
other expression for the conviction that the extension
of the area of our experience will always bring new har-
monies to light.”
2. Kant, KrV, 295.
3. Kant, KrV, 294.
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to see any notion of objective indeterminacy guarded against,
but phenomenal indeterminacy they accept as a matter of course
and understand Heisenberg to be meaning no more than that.
But a large number of these thinkers, and most of them are
philosophers, rise to protest vigorously against the idea that
the phenomenal indeterminacy of electrons in the atom can have
any relevancy to the doctrine of human freedom. Here are a
few of the opinions expressed.
P. W. Bridgman in 1929:
The failure of the law of cause and effect
has been exploited by a number of German physi-
cists, who have emphasized the conclusion that
we are thus driven to recognize that the uni-
verse is governed by pure chance . 1. . .The immedi-
ate effect will be to let loose a veritable in-
tellectual spree of licentious and debauched
thinking. 2 . . .One group will find in the failure
of the physical law of cause and effect the so-
lution of the age-long problem of the freedom
of the will.
3
H. T. Flint in 1932:
Prof. Darwin /C. G. Darwin/ believes that
the question of human free will is not touched by
recent developments in physics. It is doubtful
if any of the old deterministic descriptions of
nature were antagonistic to the doctrine of free
will, /sic/ for it is a presumption to suppose
that the organic world is controlled only by the
laws of physics and chemistry. Since the Heis-
enberg uncertainty relations are also laws of the
inorganic world, it is again a presumption to sup-
pose that they control those activities in which
human beings feel that they have freedom of choice.
What the new principle does is point out to the
"die-hard" determinist that there is nothing in
physics which makes the idea of free will absurd.
^
1. Bridgman, NVS, 448
2. Bridgman, NVS, 451
3. Bridgman, NVS, 451
4. Flint, UPMP, 746.
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And since determinism originally rested on presumed notions
in physics this may be all that is necessary to destroy deter
minism.
Erwin Schrodinger in 1936:
Many eminent scientific workers, especially
physicists, have tried to play with the idea that
the apparent indeterminacy of animate nature, that
is, of living matter, might be connected with the
theoretical indeterminacy of modern physics. What
makes that play so fascinating and thrilling is
evidently the hope (whether outspoken or concealed)
of extracting from the new physical dogma a model
of free-wills which the old one would refuse to
yield. I consider this hope an illusion, for the
following reasons.
When observed objectively in other creatures,
free-will actions do not call for a special "inde-
terminist" explanation any more than other events.
When two persons .. .react differently under apparent-
ly the same conditions, we feel compelled to account
for it, whether the reaction is a passive or on ac-
tive one, by a real, though unknown difference of
conditions, including, of course, character and the
temporary disposition on the part of the reacting
persons. A poet unrolling before us the objective
picture of free-will actions is just as concerned
about proper causation (here called motivation) as
the classical physicist was for inanimate nature.
On the other hand, when regarded as a fact of self-
observation, it has quite a different standing from
scientific experience. The two are, as it were, in
different planes, which do not intersect. Self-
observed free-will I would analyse into two facts.
First, indeed, a prediction, but not based on pre-
vious experience, certainly not in the way in which
scientific prediction is. If I am the actor, I just
know what is going to happen. . .with the greatest
amount of certainty which is ever met with in life.
The second fact is moral one; I feel responsible
for what happens...
In my opinion the whole analogy is fallacious,
because the plurality of possible events, in the
case of an action under free-will, is a self-de-
ception.
1. Schrodinger, I-".’, 13
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The philosopher, R. P. Alfred Hoernl^, wrote a review
in 1936 of two books written by John Elof Boodin. In one of
these books Boodin defends objective indeterminacy. Hoernl^
is critical of this point.
The one section of Boodin’ s argument which to
me is unconvincing, even when I put myself at his
own point of view, is the section on "The Principle
of Indeterminacy." (P. 161-168 of Three Interpre -
tations . .
. ) Like many others, Boodin interprets
the well-known difficulty in determining precisely
at once the position, and the path and velocity of
movement, of an electron, as revealing an inher-
ent "indeterminacy" in the most fundamental phys-
ical processes .. .1 must confess that, even after
reading and re-reading Boodin’ s pages, I still
find it quite impossible to discover in the exper-
imental predicament here described, any far-reach-
ing metaphysical significance . ^
Moreover, the very concept of indeterminacy
gives me trouble. I suspect an ambiguity which is
best brought to light by considering determinacy in
relation to predictability. According to the old
"determinism" not only is each event, when it oc-
curs, determinate in character, but its character
is determined by that of certain other events to
which it is related as effect to cause, so that
the causal events being known, the effect-events
can be predicted. By contrast, the indetermin-
ism, which goes with the insistence on the emer-
gence of novelties, can freely concede that each
novelty as it emerges is determinate in character,
and, once having happened, can be precisely known
for what it is, and yet deny that this determinate
event could have been predicted from the known
characters of any other events. Here the charac-
ter of the event is determinate when it happens,
but indeterminable, in the sense of not precisely
knowable or inferable from any available evidence
prior to its actual happening. . .What I still ques-
tion is whether this /difficulty of experimental
method.7 can be turned into the positive assertion
that the character of the event is intrinsically
"indeterminate," i. e. that it is not determinable.
1*7 Hoernl&, Review, 224-25
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in the sense of precisely knowable, because it is,
as it were, indefinite and fluid. 1
I thus remain profoundly sceptical of all the
far-reaching metaphysical speculations built upon
the difficulties of observing and determining pre-
cisely the behaviour of electrons or other ultimate
constituents of matter. If I am to believe in the
creativeness of the Universe,— or in the emergence
of novelites under divine control, T would rather
do so, in the first instance at any rate, on evi-
dence drawn from the macroscopic realm of Nature,
from human life, from the history of nations, from
the evidence of religious experience, or even from
such reasoning as Bergson offers in his Creative
Evolution.
When Prof. Hoernl^ says, "By contrast, the indetermin-
ism which goes with the insistence on the emergence of novelties,
can freely concede that each novelty as it emerges is determi-
nate in character," there seems to be an ambiguity involved. If
by "determinate" Hoernle means what we shall presently define
as approximate or practical causality, then of course it can
be freely conceded and no inconsistency is involved. But if
instead he means rigid determinism, as the word implies, then
it is very doubtful indeed if Alfred North Whitehead, for ex-
ample, would concede any such thing. In fact, it is quite
certain that he would not do so.
We resume the documentation of opinions opposed to us-
ing indeterminacy as an argument for human freedom.
Blanchard W. Means in 1936:
I would point out that indeterminism as such
not only does not, but can not, lead to freedom of
the will, and further that our own immediate evi-
dence of freedom goes directly to limit the reality
T~. Hoernl6, Review, 225 2. Hoernl&, Review, 226
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of any ultimate indeterminacy underlying the modern
statistical character of science.
1
C. H. Kaiser in 1948:
Our conclusion might be expressed as follows:
In so far as theology is allied with metaphysics,
it has nothing to learn from modern physics and
nothing to fear from it. 2
Here is a battery of opinion arrayed against objective
indeterminism and against any attempt to account for freedom
of human choice by reference to Heisenberg’s principle. To
this impressive list one more viewpoint of great significance
must be added.
One of the questions asked of Dr. Heisenberg in direct
correspondence was this:
Would you please give me your own opinion as to
whether the principle of indeterminacy has any ef-
fect at all on our thinking on (a) human freedom
of choice, (b) operation of chance in the universe,
and (c) God as infinite or finite?
To this question Dr. Heisenberg replied as follows:
I do not think that the principle of indeterminacy
has any immediate consequences for the problems a
and c, but has of course the immediate consequence
b, that chance plays a great role in the events of
nature
.
3
It would appear that Heisenberg himself does not feel that in-
determinacy has any direct bearing on the problem of human
freedom.
As one reads over these opinions of eminent leaders
in human thought, he becomes aware that here is the crux of
1. Means, PIV, 85. 3. Heisenberg, letter to
2. Kaiser, RMP
,
98. P. M. Hammond, Oct. 31, 1948.
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the matter. Such fundamental questions as these rise in the
mind: How are physics and religion to be related to each oth-
er? In what sense, if any, is human experience a unity? Is
a metaphysics that claims to include both religion and phy-
sics--and much els e--possible at all?
The pondering of these questions gives rise to the conr
viction that if indeterminacy may be accepted as a working
hypothesis in the realm of physics, then indeterminacy may
also be accepted as a working hypothesis in the realm of meta-
physics and religion. This is another way of saying that in-
determinacy may be regarded as objective and that therefore
human freedom may be understood as possible in the light of
this hypothesis. In support of this view six observations
follow which run counter at one point or another with those
opinions just quoted.
First, we raise the question of what constitutes proof.
In the realm of natural science men have come to understand
by "proof” positive evidence that is overwhelming in amount
and in significance in comparison with any contrary evidence
that may exist. One reason that men of science dislike to
venture into the field of metaphysics, oftentimes, is that
they realize that in that realm there is so little positive
evidence, either on one aide or on the other, and what there
is is so often of a character quite unfamiliar to men of
science, that they feel they have no "proof" of anything.
Doubtless this is the reason that in the past men of s cience
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have often thought of themselves as agnostics. Yet, it should,
not be difficult to get agreement to the proposition that what-
ever hypotheses in the a rea of metaphysics give most assistance
in bringing meaning and unity to man’s total experience--his
natural science, social science, religion, art, mathematical
calculations, etc., etc. --may be tentatively held to be true.
Applying this line of thought to the problem of indeterminacy
and human freedom, we find that the principle of indeterminacy
which physicists now find so useful is likewise useful in the
field of philosophy of religion. Furthermore, and more impor-
tant, if the principle of practical or approximate causation
is borne in mind, there is no area of human experience where
the idea of determinism is needed to explain events. If
therefore the metaphysician is willing to refrain from the
use of the word, proof—which is seldom used in metaphysics
anyway- -on what ground can physicists and philosophers of
science deny to metaphysicians the use of indeterminism as a
working hypothesis or deny that modern physics is in accord
with such an hypothesis? It would clear up one basic diffi-
culty if thinkers generally would understand that if we are
to have a metaphysics at all, it must necessarily rest on
just such propositions made probable by their helpful func-
tioning in the attempt to unify total human experience, but
never getting any better proof. In this respect human freedom
is in the same category with a belief in God for which there
is no rational necessity either. The reasonable approach to
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the problem of the existence of God is not to ask for proof,
but to ask whether the acceptance of the existence of God as
a working hypothesis in philosophy of religion tends to bring
meaning and order and unity into total human experience or
whether the acceptance of such a belief tends rather to cre-
ate more problems than it solves. So in the case of human
freedom. If the point is made that physical indeterminacy
does not prove human freedom, the answer may be made, of
course it doesn’t. In the very nature of the problem human
freedom cannot be proved— or disproved. V/e are not looking
for proof. We are looking for a coherent account of human
experience, and that coherent account must include human free-
dom in the realm of philosophy of religion and indeterminacy
in the realm of quantum mechanics and we find the two to be
in harmony. This is a sound approach to the problem and per-
haps the only one that does full justice to the nature of
metaphysics and its manner of operation.
Second, the fact that human experience is a unity must
be stressed. It is obvious that very great differences pre-
vail in the various areas of human experience. The degree of
possible certainty is much greater in some than in others.
Hypotheses and methods work admirably in some and break down
entirely in other realms. Methods that quickly get at the
truth in chemistry may be of no use whatever in biology.
Basic assumptions in mathematics may be meaningless or worse
in religion. Yet, in spite of all this, we must believe that
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in some sense all of life, all of human experience, is a
unity and that artificial bifurcations of life into animate
and inanimate, or into observer and that which is observed,
must be avoided in the last analysis. If this is not done,
then we have on our hands the Cartesian dualism and its con-
sequent problem of interaction. If the unity of all expe-
rience is accepted, then physics cannot be said to be entirely
irrelevant to philosophy. We may well be warned how we re-
late them, but they cannot go entirely unrelated.
Third, this matter of the supposed irrelevancy of the
uncertainty principle in quantum theory to the question of
human freedom in philosophy is in need of examination at an-
other point. All determinis ts have believed that determinism
prevailed without question in the inanimate world of nature.
Huxley said, "That such an order exists... is acknowledged by
every sane raan."l McTaggart said, "No one supposes that this
event /the falling of a drop of rain7 is not completely deter-
mined."^ It must be clear that if those who today find rela-
vanoy between Heisenberg and human freedom are to be found to
be in error, then so must Huxley and McTaggart and many others
be found in error also and for the same reason. It is not
reasonable to say that physics is relevant to freedom when
the evidence of physics is negative as far as freedom is con-
cerned, but that physics is irrelevant to freedom when the
1. Huxley, Hume, 214. 2. McTaggart, SDR, 149
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evidence of physics is affirmative. And in either case deter-
minism receives a bad blow. If the irrelevancy of the two
areas is thought to prevail, then the foundation is knocked
out from under determinism; if the relevancy of the areas
is established, then the superficiality of the ground of de-
terminism lies exposed.
Fourth, it must not pass unobserved that H. T. Flint
in arguing that the problem of human freedom lies untouched
by the developments of modern physics, makes a concession
which is much larger than he seems to have realized. He says,
"What the new principle does is point out to the 'die-hard*
determinist that there is nothing in physics which makes the
idea of free will absurd. That is, Flint concedes that
modern developments in physics have removed any barriers that
the older science of physics has formerly seemed to have im-
posed on the doctrine of free human choice. What more could
philosophy of religion ask? The positive evidence for free
will, such as there is, lies in another realm, that of con-
sciousness and an av/areness of moral responsibility. It has
never been supposed by any philosopher of religion that physics
could furnish any positive evidence, or at least not very
much. It has not been for lack of positive evidence that
faith in freedom of the human will has languished. Positive
evidence for all items of religious faith has always been
1. Flint, UPMP, 746

125 .
scarce. If that were not so, they would not be items of
faith. But in the case of freedom, the difficulty has been
the intolerable weight of negative evidence that natural sci-
ence has been supposed to have furnished. If that has now
vanished, the importance of the event can scarcely be exag-
gerated. In this case the removal of negative evidence is
tantamount to the placing of the proposition in question on
a level where it may freely be believed and accepted.
Fifth, it is far from certain that the indeterminacy
that is brought to light in the experiments of modern physics
is the result simply of poor tools, awkward procedure, and
the predicament of observation. This point drives at the
heart of the question of whether indeterminacy is phenomenal
or ultimate. It is uncritically assumed on the part of many
commentators that the indeterminacy is fully accounted for
by the assumption that the observer is not a part of the de-
terminate system of cause and effect and that when he, as an
outsider, interferes with it, he disturbs it and renders the
whole process uncertain and unpredictable, whereas prior to
such disturbance the system was in perfect working order and
perfectly predictable. There are several assumptions in this
viewpoint well worthy of close examination. But the point
that must have our attention now is this one: If indetermi-
nacy is thus to be accounted for, what bearing has the space-
time discussion on the problem? To assume that indeterminacy
is a result of the predicament of observation is to assume not
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only that causation is real but that time and space, as sepa-
rate entities, are real also. But Heisenberg says that this
is impossible. Of course, Heisenberg may be mistaken, but if
so, it is not our interpretation of Heisenberg that is in
error but Heisenberg. In other words, although Heisenberg
will not say that indeterminacy is ultimate, he does say that
under the quantum theory one must choose "entweder Raum-Zeit-
schreibung Oder Kausalitat . The reason for this is clear
from Heisenberg’s original statement back in 1927. In fact
he introduced his article in Zeitschrift fur Physik with a
discussion of the space-time problem in modern physics. He
pointed out that quantum mechanics finds space discontinuous
and that to speak of a velocity of a particle at a given point
is meaningless since at least two points in the path of the
particle must be found before the particle can be said to have
any velocity. As far as quantum mechanics is concerned, then,
mass, location, and velocity are inseparable and may be dis-
tinguished from each other only in abstraction as one distin-
guishes between the shape and the color of an orange. Mr.
Heisenberg concludes:
Wir haben also guten Grund, gegen die kritiklose
Anwendung jener Worte "Ort" und "Geschwindigkeit"
Verdacht zu schopfen. Wenn man zugibt, dasz fur
Vorgan^e in sehr kleinen Raumen und Zeiten Diskon-
tinuitaten irgendwie typisch sind, so ist ein Ver-
sagen eben der Begriffe "Ort” und "Geschwindig-
keit" sogar unmittelbar plausibel.^
1. Heisenberg, PPQT, 49.
2. Heisenberg, Ual, 173. "We thus have good reason to be sus-
picious of the uncritical use of both words, location and
velocity. If one concedes that discontinuities are typical
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It begins to appear that the Heisenberg principle brings
to light something far more fundamental than simply a problem
of awkward methods of observation. It brings to light the
fact that physical science is now favoring a view that it does
not dare to announce as definitely established: namely, that
physical reality consists of "particles” which are points in
space-time in rapid movement, and that in this space-time real-
ity there is an inherent uncertainty, caused perhaps by the
discrete nature of space. It is the contemplation fo such pos-
sibilities as this, at least, that gives rise to a faith in
objective uncertainty. This is the view of Erwin Biser:
It would follow from our reflections that the laws
of quantum mechanics exhibit fundamental linkages
in nature and that the uncertainty relations repre-
sent something very fundamental. The formulation
of these is independent of the disturbance produced
by the act of measurement and the indeterminacy is
not to be attributed to the perturbation incident
to the process of observation. As evidence of this
view, one may cite the intimate connection of the
uncertainty principle with the phenomena of radio-
active disintegration—these natural processes are
surely Independent of the act of measurement
.
In the same connection Mr-. Biser gives three arguments for his
belief in the metaphysical reality of uncertainty, as follows:
1. The recoil of the photon in momentum measurement is in
quantum phenomena as well as in observation.
2. The matrix method involves uncertainty and can account
for it.
in very small spaces and times anyway, then a denial even
of the concepts, position and velocity, is immediately
plausible.
"
1. Biser, DRS, 524.
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3. Discreteness of space, or what he calls the "cellular
character of space," can account for uncertainty. 1
Likewise P. A. Lindemann arrives at this conclusion:
It is important to make clear that these errors
are intrinsic and not the result of human falli-
bility. They are a necessary consequence of the
fact that a physical determination involves a re-
action between the thing to be measured and the
agent used to measure it. No method can be de-
vised, no physical process is thinkable, that will
enable one to avoid the uncertainty.^
Those who insist on proof will be disappointed in this
discussion. Nothing is proved. But shall familiar notions of
cause and effect be retained merely because they are familiar?
Or shall we choose to accept as probable that interpretation
of the universe that seems most in harmony with observed phe-
nomena? It must be conceded that most thinkers object to
ultimately real uncertainty. They object to it on the ground
that Heisenberg’s principle does not prove it. That point is
met with the assertion that proof is not what we are pretend-
ing that we have, or seeking for, or ever expect to find. We
are dealing--as the physicists are not--in the area of phi-
losophy of religion. But the assertion made here is simply
this: Objective uncertainty in our universe most clearly
brings into harmony the physics and the philosophy of religion
of our day and neither science nor philosophy has adequate
ground for valid objection to it.
Sixth, there is no real meaning in the attempt to draw
1. Cf. Biser, DRS, 524. 2. Lindemann, PSQT, 38
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any distinction in this case between the phenomenal world
and the world of ultimate reality. Sometimes this distinc-
tion is valid and indispensable. This is so whenever one
science or one area of human research and questioning is re-
quired to make assumptions and operate within a framework
that is altogether too restricted for some other science or
some other area of human research and investigation. Thus,
for the second science the results of the first science are
"phenomena." For example, the doctrine of absolute causation,
which has been an operational axiom of most physicists in the
past, has always been in the realm of "phenomena" for most
psychologists who made no such assumptions. And correspond-
ingly the discoveries of the laws of learning and ethical
principles, etc., were "phenomena" to most biologists because
they were based on the assumption of human freedom which phys-
ics could not comprehend and to which it could ascribe no
meaning. The assertions of metaphysics, therefore, are not
primarily assertions about metaphysical reality; primarily
they are assertions that are believed to have meaning and
to be acceptable to all branches of human investigation.
Secondarily whatever is found to be true and meaningful for
all investigations is thought to be true for ultimate reality.
In the particular case of the uncertainty principle
of modern physics, it is a little hard to see v/hat meaning is
to be attached to the assertion that it is true for phenomena,
but may not be asserted as true for ultimate reality. That
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would appear to mean that some science or other cannot get
on with its work if this assertion is made. But the ques-
tion arises, what science? If physics can dispense with it,
what science is left that needs it? Those who demand its re-
tention do so apparently because they believe that physics
will be needing it in the future again. Perhaps so, but sure-
ly the burden of proof is on those who think so, if the lead-
ers among younger physicists now see no such need. Heisen-
berg believes that the "Ungultigkeit "1 of the causal law is
definitely established. As long as metaphysicians are willing
to revise their ideas of ultimate reality as the enlargement
of man's experience requires, there should be no objection to
their assertion that at any given time, whatever may be agreed
upon as working hypotheses of all sciences may be said to de-
scribe reality itself.
This is another way of saying what John H. Van Vleck
has said, although his mood is quite different:
Metaphysicians can argue whether nature inherently
lacks determinism, or is instead completely deter-
ministic. With the latter view, the ambiguity in-
volved in the uncertainty, or the apparent break-
down of the law of cause and effect is to be con-
sidered as arising only by virtue of .the "spoiling"
by the experimentation. It is in a certain sense
a meaningless question which view is correct, as
the properties of nature that are inherently in-
capable of observation have no real significance .
^
3. That the area of indeterminacy is too small.
The third objection that is raised against the idea
1. Heisenberg, Ual, 197.
2. Van Vleck, Enc . Brit ., XXII, 680
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that the uncertainty principle renders human freedom accept-
able is found in the size of the fraction in the mathemat-
ical formula in which Heisenberg gives expression to indeter-
minism. The fraction, it may be remembered, was 6.61 over
1027 . A denominator with twenty-seven zeros after the digit
makes an exceedingly small fraction. No one can deny this.
What this fraction says is that prediction of position and
velocity of electrons is possible in all but this tiny realm
of space and time, expressed in terms of erg-seconds. In
other words, if one wished to locate the position or discover
the velocity more accurately than
6.61
of one erg-second, he would find the task impossible.
There are those who feel that any uncertainty that is
as tiny as this is negligible and any metaphysics based upon
it is groundless and absurd. John H. Van Vleck does not say
this; it is not clear that he implies it. But he does empha-
size the minuteness of the area of uncertainty, as noted be-
fore:
Because h is so small, the indeterminism caused
by the uncertainty principle is of no consequence
in our ordinary experience. For instance, the re-
sulting error in the position or velocity of a rifle
bullet would be completely inconsequential even
for the most refined, ballistic calculation.
. .Be-
cause of this the law of cause and effect ceases
to apply, though the ambiguity is. of course, im-
portant only on the atomic scale.
1
1. Van Vleck, Enc . Brit
., XXII, 679-80.
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This discussion raises the slippery question of how
large an uncertainty area has to be before it may make human
freedom possible. There is, of course, nothing in human ex-
perience to give us any intelligent answer to this question,
at this time. But this may be pointed out: A degree of in-
determinacy that is too small to appear at all under the
operation of chance might show up quickly and easily under
the operation of intelligence. For example, let us suppose
that a cart with four wheels is so constructed that it is
made to go straight ahead and is devoid of any steering de-
vice. Turned loose at the top of a hill it will roll down
the hill in a straight line and finally come to rest at the
same spot or nearly the same spot in every one of a dozen or
twenty or a thousand experiments. Let us say that whatever
differences there may be in the places where the cart stops
may be accounted for by (1) the unevenness of the ground,
(2) the play of the wheels on the axle, especially of the
front wheels, and (3) the blowing of the wind. Wow let us
suppose that a person rides this cart down the hill and he
wishes to steer the cart as far to the left as possible. He
waits for a moment when the wind is blowing from the right.
He places his cart in such a way that whatever hummocks may
be in the course will rise to his right and thus throw his
cart to the left. As he starts down the hill he holds his
foot against the front wheel so that whatever play there is
will cause him to veer to the left. By such means as these
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he may be able to land his little wagon many yards to the
left of where the cart always stopped when it descended the
hill unguided by human intelligence. Yet the contingency
in the first instance was very small and the area of human
freedom in the second was the same. This is by way of say-
ing that intelligence has ways of magnifying enormously the
results of the undetermined areas of life. This is because
under chance there is a cancellation process at work wherein
one set of chance results tends to offset another set of
chance results and the result of the process is such as near-
ly to conceal the fact that there is any chance operating at
all. Thus when the cart rolled down the hill by itself the
number of little hummocks that caused the cart to move to
the left was about equal to the number of little hummocks
that caused the cart to move to the right. The play in the
front wheels sometimes resulted in the cart going to the
left, and sometimes to the right, etc. But under intelligence
these contingencies are controlled to a large extent and the
calcellation process is reduced to a minimum.
The fact that our everyday world of houses and trees,
earth and sky, people and machines, can all be reduced to a
world of particles within electrons is so startling to modern
man that he frequently fails to grasp the fact that what the
physicist is talking about is not some far away heavenly body,
but the very bread on his plate and the chair on which he sits,
not to mention his own body. Quantities that are so small
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they have no meaning for every day living may have very real
meaning for the scientist dealing in quantum mechanics. And
if they have very real meaning for the scientist, they may,
when properly understood, turn out to have real meaning for
every day living after all.
Let us illustrate this.
Suppose an electron (mass of 9.11 x 10~28 gram) is to
be given a velocity of one centimeter per second. A force
— ?R
which would do this in one second would be 9.11 x 10 dyne.
_
on
Its momentum would then be 9.11 x 10 gram- centimeter per
second or 9.11 x 10" 28 dyne-second. If its average position
during this process were to be described as being one centi-
meter from a given origin, the product of its momentum and
position would be 9.11 x 10-28 erg-second. But Heisenberg
says that this product must be uncertain by at least 6.61
x 10” 27 erg-second which is over seven times the measure-
ment of the event itself. In other words the figure sought
could be as much as seven times the size it is, and still be
impossible to find.
The area of uncertainty is indeed small. But a bil-
lionth of an inch multiplied a billion times is the same size
as a tenth of an inch multiplied ten times. If this tiny area
of uncertainty is so located that conscious purpose can con-
trol it, not a few times, but many millions of times through
a process that is itself unconscious but directed to an end
that is conscious, then it is not impossible that so minute
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an area of indeterminacy may permit the events which we be-
lieve to be described by the words, freedom of human choice
in the physical world.
No one has ever denied that the limitations on human
freedom are very great. If a man jumps from a high cliff
with the intent of taking his own life and half way down
changes his mind, his new purpose is of no avail. If a man
wishes to eat everything he desires and yet keep in perfect
health and vigor, his freedom is strictly limited. The whole
question of how an impulse in the consciousness takes form
and expresses itself first in the brain cells and then in the
muscles of the body is shrouded in mystery. The uncertainty
principle throws little or no light on this. But the great
triumph for philosophy in the Heisenberg principle is that
the sharp contrast between a totally determined world of phys-
ical reality on the one hand and a supposedly free world of
human consciousness on the other is now destroyed and a way
of uniting the two worlds without violence to either is now
a possibility. And every philosopher has known all along
that these two worlds must somehow be united; but the free-
domists were unwilling that it should be accomplished by
casting freedom away.
4. That determinism may be non-physical.
The last objection to human freedom is raised by those
who assert that the Heisenberg principle is irrelevant to the
problem of human freedom, not because they deduce this from

an examination of quantum mechanics, but because they come to
this conclusion from an examination of human freedom itself.
They are quite willing to grant that indeterminism prevails
in the realm of physics. To their way of thinking the prin-
ciple of determinism of human thought and action is indispen-
sable, but it rests not at all upon physics but rather upon
a proper understanding of human consciousness. It stands,
therefore, whatever Heisenberg may do or may not do in the
realm of quantum mechanics. Robert Whallon in his Harvard
dissertation on Metaphysical Theories of Freedom of the Will
places himself in this category when he says, ''Causation need
not be mechanistic determination.
Determinism of this variety rests on a foundation dif-
fering only slightly from the foundation on which the usual
physical determinism rests. Its defenders are aware of the
need of connections between preceding events and succeeding
events. They do not see how these events are to be related
except by a causal lav;. But this leaves out of account the
principle of approximate or practical causation which with
its notion of loose jointed connectionalism accounts for re-
lations between events quite as adequately as absolute causa-
tion.
But it is not only freedomists who oppose this variety
of spiritual determinism. A physical determinist like Wil-
liam Seifriz opposes it also.
1. Whallon, MTFW, 373

137 .
They, the inde termini s ts
,
have read into the
principles of mechanism that which never resided
there. For example: determinism is primarily
concerned with realities, sense perception, and
experiences, but it does not, therefore, preclude
thoughts which arise from a esthetic feelings...
Color, taste, music, beauty, all exist by virtue
of our perceptions. Determinism recognizes them
fully, but it does not place them in the same
category with objects which exist independent of
our act of knowing. Neither determinism nor its
child, mechanism, regards factual knowledge as
the be-all and end-all of science and philosophy
.
Here we have two varieties of determinism struggling against
each other because they both rest on the same illusion:
namely, that any real connectionalism demands absolute causa-
tion. It is in fact as difficult to conceive of this uni-
verse as absolutely determined in part and free in part, as
it was for Abraham Lincoln to reconcile himself to a nation
remaining half slave and half free. And surprisingly enough
the reasons are strikingly similar: both the universe and the
nation are fundamentally a unit and any division is arbitrary.
Thus both the thought of Seifriz and that of Whallon tend
toward a dualism which lands us at last in the Cartesian
dilemma.
Furthermore, let it be noted that if Mr. Whallon in-
sists upon the principle of causation in the spiritual realm
because he feels the need of a principle to account for re-
lations between events in that realm, he must logically insist
that it exist also in the physical realm for the same reason.
1. Seifriz, CII, 29
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Otherwise, events in the physical realm are as seriously in
need of ties and connections as were his events in the mental
realm before his insistence on causation there. And corres-
pondingly Mr. Seifriz must have some way of accounting for
connections between "aesthetic feelings." Surely these are
not entirely without connections with preceding events. But
if it is thought that these connections between events in
the mental realm can be present without any doctrine of abso-
lute causation, then the whole need for such a principle
breaks down everywhere and its necessity is seen to be an
illusion.
Every careful thinker recognizes these connections be-
tween events in time in whatever realm of human experience.
But it is the considered opinion of many that so-called de-
terminism represents an exaggeration of the truth, even as
Mr. Whitehead has said:
The causal independence of contemporary occa-
sions is the ground for the freedom within the Uni-
verse.... It is not true that whatever happens is
immediately a condition laid upon everything else.
Such a conception of complete mutual determina-
tion is an exaggeration of the community of the
Universe. . .The antecendent environment is not whol-
ly efficacious in determining the initial phase
of the occasion which springs from it. 1
There can be given no adequate reason to believe that
thoughts and purposes--events in the world of mind--are any
more closely joined together by causal connections than ex-
pansion by heat or decomposition by combustion- -events in the
13 Whitehead, AI, 255.
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world of matter. The operation of uncertainty and chance that
is found in the s econd on close examination, must surely be
found in the first also. Determinism in the world of mind is
even more difficult to defend than in the realm of matter.

CHAPTER SIX
INDETERMINACY AND CHANCE
Thus far the attempt has been to relate indeterminacy-
only to the doctrine of human freedom in this dissertation.
Now the relations between the principle of Heisenberg and the
more general problem of chance must be investigated. After
this has been done the relations of chance to freedom and to
teleology will be examined.
1. The relation of indeterminacy to chance.
Mr. Heisenberg was by no means the first man to suspect
that so-called "natural laws" are only approximately correct.
In the book, Chance. Love, and Logic
.
by Charles S. Peirce,
there is an introduction by Morris R. Cohen. Although this
book appeared in print in 1923, four years before Heisenberg* s
first article, Mr. Cohen says some things strikingly similar
to what Heisenberg is to say later. Mr. Cohen says.
Philosophers inexperienced in actual scientific
measurement may naively accept as absolute truth-
such statements as "every particle of matter at-
tracts every other particle directly as the prod-
uct of their masses and inversely as the square
of the distance," or "when hydrogen and oxygen
combine to form water the ratio of the weights
is 1:8." But to those who are actually engaged
in measuring natural phenomena with instruments
of precision, nature shows no such absolute con-
stancy or simplicity. As every laboratory worker
knows, no two observers, and no one observer in
successive experiments, get absolutely identical
results. To the men of the heroic period of
science this was no difficulty. They held unques-
tioningly the Platonic faith that nature was
created on simple geometric lines, and all the
minute variations were attributable to the fault
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of the observer or the crudity of his instruments.
This heroic faith was, and still is, a most power-
ful stimulus to scientific research and a protec-
tion against incursions of supernaturalism. But
few would defend it to-day in its explicit form,
and there is little empirical evidence to show that
while the observer and his instruments are always
varying, the objects which he measures never devi-
ate in the slightest from the simple law.-
In discussing the same question Mr. Peirce is no less
positive in his statement:
How can observation determine the value of such
quantity with a probable error absolutely nil?
To one who is behind the scenes, and knows that
the most refined comparisons of masses, lengths,
and angles, far surpassing in precision all other
measurements, yet fall behind the accuracy of bank-
accounts, and that the ordinary determinations of
physical constants, such. as appear from month to
month in the journals, are about on a par with an
upholsterer's measurements of carpets and curtains,
the idea of mathematical exactitude being demon-
strated in the laboratory will appear simply ridic-
ulous. 2
What these gentlemen are driving at is that they wish to build
up a case for the operation of chance in this universe, and
they are trying to show that laboratory science is in no posi-
tion to deny it. They do not say that science proves the
existence of chance, but only that it cannot claim to be suf-
ficiently accurate to deny it. Mr. Peirce proceeds to say,
We have reason to think there is no attar in the
lichen, because essential oils seem to be in gen-
eral peculiar to single species. If the question
had been whether there was iron in the .. .lichen,
though chemical analysis should fail to detect its
presence, we should think some of it probably was
there, since iron is almost everywhere .. .It cannot,
I conceive, be maintained that we are in any better
1. Peirce, CLL, x-xi 2. Peirce, CLL, 188
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position than this in regard to the presence of the
element of chance or spontaneous departure from law
in nature. 1
Mr. Peirce makes a distinction between regularity in
nature on the one hand and mechanical causation on the other
and contends that many observers have confusedly regarded the
evidence supporting the first as a sufficient demonstration
of the second. He denies this. In this dissertation the
same point has been made, except that we have used the terms,
rigid connectionalism and loose-,] ointed connectionalism.
Here is the wording of Mr. Peirce:
Those observations which are generally adduced in
favor of mechanical causation simply prove that
there is an element of regularity in nature, and
have no bearing whatever upon the question of
whether such regularity is exact and universal,
or not. Nay, in regard to this exactitude
.
all
observation is directly on-posed to it; and the most
that can be said is that a good deal of this ob-
servation can be explained away. Try to verify
any lav; of nature, and you will find that the more
precise your observations, the more certain they
will be to show irregular departures from the law.
We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do not
say wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we can-
not usually account for such errors in any antece-
dently probable way. Trace their causes back far
enough, and you will be forced to admit they are
always due to arbitrary determinations, or chance. 2
Mr. Peirce then proceeds to give a positive argument in
favor of a chance interpretation of this universe and con-
cludes with something of a prediction.
But I must leave undeveloped the chief of my rea-
sons, and can only adumbrate it. The hypothesis
of chance-spontaneity is one whose inevitable con-
1. Peirce, CLL, 190 2. Peirce, CLL, 190
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sequences are capable of being traced out with math-
ematical precision into considerable detail. Much
of this I have done and find the consequences to
agree with observed facts to an extent which seems
to me remarkable. But the matter and methods of
reasoning are novel, and I have no right to promise
that other mathematicians shall find my deductions
as satisfactory as I myself do, so that the strong-
est reason for my belief must for the present remain
a private reason of my own, and cannot influence
others. I mention it to explain my position; and
partly to indicate to future mathematical specula-
tors a veritable goldmine, should time and circum-
stances and the abridger of all joys prevent my
opening it to the world.
1
The writer of these words died in 1914, nine years be-
fore the book appeared. As though to accept his challenge,
Werner Heisenberg published his article on uncertainty in
Zeitschrift fur Fhysik in 1927. Quite unequivocally Dr. Heis-
enberg says, "Chance plays a great role in the events of na-
ture." 2 It is worthy of note that Charles S. Peirce was also
a physicist.
Josiah Hoyce has also written on this problem of chance
in the natural order. In a mimeographed work entitled. The
Mechanical. The Historical, and the Statistical , he contends
that practically all scientific "knowledge" is statistical
in character. He says:
You will easily recognize that the actual knowledge
of vital phenomena which science possesses is, in
the main, a statistical knowledge. It is the sort
of knowledge which the mortality tables of the in-
surance companies exemplify. We know little of the
history of individual organisms, and less of their
mechanism, but we can and do study the statistics
of groups of organisms.
3
1. Peirce, ILL, 199. 3. Hoyce, MHS, 15
.
2. Heisenberg, letter to P . M.
Hammond, October 30, 1948.
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The term tendency is, in every exact usage
which you can give it, an essentially statistical
term.... The statistical view of nature has... three
fundamental conceptions, that of an average, that
of approximation, and that of probability. 1
The average behaviour of a very large collec-
tion of irregularly moving objects has characters
which are decidedly lawful, even although the laws
in Question are what may be called laws of chance. 2
. . ./For example^/ the law of random distribution. 2
Royce then takes up the question as to whether this
statistical character of scientific knowledge is due to the
difficulty of human minds and human instruments in getting
all the information needed for non-statistical or precise
statements, or whether the statistical character of scien-
tific knowledge is not rather due to the nature of the
evoibs that actually do occur in the external world. This is
the way he states it:
If the insurance companies ,... so you may say,
...could use a sufficient knowledge of the worldY s
mechanism, they would compute the precise time when
each individual man is to die, just as the astron-
omers compute the eclipses. An almanac of mortal-
ity would take the place of the present nautical
almanac. Everybody’s funeral would be announced,
if that were convenient, years in advance; and
life insurance would appear to be a blundering
and awkward substitute for scientific prediction.
...The statistical view is a mere substitute for
a mechanical view which our ignorance makes us
unable to use, in the individual case, with suf-
ficient accuracy. Such may be your comment.^...
There is... good reason to say that not the mechan-
ical but the statistical form is the canonical
form of scientific theory, and that if we knew
the natural world millions of times more widely
and minutely than we do, the mortality tables
and the computations based upon a knowledge of aver-
ages, would express our scientific knowledge about
1 ~. Rcyce
,
MHS, 17. 3. Royce, MHS, 23-24.
2. Royce, MHS, 19-20.
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individual events, much better than the nautical
almanac would do. For our mechanical theories
are in their essence too exact for precise veri-
fication. They are verifiable only approximately.
Hence, since they demand precise verification, we
never know them to be literally true. But statis-
tical theories, just because they are deliberate
approximations, are often as verifiable as their
own logical structure permits. They often can be
known to be literally, although only approximately
true.
If this assertion is true, it tends to relieve
us from a certain unnecessary reverence for the me-
chanical form of scientific theory,... a reverence
whose motives are neither rationally nor empirical-
ly well founded. It is the merit of Charles Peirce
to have emphasized these logical considerations. 2
In 1936 Edward G-. Spaulding brought out his book, A
World of Chance . As he sees it our entire universe, includ-
ing the interplay of human minds, is "shot through and through
with contingencies." This is his statement:
That there should be, in a world that is shot through
and through with contingencies, either logic itself,
or any disclosure or apprehension of logic or of
anything else, is, then, a matter of pure chance.
These "things" are
,
else there could not be the dis-
covery, by logic
.
of the "more ultimate" non-ration-
ality of both the discovery and the logic, but they
need not be, therefore, they might not be, but since
they are, their being is not impossible.
5
When Mr. Spaulding finally gets around to consider the
work of Mr. Heisenberg, he translates him into his own terms,
and summarizes him as follows:
'What we have, then is, seemingly, two systems or
structures each of which is determined according
to specifically different laws ; the one system is
that of the -particle as a particle ; this "follows"
the laws of classical mechanics; the other system
lT Royce, MHS, 24-25
2. Royce, MHS, 25.
3. Spaulding, WOG, 107
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is that of the internal structure of the particl e;
this follows the laws of wave-mechanics. But 1 be-
tween* these two structures or systems and their
laws there is no lav; , either of classical mechan-
ics, or of wave-mechanics
,
or of any other kind,
so that the two do not in this respect form a
larger causal system or whole. The two systems
are, then, indeterministically related ... I cannot
...see that this indeterminism between two systems
is (logically) different from what I have stressed
in previous chapters as Contingency . In brief, I
maintain that this Indeterminism is but an instance
of Contingency, a special one, of course, although
in this case the Contingency may be "one-sided" or
asymmetrical.-
All of those who have followed. Heisenberg closely in
his work and agree with his conclusions, see that contingency
must operate in this universe. If anyone wishes to deny that
there is chance, he must take issue with Heisenberg, as that
is the clear meaning of his work. In fact, when he says that
"die Ungultigkeit des Kausalgeset zes definitiv festgestellt
wird," 2 it is not human freedom, of course, but chance that
he has in mind as the other alternative. Thus, also, when
he says that the search for a way back to the determinate ways
of classical mechanics is "unfruchtbar und sinnlos."^ And so
again, when he says that the exact formulation of the causal
law is not the final conclusion "sondern die Voraussetzung
falsch.' ,Zf The inference we have made—and feel to be Justi-
fied—is that of human freedom. But the inference that Heis-
enberg himself makes is that of an indeterminate universe,
or one "shot through and through with contingencies," as
1. Spaulding, WOC, 211-12
2. Heisenberg, Ual
,
197.
3. Heisenberg, Ual, 197.
4. Heisenberg, Ual, 197.

Spaulding says. We have merely carried the logic a step fur-
ther, and found freedom to be at least possible in a contin-
gent universe. If, now, we lay aside the question of human
freedom of choice, for a moment, and consider merely the
question of determinism versus contingency, many of those
who were erstwhile our opponents come over to our side. The
only ones who do not do so are those who believe that the
principle of uncertainty is merely a temporary working hypoth-
esi s in quantum mechanics that will one day be replaced by
a more fundamental principle that returns to determinate re-
lations. Yet small as this group is, it contains some well-
known people, including Max Planck and Albert Einstein. Even
P. W. Eridgman stands here:
The failure of the law of cause and effect has been
exploited by a number of G-erman physicists, who
have emphasized the conclusion that we are thus driv-
en to recognize that the universe is governed by
pure chance.-'-
As years pass and the attempts of some physicists to
reduce the uncertainty of Heisenberg to a new certainty, or
to an old certainty, come to naught, the principle of inde-
terminacy is more and more accepted as a permanent fixture
in the philosophical presuppositions of science. Along
with it comes the assumption of an element of chance in na-
ture as its most immediate consequence, if not its only one.
In the restricted realm of atomic physics, even Northrop is
able to accept this.
1. Bridgman, NVS, 448

148
It Is as If all the bricks in a building were con-
tinually shifting, and all were so organically re-
lated to each other that a change in the position
of any one, entailed an alteration in the struc-
ture of the building as a whole... Our universe is
of this character. 1
It becomes apparent that while human freedom does not
immediately follow from the principle of Heisenberg, the
operation of chance in this universe does follow from it, if
one accepts Heisenberg' s interpretation.
2. Relation of chance and freedom.
There is a great deal of unnecessary confusion about
the relation of freedom and chance. This confusion arises
out of the continued use of ambiguous terms. It may be illus-
trated by Spaulding* s discussion of freedom:
Freedom is not opposed to Determinacy, of either
kind /Logical or Causal/7
,
or is it identical with
Contingency. Freedom characterizes a situation
or a whole, "when" there is Internal Determina-
tion within certain limits, and up to certain
points, i. e., when there is either logical or
causal self-sufficiency or autonomy ; but, "when"
there is this autonomy, there is freedom from ex -
ternal determination . Freedom, then, is "always"
"freedom from, n and it is quite consistent with,
indeed, it is identical with, a specific circum-
scribed internal Determination. 2
We may perhaps bring ourselves to lay aside our objections
to Spaulding's use of the term, "internal Determination,"
meaning freedom of human choice. But when he identifies "in-
ternal Determination" with "Determinacy" and then says,
"Freedom is not opposed to Determinacy," he only deepens the
1. Northrop, SFP, 146. 2. Spaulding, WOC, 231
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ocean of chaos In which this subject is already submerged.
For if by "Determinacy , " he means that concept in the his-
tory of philosophy, then certainly it is opposed to freedom
and freedom is opposed to it. Or if, as is more likely,
he means whatever of so-called determination Mr. Spaulding
himself finds in human experience, then surely it should not
be called by the name, "Determinacy , " and thereby be identi-
fied with a viewpoint proclaimed by Spinoza, Mill, McTaggart,
and others. When, however, Mr. Spaulding says that freedom
is not identical with contingency, he is entirely correct,
of course. A world of chance does not guarantee freedom.
What, then, is the relation of chance and freedom?
What Messrs. Peirce, Spaulding, and Royce have done
for us is to describe a universe in which exact prediction
would be impossible no matter how much we knew, even if we
knew all that God himself knows. They say we have that sort
of universe, an indeterminate universe. And this is precisely
what Mr. Heisenberg is also saying. If this is accepted, it
is difficult to see how it could possibly be unrelated to
the notion of human freedom of choice. Just in proportion
as Messrs. Spinoza, Mill, Huxley, and McTaggart found it im-
possible to believe in human freedom because they were. con-
vinced that this universe is determinate, so Messrs. Peirce,
Spaulding, and Royce should find it easy to believe in hu-
man freedom because they believe it to be indeterminate. If
the absence of all real chance in our universe makes human
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freedom impossible, as the classical determini sts labored
well to demonstrate, then it follows that the presence of
real chance in our universe, renders human freedom possible
again. Every bit of contingency in this world may be thought
of as potential areas of human freedom, even those that are
now far beyond the mind of man to comprehend and direct. As
a corollary to this, the only areas of experience closed for-
ever to human manipulation are those areas where the element
of chance is absent altogether, if there are such areas, or
where the element of chance is so exceedingly small that
man' s control thereof makes no appreciable difference in the
outcome. But potential freedom is not actual freedom. Kind
is required to transform the one into the other. Chance
without conscious direction results in real uncertainty, or
accident, or luck; but chance under conscious direction re-
sults in conscious choice and opportunity. This may be ex-
pressed in a simple formula:
Chance plus mind equals freedom.
In the light of the above discussion, it is mystify-
ing to find contrary opinions confidently expressed. C. H.
Kaiser says, for example:
There is perhaps no more curious phenomenon in
current philosophizing about science than the ten-
dency to associate the concepts of "chance" and
"free will . "... "Freedom" of any sort is merely the
establishment of a zone of isolation .
^
L
1. Kaiser, PCRD, 111-12
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Futting aside the matter of how anything can be "established"
unless there is a contingency in the universe, a possibility
that is not yet an actuality, let us raise the question of
what he means by describing freedom as a "zone of isolation."
A "zone of isolation" from what? Clearly from an otherwise
determined universe, or perhaps he would prefer to say, one
type of determination or one process of determination that is
separated from other types and processes. But if this is
entered as an argument against freedom, it presupposes deter-
minism and begs the question. Furthermore, it leaves unan-
swered the question of how one type or process of determina-
tion can ever become isolated in a universe where there is no
chance.
Assuming that the natural order preceded every living
thing now present in the world, under a completely determined
order there would be no choice on the part of those living
things but to follow out the dictates of predetermined tend-
encies
. Only in case there are elements of contingency, may
freedom of choice become operative.
3. Relation of chance and teleology.
We have said that indeterminacy means the operation of
chance; and the operation of chance means the possibility of
freedom. Now what effect has this on the doctrine of teleol-
ogy? S. G. Spaulding attacks this question with vigor and
clarity
.
Teleology (Purposiveness) .. .is present "when" and
"where" there is Freedom .. .Well-recognized
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purposeful actions on the part of human "beings...
are not indeterminate; they are instances of very
specific Determinisms, so that there is an auton-
omous situation. . .Teleology
,
then, "rests on"
Freedom, and Freedom on a Discontinuity of Specif -
ic Determinisms (each autonomous) But such Dis-
continuity in turn is an instance of Contingency.
There could be, then, no Freedom and no Teleology,
if there were no Contingency, and instances of
this, but there could be Contingency and yet no
Freedom and no Teleology. 1
To be quite consistent with what has been said before we
should here again protest against the "specific Determinism,"
or discontinuous determinisms, or autonomous determinisms,
for these all mean exactly what Mr. Kaiser meant by a "zone
of isolation." But in this case there is less reason for the
protest as Mr. Spaulding clearly states that "such Discon-
tinuity in turn is an instance of Contingency." And this,
of course, is the main point.
Teleology, like freedom apparently, becomes possible
only as contingency is found in the world of human experience,
but, again like freedom, contingency does not guarantee it.
In fact, as Mr. Spaulding uses the terms, freedom and teleol-
ogy are virtually synonomous. Freedom means the purposive
use of choices offered in a chance situation. Thus freedom
always involves teleology.
But the word, teleology, is often used with a much
larger meaning than this. When it is said that the scien-
tists of the nineteenth century rejected teleology, it is not
usually supposed that what is meant is that they denied
lT Spaulding, WOC, 231-32.

human freedom. Rather It Is usually supposed that the nine-
teenth century scientists denied the existence of evidence
of any coherent general purpose in the world of nature, es-
pecially that part of nature outside qf man. Mr. Spaulding,
however, finds some evidence for this kind of teleology also.
I find that this Evolutionary Series as a whole is
of such a character that in it'there are realized,
by particulars in space and time. Causality, both
discontinuous and Continuous, Creativity or Emer-
gence, Self-Determination or Autonomy, —of quali-
tatively distinct realms pr levels,—Freedom,
—
Freedom both from limitations and from "Specifici-
ties," and Teleology or Self-Regulation. 1
But now a new and fascinating question arises: What
is the effect of the doctrine of indeterminacy and chance on
this larger view of teleology in nature? It seems clear, at
first sight anyway, that if nature in the large is trying to
express any purpose and reach any goal, then any uncertain-
ty or indeterminacy or chance found operating in the process
represents so much hesitation and faltering in that purpose.
If there is a 3-od, and he has a purpose that he is carefully
working out, then chance seems somehow out of harmony and a
liability to the realization of divine purpose.
We have probably come at last to the point that has
impressed so many philosophers of religion and caused them
to avoid the path of chance that leads to the difficulty so
clearly. They have felt that teleology in the world as a
whole was far too important an item of faith to jeopardize
1. Spaulding, WOC, 244.
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by acceptance of a belief in a world of chance. Immanuel
Kant’s ideal of a Supreme Being ("Das hochste Wesen"), 1 for
example, would never fit into Spaulding’s world of chance.
Eut note must be taken of this important point, that
the very doctrine of chance that seems to interfere with the
freedom of God is the indispensable prerequisite of the free
dora of man. Must we choose, then, between man' s freedom and
God' s freedom: This question will occupy our attention in
the next and final chapter, but here we may give an answer
subject to confirmation later. The same principle of prac-
tical or approximate causation, that preserves a world of
order and prediction notwithstanding Heisenberg’ s doctrine
of uncertainty, delivers us here again from a notion that
the world of nature is outside of the control of God. In
fact, to imagine that chance, as Heisenberg describes it
anyway, interferes with teleology in nature is to forget the
size of that denominator in the h fraction that has twenty-
seven zeros in it. Even as it can be said that for all prac
tical purposes, causation still operates even after the Heis
enberg principle is understood and accepted, so can it also
be said that for all practical purposes whatever goals the
total evolutionary process is seeking it may seek still as
far as anything Heisenberg has discovered is concerned.
The situation probably arises frequently where the
individual human free will comes in direct conflict with the
1. Kant, KrV, B669
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ongoing purpose of God as expressed in nature. When that
happens, the human purpose may usually prevail as an immedi-
ate consequence. But try as it will, the human purpose can-
not control all the consequences of its own initial act.
In the long run, then, the original human purpose will often
he reversed or modified or at least regretted and its repe-
tition avoided. There is nothing in all this to suggest
rigid determinism and nothing out of harmony with Heisen-
berg' s principle of uncertainty or with Spaulding' s world
of chance.

CHAPTER SEVEN
INDETERMINACY AND THE IDEA OF GOD
Thus far the attempt has been to show that Heisenberg’s
principle of uncertainty fits in logically with modern phi-
losophy of religion. It renders human freedom possible. It
makes way for emergence of the novel in history. It helps
make time real. Even the doctrine of chance whicti uncertain-
ty champions is, up to a point, quite acceptable to religion.
But when we come to the idea of God, what then? Can we rec-
oncile a doctrine of chance with a religious view of God?
1. Two problems arising from the doctrine of chance.
The doctrine of chance, thus far accepted, does force
upon us two difficult problems when we try to harmonize it
with a faith in God. The first problem is this: In a world
of chance is there any evidence of a supreme purpose, a di-
vine teleology, or is everything fortuitous? And the second
problem is similar: If chance destroys the law of causation,
as Heisenberg contends, then what becomes of the argument
for God as a "first cause"?
Let us look at the first problem, that of evidence for
a divine purpose in a world of chance.
In the preceding chapter, the assertion was made that
chance and teleology can be reconciled. But there teleology
referred not to general purpose throughout the universe, not
to universal purpose, or divine purpose, but to any purpose
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at all, be it ever so partial or temporary. To believe that
men may have a purpose and carry it through to completion in
a large measure is one thing; but to believe that God can
and does have a purpose and that the laws of nature are in
•harmony with that purpose and do in part express it is quite
another thing. There are those who believe that a world of
chance may make room for the first but renders the second
utterly impossible. E. G. Spaulding is such a person.
Is Evolution Progress? Yes, but only to those who,
themselves' "produced" in the evolutionary process
itself, make those assumptions, either tacitly or
explicitly, that imply this conclusion. But to the
evolutionary process itself, as a whole, neither
'‘Yes" nor "hc.^ To it, it is a matter of supreme
indifference whether such assumptions are made as
will enable one of its own products to show that
it is Progress or not. The Evolutionary Process,
as a whole , does not value: it has no interests;
it dees not make selections as to what shall be re-
garded as Instances of the good; it does not at-
tempt to order these "goods" so as to find a Sum-
mum Bonum . 1
Here is a clear statement of a partial--that is, non-universal
—purpose in operation in the universe. Mr. Spaulding does
not believe that our universe, "as a whole," reveals a pur-
pose general enough to be called universal. And in his opin-
ion such a purpose, if there were one, would not be in har-
mony with the world of chance such as he observes.
Earlier in this dissertation P. W. Bridgman was quoted
as saying, "One group will find in the failure of the physical
1. Spaulding, WOC, 267
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law of cause and effect the solution of the age-long problem
of the freedom of the will.” In this same statement, Mr.
Bridgman goes on to say, "...and on the other hand the atheist
will find the justification of his contention that chance
rules the universe. Of course, Mr. Bridgman regrets both
of these views, simply because he finds Heisenberg's prin-
ciple irrelevant to both problems. But if in spite of Mr.
Bridgman's warning one feels compelled to accept and cham-
pion the idea that Heisenberg's principle does contribute to
the solution of ,f the age-long problem of the freedom of the
will," how does he escape the other horn of the dilemma,
that "chance rules the universe"?
To begin with it is not clear that modern science
finds chance as predominant in our universe as Mr. Spaulding
does. Modern science puts much more emphasis on the idea of
order than does Mr. Spaulding. Science may have difficulty
recognizing adequately the dual ideas of order and disorder,
but it does face the truth that both facts are there demand-
ing recognition. Mr. Northrop wrestles with this.
The microscopic particles tend to produce disorgan-
ization; the macroscopic atom organization. It fol-
lows that our universe must be a mixture of macro-
scopic order and microscopic disorder. 2
To attempt to say that this universe is devoid of all order
and purpose is even more unreasonable than to assert the oppo-
site, that all is the result of an absolutely determined order.
T~. Bridgman, NVS, 451. 2. Northrop, SFP, 148.
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But the reason for the atheistic view of believers in
a world of chance, needs to be brought to the light and exam-
ined. If Mr. Spaulding sees our universe as one that makes
no attempt to "find a Summum Bonum ," can there be any doubt
in the mind of anyone what is in the back of his thinking
that causes him to feel this way? How could it be anything
other than his attempt to face the fact of evil? It is the
recognition of the "evils of a wild storm at sea, the expe-
rience of freezing and starving, or the symptoms of syphilis
or arteriosclerosis,"! it is the presence of "cancer, imbe-
cility, and earthquakes , "^ that causes men to question divine
teleology. It is hard to believe that any honest thinker
would ever question the existence of universal purpose ex-
pressed throughout this universe, if only this troublesome
problem could be solved: How can you account for evil in a
universe where a benevolent purpose reigns supreme?
This is a universe of contradictory facts, of order
and disorder, of roses and cripples. It is easy indeed to
account for order and roses on one philosophy of life; it is
likewise easy to account for disorder and cripples on another
philosophy of life. But to account for both in one coherent
philosophy of life, that is the aim of the struggle men have
made for many centuries. Nov/ that a basic natural science,
physics, has, perhaps for the first time, recognized the fact
Brightman, POR, 263. 2. Brightman, POR, 268.
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of disorder and uncertainty as something that is not acciden-
tal and superficial, but as something that is inherent and
fundamental, it may be that a system of thought somewhat akin
to that of Whitehead will now be found more acceptable alike
to natural scientists, social scientists, and religionists.
For here is the crux of the matter: How are order and dis-
order to be related?
The most promising answer available is the doctrine
of a finite God. Belief in an infinite God cannot give an
adequate account of disorder and cripples; belief in no God
at all cannot give an adequate account of order and roses.
But both sets of facts are there demanding interpretation.
Perhaps a belief in a finite God can give the answer. The
attempt will not be made to show that Heisenberg’s principle
of indeterminacy ’’proves" a finite God. No attempt was made
to show that indeterminacy "proves” human freedom, it will
be remembered. The assertion was simply that indeterminacy
"fits in" better with freedom than with determinism, that
the two viewpoints taken together give a more coherent ac-
count of human experience, or at least that indeterminacy
makes possible a belief in human free will. The same view-
point will now be urged. The Heisenberg principle does not
prove a doctrine of a finite God. But the two viewpoints
taken together do give us a consistent account of life. And
certainly indeterminacy makes possible a belief in a finite
God

We must now look for a moment at the second problem
made by the doctrine of chance in connection with a belief in
God, any belief in God. This is the argument of the first
cause, as a supposed reason to believe that there must be a
God. This is an old, old argument, rarely abandoned alto-
gether, and often relied on heavily by theists. Our atten-
tion is called to the fact that now we have ventured to be-
lieve that novelties may emerge spontaneously in our universe.
If this is possible, our critic wants to know, what is to
prevent the universe itself from emerging spontaneously? If
this could happen, then quite obviously the need of a ’’first
cause’’ disappears along with all other ’’causes,” which may
or may not be present. Some will conclude from this that the
destruction of the law of causation simultaneously destroys
all reason to believe in the existenceof God at all. More
moderate persons will suggest that it means that hereafter
persons attempting to establish the existence of God will be
wary about the use of the argument from first cause and rely
on other arguments. McTaggart has pointed this out to us.
Now, if we do not understand the nature of a cause
sufficiently to trust what our reason says about
it, the whole argument for a first cause breaks
down. If we are able to be sceptical about causes,
we shall have no right to believe that every event
must have a cause. 1
It seems curious that believers in human free will
should often accept the argument for God’s existence
from the necessity of a first cause. If human
McTaggart, SDR, 196.1
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volition is not completely determined, the law of
causality is not universally valid. And, in that
case, what force remains in the argument for a
first cause?l
It must be conceded that a strict "necessity” of a
first cause disappears in an indeterminate universe. Thus
if this argument rests on strict necessity, its unreliability
is established and it must be laid aside even as the onto-
logical argument for God has been laid aside, at least in its
ancient form. But there is a question as to whether this
need for a first cause does rest on strict necessity. It has
already been conceded that there is no strict logical necessity
for a belief in human freedom. It has been conceded likewise
that there is no strict necessity for a belief in the exis-
tence of God. Our belief in these matters does not rest on
strict necessity, but rather on coherence. We believe that
which gives us the most coherent account of man's total expe-
rience. On this basis, it is not clear that the argument
for God as a first cause of all must be abandoned.
Two qualifications on the notion of God as a first
cause must be made however. First, the indeterminist must be
careful never to say, there must be a first cause; he may say
only that it is more reasonable to believe in a first cause
than to disbelieve in one. Anything more than this is extrav-
agant and unnecessary. And second, he must not assume that
this first cause in our universe is necessarily to be identified
TT McTaggart, SDR, 210, footnote.
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with the loving heavenly Father of the Christian faith. He
may so identify them, but he may not say that they are nec-
essarily identical. Here again coherence rather than ration-
al necessity prevails.
In any case, the argument from design appears to be
stronger. The good, the beautiful, and the true are here.
They did arrive somehow. If they can be accounted for solely
on the basis of chance, well and good; but to many this seems
to be a great overemphasis on the ability of pure chance to
develop such complex achievements as the eye of a mammal,
or the Messiah of Handel. Certainly there is nothing in the
philosophy of Heisenberg that cannot be reconciled with a
belief in a universal purpose, especially if that purpose is
held by a finite being who suffers a degree of defeat at
times .
But these two problems of harmonizing a belief in God
with a world of chance seem to involve two adjustments on
the part of philosophy of religion: First, it must recognize
that the argument for God as a first cause, does not rest on
rational necessity, and, second, it must accept a belief in
a God of limited powers. Whether this belief in a God of
limited powers necessarily means a finite God, we will leave
until a little later in the discussion.
2. Brief history of the doctrine of a finite God.
The philosophical doctrine of a finite God begins
with Plato. In Plato’s account of creation he uses numerous
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phrases to indicate that God’s power was not limitless, but
strictly limited. Some of these references follow: "As the
intelligible universe was an eternal animal, he tried to make
this ^/the sensible universe^, as far as he could, similarly
perfect."-*- "...That it might be as far as possible splendid
and fair to behold."^ "And let us above all things hold,
and ever hold, that the Deity made them as far as possible
the most beautiful and the best."^ "The Deity made each in-
dividuality to harmonize with itself and mutually with all
the rest, so far as things could possibly be brought into
symmetry and proportion."^ In the Republic Plato is a little
more specific:
Let this then be one of our rules and principles
concerning the gods to which our poets and recit-
ers will be expected to conform— that God is not
the author of all things, but of the good only.
Plato clearly believed that outside of God there was another
element whi
c
v
\ he could only partially control. For Plato
this was a world of matter that was co-eternal with God and
never entirely within his control.
From the time of Plato down through the centuries al-
most up to the present time, this doctrine of a finite God
has descended through a strange line of heretics, skeptics,
and semi-atheists. Of course this description is not so
much a characterization of the doctrine as a reflection on
1. Plato, Tim.
,
rw: 4. Plato, Tim. 3, XLIII
.
2.
3.
Plato,
Plato,
Tim.
Tim.
,
XV.
,
XXVII.
5. Plato, Rep.,
,
II, 380C
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the orthodox thinkers who would not tolerate such irregular
views. There was, for example, the Gnostic, Marcion (85-
159). Dr. Brightrnan describes Marcion in these words:
There are, he taught, three fundamental powers in
the universe: (1) the loving Heavenly Father, re-
vealed by Christ but unknown previous ly--perfect
in goodness, yet limited in power by the other two
environing forces; (2) a realm of evil matter...,
ruled by the devil;... and (5) the God of the Heb-
rew Old Testament, who... forms a world out of the
devil's matter, and is finite not only in power but
also in goodness, as is evidenced by the cruelty
of his commands.
Then there was also Mani (215-276) who was the founder
of the sect of the Manichaeans.
The universe is an eternal struggle between the
force of light and the force of darkness, that
is, between spirit and matter. The realm of
light and spirit was presided over by the good
Father God, and the realm of darkness and matter
was presided over by a diabolical Ahriman. The
eternal history of the universe is that of a
struggle between these two powers... For us, the
main point is that God is not the creator of
matter, but rather its enemy.
^
An interesting defender of the idea of a finite God was
the French writer, little known today, named Pierre Bayle
(1647-1706), the author of Dictionnaire historique et critique.
*
When he wrote of Marcion and Mani and others, he defended them
and pointed out that "the doctrine of predestination held both
by the Catholic Augustine and the Protestant Calvin logically
made God the seat of the evil principle as well as of the
good."3 He therefore preferred a dualistic view of the world
1. Brightrnan, POR, 290-91. 3. Brightrnan, POR, 293.
2. Brightrnan, POR, 292.
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that would account for both good and evil.
David Hume (1711-1776) also gave utterance to the pos-
sibility of the belief in a finite God. In his posthumous
work. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion , he puts into the
mouth of Cleanthes the argument that since there is nothing
in the universe to indicate infinite power, there is no rea-
son to ascribe this attribute to the divine Being.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) rejects the finite God idea,
but he does have a very interesting observation to make on
the point. He says that his favorite argument for God, the
teleological argument, does not prove ,T einen Weltschopfer
,
dessen Idee alles unterworfen ist,"
1
but rather "einen Welt-
baumeister, der durch die Tauglichkeit des Stoffs, den er
bearbeitet, immer sehr eingeschrankt ware."^
Only since John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) has the con-
cept of a finite God had much real consideration in phi-
losophy. Mill’s writing on the question, like that of Hume,
appeared posthumously. He says, ’’The author of the Kosmos
worked under limitations," and "was obliged to adapt himself
to conditions independent of his will."^ In his book. An
Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy
,
Mr. Mill
makes a vigorous protest against calling an infinite God good.
1. Kant, KrV, B655. "A world-creator to whose idea every-
thing is subjected."
2. Kant, KrV, B655. "A world -architect
,
who would always be
greatly limited by the suitability of the stuff with which
he works."
3. Mill, TER, 177.
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He says,
I will call no being good, who is not what I mean
when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures;
and if such a being can sentence me to hell for
not so calling him, to hell I will go.
J. M. E. McTaggart (1866-1925) wrote at some length on
the point and gave a thoroughly modern exposition of the sub-
ject. He says,,
I maintain that omnipotence is incompatible
with personality, and that, since the world around
us is what it is, omnipotence is incompatible with
goodness .
^
An omnipotent God could have prevented all
the evil in the universe if he had willed to do so.
It is impossible to deny this, if omnipotence is
to have any meaning, for to deny it would be to
assert that there was something that God could not
do if he willed to do it.^
McTaggart further points out that even a small amount of evil
points the finger of evidence to a finite God just as surely
as a large amount of evil wotild.
If a man should, at the risk of his life, save all
the crew of a sinking ship but one, and should then,
from mere caprice, leave that man to sink, whom he
could easily have saved, we should say that he
acted wickedly. Nor is it necessary that a man
should do evil for the sake of evil. To desire to
attend a concert is not a desire for evil as such,
but if I killed a man in order to acquire his tick-
et, I should have acted wickedly. Now in what way
would the conduct of an omnipotent God, who per-
mitted the existence of evil, differ from the con-
duct of such men except for the worse? 4
The conclusion to which McTaggart finally comes well
illustrated the reason that orthodox religion has been so slow
1. Mill, EHP, 129.
2. McTaggart, SDR, 202.
3. McTaggart, SDR, 210.
4. McTaggart, SDR, 212.
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to accept such a view. --cTaggart concludes, "If God's moral
character is saved by limiting his power, we have no right
to be confident as to the eventual victory of those ends in
which God is interested. "1 That is, it must be conceded that
a doctrine of a finite God emphasizes his weakness in con-
trast to the view of an omnipotent God that emphasizes his
power. But a close examination of the doctrine leads one to
suspect that the supposed weakness of a finite God is more
an emotional reaction--both on the part of many of its friends,
McTaggart for example, and on the part of its enemies --than
it is an intellectual or a reasonable one. May not a finite
God be powerful far beyond man's poor power to comprehend?
To claim that God is something less than infinite in power
is scarcely to declare him weak. The notion of a God of
great power, but of something less than infinite power, is
probably a fair description of the God of Henri Bergson,
Alfred North Whitehead, and H. B. Alexander. It is certainly
a fair description of more recent thinkers who conceive of
themselves as devout believers such as Edgar S. Brightman,
John Bennett, Georgia Harkness, Radoslav Tsanoff, William
P. Montague, Robert L. Calhoun, Peter A. Bertocci, and many
more. In general it may be said that the trend in twentieth
century United States is toward a belief in a finite God,
although in Europe the trend under Karl Barth seems to be
going in the opposite direction.
T~. McTaggart, SDR
,
259.

The view of God expressed in this doctrine of a finite
God has been phrased in clear terms by Edgar Brightman:
God is personal consciousness of eternal duration;
his consciousness is an eternally actively will,
which eternally finds and controls The Given with-
in every moment of his eternal experience. The
Given consists of the eternal, uncreated lav/s of
reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated
processes of nonrational consciousness which ex-
hibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects
( qualia ) , disorderly impulses and desires, such
experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of
space and time, and whatever in God is the source
of surd evil. The common characteristic of all
that is "given” (in the technical sense) is,
first, that it is eternal within the experience
of God and hence has no other origin than God’s
eternal being; and, secondly, that it is not a
product of will or created activity. For The
Given to be in consciousness at all means that
it must be process; but unwilled, nonvoluntary
consciousness is distinguishable from voluntary
consciousness, both in God and in man. God’s
finiteness thus does not mean that he began or
will end; nor does it mean he is limited by any-
thing external to himself. Strictly we should
speak of a God whose will is finite rather than
a finite God; for even the finite God is absolute
in the sense of being the ultimate source of all
creation.
1
Especially since the rise of American democracy and
the appearance of an urge on the part of all peoples over the
earth to be free, there has arisen a desire on the part of
many men to free God from old ideas of autocratic rule and
think of him in modern terms as a leader, an example, or a
father in a democratically operated household. Under a phi-
losophy of determinism this was almost impossible. We may in-
fer determinism from the idea of an infinite or omnipotent
1. Brightman, POR, 336-37
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God. Prom this point of view the doctrine of a finite God
introduces a new relationship between God and man as Carl
Miller has observed:
The only progress possible in such a determined
society is one which was ordained from the begin-
ning of time. Progress would thus be inevitably
coupled with the existence of some sort of divine
Providence. The difference between such a Provi-
dence and a Christian conception of God is funda-
mentally that it pictures man, no longer as God’s
partner, but as his slave. -1-
The ethical virtue long claimed for atheistic humanism- -that
it challenged man to his greatest efforts--might better be
made for the belief in a finite God, for in that belief there
is considerable hope for the success of man’s best efforts,
where it is hard to see where there is any hope if there is
no God at all.
3. Indeterminacy and evil.
Under the irritating but often revealing writings of
atheists, who put forth in powerful fashion the traditional
arguments against a belief in God, modern philosophers of
religion are inclined to take evil seriously. In fact it
would appear that both theists and atheists have in the past
been remiss in refusing to recognize the need of a total view
that made due allowance for both good and evil facts. It is
difficult to see how any philosophical view in religion can
make headway in the future unless it does grasp in one coher-
ent view the contrary facts of beauty and ugliness, joy and
T~. Miller, SAR, 77.
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agony, roses and cripples. This challenge the doctrine of a
finite God is designed to meet.
A few pages back the remark was made that a God of
limited powers is not necessarily a finite God. The meaning
intended is this: A God of limited powers may mean (1) a
God who chooses to limit his own powers in the interest of
some high purpose—usually the freedom of men- -but who could,
if he so willed, exercise infinite power, or (2) a God who
does, the best he can with (a) an uncreated physical or other
set of elements outside of his nature out of which the world
including man is made, or with (b) a "given" within his own
nature which he controls in large measure but cannot eliminate
or control entirely. Pew theists today believe in an eternal
physical universe, so the real choice for theists is between
a doctrine of a God that chooses to limit his own powers and
one that cannot do other than accept the limitations imposed
on him by his own nature.
Nov; the question arises, is the indeterminacy that
Heisenberg has discovered in our universe to be thought of
as an indeterminacy that God has chosen and desires, or is
it to be thought of as an inevitable characteristic of the
nature of God? If it does not seem apparent at once, it
will become so on reflection that the answer to this question
depends on another: Are we to account for the presence of
evil in this universe on the basis of indeterminacy? If so,
then indeterminacy must be in the nature of God, or God
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becomes responsible for choosing the evil we experience.
In addition to these two alternatives, there are various pos-
sible combinations of these two points of view. Certainly
if God is an intelligent conscious being, he does exercise
some choice whether he is finite or not. Thus for example,
it is possible that God chose to make this world indetermin-
ate and thereby make human freedom possible, but did not
choose all the natural evils that such a choice entailed.
If this were the case, then God would be finite at the point
of his inability to escape from this dilemma*
As in every other problem in metaphysics, the test of
truth must be found in the coherency of the view. What inter-
pretation can we make that brings all the elements into the
best possible harmony?
To begin with, the conviction is upon us that whatever
we are to think of as contained in this "given” in the nature
of God that puts limitations on the power of God, it must be
something very similar in nature to what Heisenberg has
called "Ungenauigkeit" or "Unbestimmtheit . " It would be
unduly sweeping to say that the uncertain relations of par-
ticles in the atom constitute the whole area in the nature
of God with which he has to contend. But on the other hand
it is impossible that they are not related. They could con-
ceivably be related in any one of these ways: (1) Uncertain-
ty could be "akin" to the nature of God, (2) uncertainty could
reveal the nature of God, or (3) uncertainty could be a part
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of the nature of God. These three views are not essentially
different and do little more than reveal the difficulty in
our own minds. Eut all three do drive at a conviction.
If we are prepared to accept the presence of evil in
the world as a fact, and if furthermore we are prepared to
accept the presence of order and goodness and beauty in the
world as also a fact, then we can see at once how a concept
of a G-od with indeterminacy in his nature may help us to
%
understand the whole and put together these two apparently
irreconcilable sets of facts. It is not here claimed that
Heisenberg's discovery is the whole story. It is claimed
only that it throws light on the whole story, and reveals
the nature of the explanation that is required.
Apparently the only other alternative to the explana-
tion that is here defended is that God has chosen a universe
of uncertainty. This could be defended on grounds found in
this dissertation itself: namely, that God wants a world
where men are free, and uncertainty makes freedom possible.
But from the standpoint of philosophy of value, this choice
thrusts us into a new dilemma. Either we must say that the
presence of evil in this world is to be accounted for on a
basis quite other than the principle of indeterminacy, or
else we must find God responsible for the evil in the world.
Atheistic critics have made it abundantly clear that we have
no other choices. It is true that we are not prepared to say
that indeterminacy and that alone can be offered as a complete
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and sufficient explanation for all deserts, diseases, earth-
quakes, and feeble-mindedness. But we are prepared to say
that whatever the true explanation is finally found to be,
it will include the principle that Heisenberg has discovered
for us.
One great difficulty with traditional theistlc phi-
losophy has been its failure to deal adequately with the prob-
lem of evil. The result of this lack in philosophy has shown
up in pastoral work in the failure of the minister oftentimes
to have anything truly appropriate to say when catastrophe
strikes. Non-theists have made much of this failure and can
easily show how much more neatly their metaphysics can account
for all evil, both moral and natural. For centuries this has
been a source of bafflement to thoughtful theists, and not in-
frequently a false haven of refuge to troubled souls as well,
who have for this reason embraced atheism simply because it
gave them some explanation of their own misery.
We may very well agree with those who believe in omnip-
otent theism this far, that if G-od had to choose between the
universe as it is today and a universe in which there was no
freedom at all and goodness was thrust upon us, he would un-
doubtedly choose the one we now have, even with all its evil.
But this does not help us to escape from this problem: How
is it that in order to have indeterminacy enough for free hu-
man choice, he had also to allow freezing and burning, syph-
ilis and insanity, polio and. malformed organs of the human
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body? If God was required to choose all of these things as
necessary concomitants of human freedom, then he is finite
and not infinite, and the given with which he must work lim-
its that which he may do. This being the case, we must say
that even if God chose indeterminacy, he still did not choose
all it involved, but that he has found these elements in him-
self, an inescapable part of his own nature, and that at
least temporarily the world* s evil is in the "given" of God
of which Brightman speaks.
We therefore have two options. We may say (l) God had
no choice in this matter of indeterminacy. He found it in his
own nature. He could do no other than make man free. He could
d.o no other than create a world in which all present evils
were possible. Or we may say (2) God did have a choice. He
could have brought into existence a determinate world, in
which men are not free and from which most or all evil would
have been excluded. But such a world would not have accom-
plished his purpose in desiring a world in the first place.
He wished to develop persons, beings with something in common
with himself. In order to do this he had to have freedom of
human choice. In order to have freedom of human choice, he
had to have an indeterminate universe. So that is what he
selected. But in so doing he knew he was making possible not
only a long series of moral evils, for which man would be
responsible in his own wrong choices, but he was also making
possible a long series of natural evils, for which man could
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scarcely be held accountable. But God could not escape from
this situation, if he chose an indeterminate universe. As
man chooses which of these two options he prefers to believe
about God, he must face the fact that in either case, he is
describing to himself a God that is finite and not omnipotent.
4. Conclusion.
Throughout this entire dissertation the uncertainty
principle of Werner Heisenberg has been used to show that in
at least two respects our universe is not absolute: first,
it is not absolute since events in time are not necessarily
determined by events in preceding time, thereby making pos-
sible the emergence of the novel and the free exercise of
human will under some circumstances; and second, our universe
is not absolute because although it reveals a general purpose
for values, yet such a purpose seems not to be in unqualified
control of all events, not even of all natural events. It
may be said, therefore, that this dissertation is a case
against absolutisms. But this would be dangerous and mislead-
ing. True, we have argued against determinism and an omnipo-
tent God, and these are both absolutisms. But it is also true
that we have seen the pitfall of implying absence of all con-
nections between events in time. We have also seen the danger
of viewing the universe as controlled entirely by chance and
thereby making of intelligence itself a strange thing that
wandered by chance into a chance universe. If on the basis
of the principle of Heisenberg a universe absolutely determined
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by an omnipotent God seems strangely out of date and out of
place, on the basis of the historical progress in the reali-
zation of values a universe entirely in the control of chance
devoid of any divine power at all, and even devoid of true
norms and universal values, is quite as much out of date and
out of place. One extreme is as irrational as the other.
This dissertation, then, is not a diatribe against absolut-
isms. Rather it is a plea that extremes of absolute thought
on the one hand and utterly relativistic thought on the other
be avoided. The most characteristic thing about our universe
is also the most surprising: the twin facts of order and dis
order, of evil and love, of roses and cripples. Any thinker
who goes "all out" for absolute thought on the one band or
"all out" for unqualified relativism on the other hand will
never be able to give an adequate account of both these sets
of facts.
There is one final problem which has crept into this
discussion to which a couple of paragraphs must be devoted.
What has happened to norms and values in the universe which
we have now pictured to ourselves? Are they universal and
eternally valid or are they significant only to man and per-
haps only temporarily even to him: If we have to qualify
the power of God to preserve faith in him at all, will we
have to do the same for universal norms, and if so, what will
be the result? Let us take the principle, for example, of
the redemptive power of love. Is this supposed general
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principle valid and applicable only where it can be shown
to be so by actual demonstration, or can we say that the prin-
ciple is inherent in our universe and hence universal and
eternally valid and true? If the will of God is finite and
limited and if there is genuine contingency in our universe,
then are the principles by which God may be supposed to work
undependable and fluctuating?
In answer it may be said that Plato, who most vigor-
ously insisted on a finite God, would have replied by saying
that norms and values and "ideas” are the one sort of thing
in our universe that never change and they and they alone
give whatever permanence is to be found in all the rest* Per-
haps we should content ourselves with a point of view a little
more conservative and say that the principle of the redemp-
tive power of love is quite as universal and unaffected by
time and circumstance as, let us say, the laws of falling
bodies or the laws of learning. The laws of falling bodies,
and probably the laws of learning also, are not left un-
touched by the Heisenberg principle. Eut they still stand,
and will do so for some time to come, for anything Heisenberg
has to say against them. But the law of redemptive love, by
virtue of being more inclusive, stands in even less danger of
serious modification by the uncertainties revealed in our
physical universe.
The man of religious interests, sometimes blind to the
facts of science, usually wishes to believe that our universe
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1 3 under the complete control of a benevolent G-od with a
purpose of maintaining a world best suited to man' s highest
interest dominant throughout and unqualifiedly in control.
The man of scientific interests, sometimes blind to the facts
of religious experience, usually wishes to believe that our
universe is under the complete domination of a power whose
one purpose is regularity and order, and that this power is
unqualifiedly in control throughout all nature. But Werner
Heisenberg in forcing a revision of the second also forces a
revision of the first. It should have been clear from the
first that unqualified order meant the absence of creativity
and the impossibility of emerging novelty. It is now to be
hoped that science will yield the second, which seems impos-
sible to defend under the onslaughts of Heisenberg. It is
likewise to be hoped that religion will yield the first which
is equally Impossible to defend under the discipline of a
rigorous study of evil in this universe. When science yields
the second, an indeterminate universe is the result. When
religion yields the first, a finite God is the result. Hap-
pily these two viewpoints work together in close harmony.
A way is thereby opened for a much larger measure of
agreement between science and religion. Not only so, but a
way is also opened for a larger measure of agreement between
social scientists and natural scientists. Coherent accounts
of total human experience thus become easier and the accom-
plishments of metaphysics move on another step.
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The general problem of this dissertation has been
that of discovering how religion and physics may properly
be related. This tends toward the still more general prob-
lem of how any metaphysics is possible at all. But the
effort to limit this is made and the problem is restricted
in scope to a study of Heisenberg’s principle of indetermi-
nacy and its bearing on three issues in philosophy of reli-
gion, as follows: The freedom of human will, chance, and a
finite God.
The method adopted in this study is to place a brief
historical survey of each problem beside the opinions ex-
pressed by Dr. Heisenberg revelent to the point as well as
analyses of the uncertainty principle, and try to discover
principles that would hold true in all instances. It was
recognized from the first that such a procedure would not
constitute proof of the truth of the conclusions--at least
not "proof" as the scientist uses the term. But the conten-
tion is made that if there is ever to be any metaphysics at
all, it can be formulated only by this very procedure extend-
ed over many areas of human experience. Conclusions are
reached, therefore, in the confidence that a contribution
is thereby made not only to these specific problems in the
philosophy of religion, but also to the general problem of
metaphysical reality.
The research was based on the written works of Werner
Heisenberg, only one of which has ever appeared in English.
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These writings include his first article in Zeitschrift fur
Physik in 1927, and five books written between 193C and
19^3. In the research three things were sought: First,
any direct references to freedom, chance, and G-od, and any
references to such companion notions as causation and will;
second, a clear understanding of the uncertainty' relation,
as Heisenberg expounds it, and especially how he relates it
to discrete space and time and why he believes as strongly
as he does that absolute causation is forever banished from
scientific thought; and third, hew Heisenberg answers his
critics who think that his conclusions are not justified by
the actual data before him.
The conclusions to which this investigation has led
are as follows:
First, although often glossed over, before Heisenberg
there was a real conflict between the supposed requirement
of natural science that the physical world be regarded as
determined and the supposed requirement of religion and
social science that the world of conscious persons be re-
garded as free and as containing elements uncaused by pre-
vious events or conditions. This conflict is now resolved.
Mr. Heisenberg has shown not only that physics does not
require an absolute cause-and-effect relation between events
but also that it could assign no meaning to it even if it
were insisted on.
Second, the traditional concept of a universe governed
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by law and operating in an orderly and predictable manner
still stands because the area of uncertainty is exceedingly
small and under the operation of chance there is a natural
cancellation process at work, so that in the macroscopic
order the uncertainty is concealed altogether. This prin-
ciple has been given in this dissertation the name of prac-
tical or approximate causation.
Third, a long series of tiny contingencies, con-
cealed entirely in the natural cancellation process that
takes place under the operation of chance, takes on a very
different character when that same series operates under
the control of intelligence. Far great divergence appears.
Events that were easily predictable under chance, become
unpredictable under the control of human mind. The wagon
that rolls down the hill by itself stops at about the same
place every time. That same wagon guided by a human occu-
pant will come to rest at the bottom of the hill at a great
many different places in as many experiments. The area of
chance is thus the area of potential freedom of human choice.
Fourth, the champions of the doctrine of chance now
receive support from the Heisenberg principle. Chance must
now be conceived not as man 1 s ignorance of causes, but
rather as an element of uncertainty and inexactness in the
causal process itself. Chance is real. However, it may
be doubted whether this element of chance is large enough
to account for the facts of "design." The element of order
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is still far larger than the element of disorder.
Fifth, any metaphysics that adequately accounts for
the twin facts of order and disorder, of contingency and
purpose, must find some middle ground between an infinite
and omnipotent God on the one hand and an atheistic dis-
belief in God altogether on the other hand. A God that in
some sense is finite, or one with a finite will, is the
only tenable answer.
The work of Werner Heisenberg makes possible such
a reconciliation of religion and physics, not merely in
spirit and motive, but in actual thought and presupposi-
tions, as has not previously been possible since the work
of Thomas Aquinas
.
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